The Silent Arms Race: The Role of the Supercomputer During the Cold War, 1947-1963 by Kirsch, David Warren




The Silent Arms Race: The Role of the
Supercomputer During the Cold War, 1947-1963
David Warren Kirsch
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the Asian History Commons, European History Commons, History of Science,
Technology, and Medicine Commons, and the United States History Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu, ccmiddle@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation


























THE SILENT ARMS RACE:  
























THE SILENT ARMS RACE: THE ROLE OF THE SUPERCOMPUTER DURING THE 









A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
Of the requirements for the degree of 
















David Warren Kirsch 
University of Arkansas 
Bachelor of Arts in History, 1992 
University of Arkansas 
Bachelor of Arts, Criminal Justice, 2001 
University of Arkansas 













 One of the central features of the Cold War is the “Arms 
Race.” The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
republics vied for supremacy over the globe for a fifty-year 
period in which there were several arms races; atomic weapons, 
thermonuclear weapons and various kinds of conventional weapons. 
However, there is another arms race that goes unsung during this 
period of history and that is in the area of supercomputing. The 
other types of arms races are taken for granted by historians 
and others, but the technological competition between the 
superpowers would have been impossible without the historically 
silent arms race in the area of supercomputers. The construction 
of missiles, jets as well as the testing of nuclear weapons had 
serious implications for international relations. Often 
perception is more important than fact. Perceived power 
maintained a deterrent effect on the two superpowers. If one 
superpower suspected that they, in fact, had an advantage over 
the other then the balance of power would be upset and more 
aggressive measures might have been taken in various fronts of 
the conflict, perhaps leading to war. Due to this, it was 
necessary to maintain a balance of power not only in weapons but 
in supercomputing as well. Considering the role that the 
computers played, it is time for closer historical scrutiny. 
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The topic of this dissertation is somewhat obscure. Few 
historians have taken on the subject of computer technology 
preferring to leave it to those in the field of computer 
scientists. In fact, in earlier works I was criticized for doing 
what was in the realm of that discipline. So in order to pursue 
my academic interests I have often had to present arguments as 
to how technology pertains to history and why it is important to 
examine in an academic environment. Considering the difficulty 
of creating justifications for my work I have some people I 
would like to thank. 
 First, is my dissertation advisor Alessandro Brogi who has 
shown considerable patience while I completed this work. He also 
deserves sole credit for showing me a new way of looking at the 
history of the Cold War. Typically the Cold War is taught from a 
purely American perspective and so the information presented 
does not differ from any American history course. Professor 
Brogi changed this for me by widening the scope of events 
outside of the United States and to consider the impact of the 
Cold War upon other nations.  
 Second, to be thanked are my early mentors in my academic 
career. Professors Donald W. Engels, Evan Burr Bukey, William F. 
Tucker, James S. Chase, and Lynda L. Coon who took a personal 
interest in me as a younger man and in their teachings uncovered 
my potential to be a student of history. To add to this are 
Professors Douglas James Adams, Gordon D. Morgan, Steven Worden, 
and Libby Newman who added to my academic repertoire by 
introducing me to the discipline of Sociology and sharpening my 
thinking about the world around me.  
 Third, my colleagues Scott Cashion, David Schieffler, Chet 
Cornell and especially Dr. Warren Paul Waren who have helped me 
often and have listened to me prattle on about this subject for 
several years and contributing their insights.  
 Finally, I want to thank my parents and my family for 
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“Russia is sure to learn how to make the atomic bomb. I think 
Stalin has inherited Hitler’s ambition for world dictatorship. 
One must expect a war between U.S.A and U.S.S.R.” 
      -John von Neumann, 1945 
 
“The IBM Company owes half its money to Johnny von Neumann.” 




The Silent Arms Race 
 
The central feature of the Cold War was the “Arms Race.” 
The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
vied for supremacy over the globe for a fifty-year period in 
which there were several arms races: atomic weapons, 
thermonuclear weapons and various kinds of conventional weapons. 
However, there was another arms race that goes unsung during 
this period of history and that is in the area of 
supercomputing. The other types of arms races are taken for 
granted by historians and others, but the technological 
competition between the two superpowers would have been 
impossible without the historically silent arms race in the area 
of supercomputers. The construction of missiles, jets, as well 
as the testing of nuclear weapons had serious implications for 
international relations. Often perception is more important than 
fact. Perceived power maintained a deterrent effect on the two 
superpowers. If one superpower suspected it had an advantage 
over the other then the balance of power would be upset and more 
aggressive measures might have been taken in various fronts of 
the conflict, perhaps leading to war. Due to this, it was 
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necessary to maintain a balance of power not only in weapons but 
in supercomputing as well. 
Even before the Cold War it was apparent that computing had 
an important role to play. The onset of the digital age of 
computing was on the horizon, but not too far in the future. 
During the mid to late 1920s Vannevar Bush’s Differential 
Analyzer was the first step on the road of high-speed computing, 
creating mechanized methods for solving differential equations 
that were specific for targeting of weaponry. In the 1930s in 
Great Britain, Alan M. Turing wrote his now famous paper; On 
Computable Numbers. From this paper the well-spring of 
supercomputing emerged. Other men such as: Konrad Zuse, J. 
Presper Eckert, John Mauchly and Howard Aiken turned Turing’s 
abstractions into machines of cold steel that were capable of 
practical applications and thus contributing to the outcome of 
the Second World War. Some of these same men would contribute to 
the outcome of the Cold War as well. 
Another feature of the Cold War was the notion of grand 
geopolitical strategies such as “Containment” authored by George 
Kennan or “Rollback” as enunciated in NSC 68. The grand 
strategies of Kennan, Paul Nitze his successor at the State 
Department’s policy planning staff, as well as others are well 
documented. Their authors showed their brilliance and ingenuity 
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in thinking about the post-war world. However, their theories 
were “soft” lacking the hard realities that those selfsame 
theories needed in enforcement. One cannot have in diplomacy 
what they do not own on the ground. This is something that 
Stalin was best aware of. In other words the grand strategies on 
both sides had to be tied directly to the computers and weaponry 
that were available to them. There also had to be a means of 
predicting the moves of an enemy without actually being privy to 
mental rationale of said enemy. Mathematicians John von Neumann 
and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 gave a modern enunciation to Game 
Theory, which produced predictive models that had economic 
applications. Certain “games,” most notably the “Prisoner’s 
Dilemma,” had military applications. The “Dilemma” was best 
suited to the possibility of thermonuclear conflict. This 
mathematical scheme was more pertinent and durable than any 
grand strategy created during the Cold War  
By the time of George Kennan’s strategy of Containment the 
armed forces of the United States had invested heavily in 
supercomputing. But with the end of the Second World War there 
was a serious question as to just whether or not the military 
establishment would continue on this path. The Electronic 
Numerical Integrator and Computer or ENIAC was America’s first 
entry into digital computing. It represented a leap in 
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supercomputing over the analog methods utilized in Bush’s 
machines that were at military installations such as the 
Aberdeen proving grounds. Speed was the ultimate measure of 
scientific computing and the fact that ENIAC performed fast 
calculations was enough to justify military investment during 
wartime. ENIAC however was not fully completed to aid in the war 
effort. By 1945, considering that there were no concrete 
hostilities on the international scene justifying such 
investment the need for high-speed computing became questioned. 
It was after the Soviets became more aggressive in Eastern 
Europe that the importance of a larger atomic force became 
apparent. Because of the further need for a nuclear deterrent, 
the armed forces had to make even heavier investments now into 
digital computing. From this investment came a series of 
Princeton Class Computers such as EDVAC, IAS, IBM’s SSEC, 
ILLIAC, MANIAC and ORACLE among others. All of these 
supercomputers were devoted to increasing the U.S. arsenal which 
in these early days of the Cold War grew to roughly 200 plus 
atomic bombs. This was before the Soviet Union had tested their 
first atomic device. 
The Soviets had arrived late to the supercomputer race, 
partly for ideological reasons. In the Soviet Union science had 
been subordinated to ideological justifications during the 1920s 
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and 1930s. This was all well and good until the country felt the 
need to counter the U.S. atomic arsenal. Stalin had been 
notified of the existence of the atomic bomb in a roundabout 
manner at the Potsdam Conference. He in actuality knew about the 
Manhattan Project due to the mature Soviet espionage efforts. In 
light of this, Stalin committed the U.S.S.R. to “practical 
math.” In turn, Sergei Lebedev, a brilliant engineer created the 
Soviets first digital computer; the MESM in 1948. Not 
surprisingly in the following year the Soviets first atomic test 
occurred successfully. This is not to say that the U.S.S.R. was 
fully committed to supercomputing. There were still many 
bureaucratic hurdles to overcome and this was partially what 
created a “Supercomputer Gap” in favor of the West. 
In light of international events in Turkey, Greece and 
China, George Kennan’s policy of Containment was subjected to 
political criticism and found to be wanting. Thus the Truman 
Administration found the need for a new grand strategy more 
suited to combat Soviet aggression. The idea of rolling back the 
Soviets came to fruition in NSC 68, authored by Paul Nitze. The 
increase in the military budget opened a clear path for further 
supercomputing efforts in the United States. But the United 
States was not the only power developing supercomputers. In 
Great Britain Alan Turing, who had worked on decryption efforts 
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during the Second World War with Colossus; the first 
programmable computer, was developing his ACE computer and 
asking some philosophical questions about computing and 
intelligence that would characterize the academic treatment of 
computing efforts for all times.  
During the same time in the U.S. an outcropping of the 
Airforce came into existence. Project RAND was created as a 
think-tank for military strategies. The project’s analysts 
subjected geopolitical strategies to mathematical analysis, 
which created further needs for supercomputing beyond encryption 
and nuclear calculations. For this RAND analysts consulted John 
von Neumann about their particular needs for high-speed 
computing, which led to the creation of RAND’s JOHNNIAC. The 
work done at RAND was complex and its results were at times 
prescient, RAND by creating solutions to complex problems RAND’s 
credibility rose. The benefits of these calculations were for 
the United States alone, as the country perfected its own 
deterrent, leaving its allies around the globe vulnerable to 
attacks despite solemn commitments from Washington. 
Because the interests of the United States were paramount, 
the Air Defense System Engineering Committee was created to 
discuss defense strategies. The committee understood that the 
U.S. was vulnerable to first strikes and that new automated 
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defenses would have to be developed. To this end, Project 
Whirlwind was initiated. The project was ambitious and called 
for stringent and specific calculating abilities for optimum 
computerized self-sufficiency. This meant that the priority was 
to have the minimum amount of human labor to interact with the 
computer. During the same period the atomic phase ceased gave 
way to the thermonuclear age. At this point, there was no 
alternative to supercomputers. Thermonuclear calculations were 
too complex for human efforts alone and so the supercomputer was 
now a hard necessity for national and international security. 
This was made even more so by the incoming Eisenhower 
Administration’s policies. 
President Eisenhower created a geopolitical strategy of 
Massive Retaliation relying heavily on thermonuclear arsenals. 
He was able to use the policy as a “bluff” to deter Soviet 
aggression. At the same time, his policy had an economic 
component, which would bring Cold War military spending in line 
with fiscal responsibility. In short, missiles were cheaper than 
conventional forces. But to have more missiles more 
supercomputers would be necessary. Eisenhower also used covert 
operations to ensure security. Supercomputers had their roles to 
play in this as well. For example, in 1954 computerized means of 
translation from Russian to English had been implemented 
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creating an inroad for new information about Soviet activities. 
Furthermore, U.S. allies were aided by companies such as IBM to 
create infrastructures for their countries as well.  
In the Soviet Union a political power vacuum was left in 
the wake of Stalin’s death in 1953. Although Stalin had granted 
Soviet supercomputing efforts his blessing, his successors went 
even further, accelerating the nation’s scientific work. Nikita 
Khrushchev, Lavrenti Beria and Nikolai Bulganin all had ties to 
computing circles in the Soviet Union and supported those 
projects whole-heartedly. Two large supercomputing projects were 
initiated creating both the BESM and the Strela I. In 1955 
Sergei Lebedev, who created the BESM, and his chief rival, Iurii 
Bazilevskii, who created Strela I attended the International 
Federation for Information Processing conference held in 
Darmstadt, Germany. The event put the world on notice of Soviet 
Supercomputing achievements. The Soviets could not be seen 
trailing the West in this area. Soon the Soviets had in their 
arsenal not only the BESM and Strela but also the M-1, M-2, M-3, 
SESM and other systems, and with each computer came an increase 
in nuclear strike capability and the development of other 
advanced weaponry. 
In 1957 the United States lost John von Neumann to cancer. 
The man who had helped create a durable computer architecture 
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and formed the mathematical basis for managing nuclear conflict 
was gone. His legacy, however, would live on for the remainder 
of the Cold War. In that same year, on October 4
th
 the Soviets 
launched the first artificial space satellite, Sputnik, causing 
panic in Washington D.C. and giving rise to one on the largest 
myths of the Cold War, namely the “Missile Gap.” New agencies 
such as the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) invested 
heavily in supercomputing projects. Furthermore, the National 
Defense and Education Act produced a generation of scientists 
and engineers who worked in defense projects of all kinds. 
There was a “silver lining” during 1957. Project Whirlwind 
culminated in IBM’s Whirlwind II supercomputer, which powered 
S.A.G.E., the Semi Automatic Ground Environment system. SAGE was 
an early warning system, which covered the U.S. and part of 
Canada, alerting and directing military forces in case of 
attack. SAGE was a model of self-sufficiency, which marginalized 
human labor to respond to attack conditions more efficiently. 
Defense was now handled by machine calculation rather than 
exclusive human interactions. For the next 26 years SAGE was our 
defensive eyes and ears. However, the Soviets countered with the 
M-4, M-4m, M-20, M-40, and Setun, the first tertiary logic based 
supercomputer. The supercomputer arms race was becoming very 
competitive by the end of the Eisenhower Administration. 
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 John F. Kennedy, the incoming president, appointed Robert 
Strange McNamara his Secretary of Defense to do a study on the 
“Missile Gap.” It was then that Kennedy understood that the gap 
did exist but in favor of the United States. Despite U.S. 
strength a series of foreign policy failures on the part of the 
Administration may have allowed the Soviets to become more 
aggressive. On the other hand Khrushchev may have also acted out 
of a feeling of insecurity. Whatever his rationale the Soviet 
actions were hostile.   
In 1962 when the Cuban Missile crisis erupted von Neumann’s 
construct was put to the test. Khrushchev broke from von 
Neumann’s rational position in the Prisoner’s Dilemma in order 
to cow the United States. The mathematical nature of the Cold 
War was put to the test and luckily held. Nevertheless not all 
people were happy with the outcome of the crisis. The analysts 
at RAND and other think tanks wanted to test their mathematical 
schemes in a scenario of rationalized limited nuclear exchange. 
By 1963, in an effort to avoid nuclear conflicts in the future, 
President Kennedy proposed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 
which was signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and 
Great Britain. But the U.S. soon bypassed the treaty’s 
restrictions using Seymour Cray’s CDC 6600 supercomputer. The 
computer was powerful enough to simulate thermonuclear 
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explosions without actually detonating a device. Thus the U.S. 
could continue its testing covertly, abrogating the treaty.  If 
there was any direct example of a supercomputer affecting 
international affairs it was this. The United States could 
continue testing by the use of the premiere supercomputer on the 
planet, leaving the other signatories of the Test Ban at a 
disadvantage.    
The mathematical nature of the Cold War was a hard fact, 
not a flight of fancy of H.G. Wells or Jules Verne. 
Supercomputers were the central lifeblood of the protracted 
U.S./Soviet conflict, crucially contributing to the arsenals 
necessary to keep the Cold War “Cold.” This silent arms race has 
been neglected for far too long and deserves the full attention 
of historians that specialize in that period.   
                     
     
 
                     






Precursors to the Cold War 
The Development of Computers and Their Effect on the Outcome of 
World War II: 1928-1945 
  
The history of technology is not always treated kindly by 
historians. There is a reason for this, albeit an unfair one. 
The typical focus of history is on events and the dates in which 
those events have occurred. Things are often overlooked and they 
are, at best, shunted aside and dismissed as mere 
“antiquarianism.” It is myopic to ignore the things that have 
led us to conclusions of one era and the beginning of another. 
Coincidental to the subject at hand, it is in a Marxian sense, 
that material is the prime motivator of historical events: “The 
hand-mill will give you a society with the feudal lord, the 
steam-mill a society with the industrial capitalist.”
1
 This is 
definitely the case when it concerns the computer’s role in the 
shaping of historical outcomes. To ignore this is at one’s own 
peril, as the Axis Powers during World War II found out. No 
writer on the subject of computers, historian, philosopher, 
mathematician or others can agree upon when the computer was 
                       
1 Bottomore, T.B., ed. Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social 
Philosophy. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964, Pp. 95. 
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invented or built.  One could go back to Blaise Pascal in 1642 
with his invention of the Pascaline, Wilhelm Leibnitz in the 
1670s with his “Reckoner,” and quoted most often of late, 
Charles Babbage in the 1820 and 1830s with the Difference Engine 
and the Analytical Engine. Where this begins depends on your 
conception of what a "computer" is. We are not talking about 
mere counting machines such as the Pascaline or failed projects 
such as Babbage’s Analytical Engine proposed to Parliament in 
1842, which was not only a failed project but one that was so 
expensive to the British government (approximately $608,247 U.S. 
Dollars adjusted for 2012), it caused a great deal of animosity 
between Babbage and British Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel. Peel 
cancelled the project even though the investment had been so 
large. We are speaking of a machine that is capable of managing 
complex mathematical problems, storing the data and providing 
solutions.
2
 The best point of departure would be before World War 
Two. 
Differential Equations 
Most of the mathematical nature concerning World War II 
centers on what is called a differential equation. A simple 
explanation of a differential equation is a mathematical 
equation that is in its workings refers back to itself and all 
                       
2 Swade, Doron. The Difference Engine: Charles Babbage and the Quest to Build 
the First Computer. New York: Viking Penguin, 2001, Pp. 148, 149. 
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the variables thereof. As it applies to this work the 
differential equation is a problem of physics, namely for the 
solution of ballistics trajectory as well as other applications. 
The equation must take into account more than just geometric 
directions and velocity of a projectile, but also atmospheric 
conditions such as wind resistance and air flow. In short, the 
differential equation is a difficult problem. It is true that 
equations of this type can be solved by human computers 
manually. But solving such equations could take a month or 
several months to complete by hand. 
No one can definitively pinpoint the creation of the 
computer. For purposes of this work it is reasonable to begin 
with Vannevar Bush and his creation the Differential Analyzer.  
Jerome B. Wiesner stated in his biographical sketch for the 
National Academy of Sciences in 1979: 
No American has had a greater influence in the growth 
of science and technology than Vannevar Bush, and the 
20th century may yet not produce his equal. He was a 
statesman of integrity and creative ability… [He] Led 





 The statement might be a bit of hyperbole and exaggeration; 
however, it is not too much of a stretch. President Franklin 
                       
3 Wiesner, Jerome B. "Vannevar Bush 1890-1974: A Biographical Memoir." 
Biographical Memoirs National Academy of Sciences 50 (1979): 89-117, Pp. 89. 
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Delano Roosevelt’s scientific advisor seemed to be a 
fountainhead of both intellect and invention. Indeed, during a 
lifetime that spanned eighty-four years there were not many 
topics having to do with science for which he was not consulted. 
His work, which had a notable impact on the world, began at 
Tufts University.  
Isolationism and the Computer. Bush’s worldview was shaped 
by post-World War I politics. The 1920s was a time in which 
Americans had tired of foreign affairs and the policies that 
went along with them. As was typical of the American character 
in regards to foreign affairs before World War II, the nation 
retreated into isolationism exchanging international 
participation for President Harding’s “normalcy.” In fact, there 
were few notable events having to do with foreign affairs for 
the entire decade: the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-1922, 
the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, 
and the Clark Memorandum. The lack of active participation in 
international affairs did not mean that the United States did 
not excel. During this period Americans immersed themselves in 
other fields such as sports and business. Most notably, this was 
a decade in which the belief in scientific solutions was 
paramount. As America was maturing, the switch to electrical 
power for its urban areas was ascending. However, the electrical 
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grids were hardly what one would call reliable. Presented with 
this problem, Bush and one of his graduate students, Herbert 
Stewart understood that there must be a method to simulate these 
electrical networks.
4
 The result of their work was a machine 
called the Network Analyzer. 
 The Differential Analyzer. The year that marked the 
ascendancy of Bush’s scientific career was 1925. He began the 
construction of machines that could calculate and simulate. In 
1928 Bush and another of his graduate students, Harold Hazen 
began the construction of another machine that was capable of 
much more: the Differential Analyzer. The analyzer was completed 
in 1931. Its total cost was $25,000.
5
 It was at this early date 
that Vannevar Bush would make an indelible mark on science. In 
fact, it is rare for this analog computer, to not be directly 
referred to as Vannevar Bush’s Differential Analyzer.  
 As important as it is to recognize the scientific worth of 
the Differential Analyzer as a computer, it is hardly what we 
today in 2012 would conceive as such a machine. The analyzer is 
what is called an analog machine. This means that the machine 
calculates by a physical method. A mathematical problem is fed 
                       
4 Zachary, G. Pascal. Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the 
American Century. New York: The Free Press, 1997, Pp. 48. 
 




into the machine by adjusting the computer itself. This is done 
by physically manipulating gears and shafts. As opposed to a 
“digital” machine which manipulates symbols such as 1’s and 0’s 
to calculate a problem and come up with its solution by 
electronic means. 
 Despite this crude method of calculation, the machine was 
lauded by the New York Times as a device that could solve 
problems, which it would require a phalanx of human 
mathematician’s months to solve.
6
 The machine was set to a number 
of tasks that are, even today, considered to be daunting. Many 
of the problems are surprising when one considers the context of 
history. From 1928 well into the 1930’s and 1940’s the analyzer 
was set to deal with atomic physics, astrophysics, the 
properties of cosmic rays, the study of the earth’s magnetic 
field and quantum physics.
7
 To say that the analyzer proved 
useful is something of an understatement. In 1931 the analyzer 
had proven that it was indispensible. The Rockefeller Foundation 
became interested in the machine. Unfortunately, in the depths 
of the Great Depression the Foundation would not give Bush a 
grant for a new, more powerful analyzer until 1935. 
                       
6 Owens, Larry. "Vannevar Bush and the Differential Analyzer: The Text and 
Context of an Early Computer." Technology and Culture 27, no. 1 (1986): 63-
95, Pp. 64.  
 





Nevertheless, in historical context, one would not typically 
associate a computer to solve complex problems to the late 
1920’s and early 1930’s. 
 Despite the ability of the Differential Analyzer to provide 
answers to purely scientific questions it was created to solve 
one type of problem. This was the differential equation. It 
would make the analyzer pertinent to world affairs. 
 Ballistics and Computing. By the 1930’s, the U.S. Army and 
Navy became interested in the analyzer. The rationale for this 
was the necessity of accuracy when firing weapons that had 
explosives. Specifically, the armed forces needed to understand 
the accurate firing of shells and gain more accuracy in their 
trajectories. For this purpose Differential Analyzers were sent 
to the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland to fulfill their 
needs. This instance was perhaps the most important event in the 
history of computing; the beginning of a relationship between 
the armed forces and the scientists who invented the “thinking 
machines.” This perhaps was the first time such a relationship 
was so firmly established, but it wouldn’t be the last. There 
are reasons for this, one was the armed forces’ need for 
practicable solutions that could only come from computing, and 
another was the scientists, mathematicians and engineers’ needs 
for capital to create the machines themselves that would aid 
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them in their own private and professional pursuits. At this 
point Vannevar Bush’s career as a scientist was altered from 
mere academician to one of scientific advisor to presidents. 
This relationship between Bush and the U.S. Presidents would 
last well into the Cold War.  
 By 1935 the United States was becoming suspicious of 
Japan’s global maneuvers. The forces of the Empire of Japan 
invaded Manchuria in 1931 and created Manchukuo in the following 
year. The U.S. attempted to assuage the situation to no avail.
8
  
This prompted the Navy to create special sections such as OP-20-
G to break Japanese codes. Bush was approached to find new ways 
of computing to break these codes. Bush examined the Navy’s 
equipment and found its IBM machines lacking for this purpose. 
IBM had been building tabulators and other machines since its 
incorporation in 1924 but its machines were not specifically 
designed for this type of work. Bush built a machine called a 
comparator for this purpose and the Navy awarded him a $10,000 
consulting fee.
9
 Bush was even offered a commission for his 
work.
10
 It was also during this time that the international scene 
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was heating up in Europe. By 1938 aviator and national hero 
Charles Lindbergh went to Nazi Germany to examine their air-
force, the Luftwaffe. His reports to the U.S. were 
disheartening. He believed that the Luftwaffe could overwhelm 
Europe in little time. Thus the U.S. began wind-tunnel testing. 
Bush also devoted himself to the development of radar as a way 
of detecting planes and increasing the ability to hit such 
targets. In order to develop both technologies, the abilities of 
the Differential Analyzer were necessary.  
World War II 
By 1941 Bush had risen in stature. He was taken into 
complete confidence by President Roosevelt. In the face of 
Japanese aggression in Asia, which was in violation of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, and because of Nazi aggression in Europe in 
violation of the Treaty of Versailles, Roosevelt made a fateful 
decision. By the 1940’s work in the field of atomic physics was 
prolific in the scientific community. Work was being done by 
exiled physicists such as: Werner Heisenberg, Enrico Fermi and 
Leo Szilard as well as others in the field. Nevertheless, the 
United States was not at war and so there was no real 
justification for an atomic bomb project. What was unknown to 
the general public was that FDR met with Vice-President Henry 
Wallace and Bush on October 9, 1941, before the war against 
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Japan had begun, to vigorously proceed with a project that would 
produce such a weapon.
11
  
 Atomic calculations are not impossible to solve by manual 
labor, but it is difficult. It is made even more so during 
crisis situations in which time is a significant factor. So the 
analyzers were set to the task. However, as the U.S. was 
officially pulled into the war on December 8, 1941, the 
Differential Analyzers were increasingly becoming an 
insufficient means of calculation. Still, they were used for 
aeronautics problems, ones that would herald another historical 
era that was closer on the horizon than one might have thought.   
 World War II taught the United States many lessons. One of 
these lessons was that technology develops very quickly in the 
midst of war. In crisis situations technology is no longer the 
fancy of a few futurists who had been pontificating on glorified 
clocks and cash-registers. Advances in technology became 
imperative. Bush was managing the Manhattan Project, the U.S. 
atomic bomb program and pushing the use of radar against 
submarines; he also created a weapon called the Proximity Fuse. 
The weapon was the forerunner of the guided missile; four vacuum 
tubes emitted a radio wave, if a target broke the wave the 
weapon detonated. This weapon was used against enemy aircraft as 
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 General George Patton was sold on the 
technology describing it as: 
The new shell with the funny fuse is [devastating]…I 
think that when all armies get this shell we will have 




 It seemed that General Patton was prescient. It was 
difficult to convince Generals George Catlett Marshall and 
Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower did reconsider his position 
when one of Bush’s worst fears was brought to his attention.  
 On June 13, 1944 the first “revenge weapon” the V-1 was 
unleashed upon London. Bush was alarmed at the potential 
capacity of this missile to carry “radiological or biological” 
compounds. In fact the Germans were prodded to move more quickly 
with their atomic program with the production of the V-1 and V-
2.
14
 Bush was so disturbed by the idea of unmanned guided weapons 
that in the spring of 1944 he visited Eisenhower, personally. He 
told the General: 
 Without better preparation… German rockets might rain 
down on Plymouth and Bristol and turn the Normandy 
                       
12 Zachary, Endless Frontier, 174. 
 
13 Ibid, 183. 
  




invasion into chaos. Eisenhower said: “You scare the 




 It was then that Bush suggested a complete bombing of the 
land-based sites where the rockets were located, which 
Eisenhower did. If the V-1 scared Bush, the V-2 was even a worse 
prospect to him. It carried a larger payload and traveled at 
supersonic speeds. There was no defense against the weapon. 
Although the V-1’s and V-2’s were produced too late for them to 
have a significant effect on the outcome of the war, the danger 
that they represented was perceived as very real. None of these 
weapons could have been produced without computing power. The 
nature of atomic and aerodynamic equations made this so. The 
computer was necessary to produce advanced weaponry to aid the 
war effort. 
 The same speed and necessity that brought the Differential 
Analyzer to the forefront of computing efforts was to also 
herald its obsolescence. This passing happened not because of 
the advent of a new machine, but rather a man.  
 The Universal Machine. Alan Mathison Turing was an 
extraordinary mathematician and a man that bore an indelible 
mark on the computing world for all time. In 1935, he presented 
                       




his dissertation on the Central Limit Theorem of Probability. At 
the same time that Turing began to show interest in mathematical 
logic. He presented a paper titled On Computable Numbers in 
November 1936 to the London Mathematical Society. Turing came up 
with the idea that machines could be “programmed” for several 
different types of tasks. A “Turing Machine” would be a 
universal machine unlike the analyzers. Like most of his 
predecessors, Turing recognized the need of a machine to deal 
with tedious computations. One of the obvious observations in 
Turing’s paper was that human memory was "necessarily limited."
16
 
He also noted that a human doing calculations would have to use 
"successive observations."
17
 Turing concluded:  
It is possible to invent a single machine which can be 




 The mathematician postulated that in order for machines to 
do these calculations they would have to be simplified. To this 
end, he used symbolic binary logic.  He stated: "that an Arabic 
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number can be recognized by a symbol."
19
 And outlined exactly 
what the machine was supposed to do: 
To each computable sequence there corresponds at least 
one  description number, while no description number 





 Turing then set a task for future computer scientists.  One 
of the main problems with computers is memory. Without the 
ability to store data the computer is as useless at solving 
complex problems. Turing came up with an abstraction of computer 
memory by using a tape as data storage.
21
  His ideas were nothing 
more than ideas. These abstract ideas became known as a 
“Universal Turing Machine.”  The machine has three parts: 
1.  A control unit utilizing symbolic binary code:   
I assume then that the computation is carried out on 
 one dimensional paper, i.e. on the tape divided into 
 squares. I shall also suppose that the number of 




2.  Data Storage utilizing paper tape. 
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3.  The machine must have a way to transcribe information, and 
 then feed it to other parts of the machine for calculation.   
 Turing had mathematically conceptualized how to overcome 
two of the most difficult obstacles plaguing the computing 
world, at that time: having a programmable machine and having a 
mature conception of memory which was essential.  
 On Computable Numbers assured Turing's reputation as a 
first-class mathematician, and the premier computer scientist. 
He was invited to Princeton to work with Alonzo Church, and 
during this time he received his Ph.D. on the subject of Systems 
of Logic based on Ordinals.  This is not a surprise considering 
that he had laid out the use of symbolic binary logic in On 
Computable Numbers. Turing was offered a post at Princeton, but 
turned it down to return to Cambridge.  At the outbreak of the 
Second World War in Europe in 1939, Turing technically worked at 
the British Foreign Office. In reality he was 50 miles away from 
London at Bletchley Park. During the war, Bletchley Park had a 
thousand scientists and mathematicians, and even international 
chess players to work on decryption of codes created by the 
Enigma machine.   
Enigma. The Enigma machine was created by a German engineer 
named Arthur Scherbius in the 1920s.  It was made available for 
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commercial purchase, but by the time of the war it had definite 
military applications.  
Enigma had five rotors within it, a keyboard, and a light-
up lamp-board display corresponding with the keyboard.  For 
example, if one pressed on the keys for the letter “W” and the 
letter “E” forming the word “we,” one might get an encryption 
that had the letter “X” and the letter “P;” the transmission was 
then sent in Morse code to another station that had a codebook; 
the rotor would be reset to decrypt the message after it was fed 
to another Enigma machine that was set to the same cipher-code.  
The codes were changed by the Nazis at midnight every night.  
There was not very much headway made in decrypting the messages 
sent by the Enigma. The calculations necessary to decrypt it 
were too complex. It was of the utmost importance to break the 
Nazi codes quickly to save lives as well as defeat the Nazi war-
machine. 
Alan Turing at Bletchley worked in various huts. In hut six 
there were decrypting staffs for the Nazi army and Luftwaffe 
transmissions and in hut three there were staffs committed to 
naval transmissions which were much harder to break. In hut 
three there was a machine called a “Bombe” (pronounced “bomb”), 
supposedly named after a dessert shaped like a dome. The Bombe 
worked on the decryption by emulating several different Enigma 
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machines at once. Two hundred of the machines were manufactured 
by the British Tabulating Company in Hartfordshire. The machine 
had 102 rotors in all: 33 in the first row, 36 in the second, 
and 33 in the third. Each of these corresponded with rotors in 
the Enigma machine. By imbuing the Bombe with so many rotors of 
its own, it had the “brute force,” meaning it could examine all 
possible combinations to break the Enigma’s codes. Later more 
powerful versions of the Bombe, using the decoding methods of 




Although the Bombe was a remarkable achievement, it paled 
in significance to another of Turing’s devices called Colossus. 
Colossus was a different machine constructed at Bletchley in 
1943. In order to increase the speed of decryption a new 
architecture was formed. Colossus utilized photoelectric cells 
and about 2400 radio tubes to process information. The machine’s 
top speed ran at five kilohertz, a blazing speed for its time, 
processing five thousand characters per second, and with this 
new architecture, Colossus could break ciphers in seconds rather 
than in minutes or hours. The new processing power in Colossus 
also had a direct effect on one of the most important offensives 
of the war. 
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On June 6, 1944, forty-seven allied divisions under the 
command of the Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower 
formed the largest amphibious assault in history: D-Day. The 
Germans mounted their defense at Pas de Calais. Notable 
historians such as Stephen Ambrose and John Keegan pick up their 
narrative by stating things about “deceptions” and that Hitler 
and his army moved their forces away from Normandy. However, 
these descriptions of the event, while well documented and 
accepted, are incomplete and this is where we all owe a huge 
debt to Colossus. 
     Colossus and D-Day. Germany’s Lorenz code was a complex 
encryption that was thought to be “unbreakable.” Therefore, it 
was thought the encrypted messages could safely be transmitted 
by radio with complete secrecy.
24
 The Nazis believed the code 
would remain a secret because random characters would be added 
to the encryption making it confusing. The first crack in a 
Lorenz message was due to a simple mistake. The Nazi decoders 
had a problem with a four thousand word transmission that 
neither side seemed to be able to translate. The message was 
sent again and still there was no correct transmission. At that 
point the decoders mistakenly set their encryption machines in 
synchronous positions and because of this the code was broken 
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manually, but it was taking human decoders a month and a half to 
break each cipher. This was not acceptable. The people at 
Bletchley Park fed the information into Colossus and the code 
was decrypted. Within hours the decrypted message pointed to the 
fact that Hitler was moving his forces to Pas de Calais leaving 
a much smaller contingent at Normandy. Thusly, Colossus 
correctly transmitted data giving vital information to the 
allied armies that allowed them to move ahead in an operation 
that historian Stephen Ambrose believes ended the war within a 
year.   
For more than thirty-five years after the war the work at 
Bletchley Park was still unknown. Winston Churchill called the 
people who worked at Bletchley “The geese that laid the golden 
egg but never cackled.”
25
 Turing himself went without credit 
until 2009 when the British Government finally would recognize 
his contribution to his homeland.  
By breaking these ciphers, historians speculate that the 
work done at Bletchley ended the war about two-years before it 
might otherwise have ended. The investment that the British 
government made in what Prime Minister Winston Churchill called 
“the wizard war” yielded practical solutions to problems that 
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otherwise could not have been solved.
26
 In short, the machines 
affected the outcome of the war in a way that was tangible, and 
justified the investment that the British government made in the 
work at Bletchley Park.   
American Code Breaking. The role of machine encryption and 
decryption on the American side of the war effort is somewhat 
more sublimated. Perhaps this is because there was no one 
“colossal” (no pun intended), figure such as Alan Turing for 
historians to focus on. This is not to say that there was no 
effort to develop computing machines since the threat of global 
war became a concern in Washington. 
In 1934 and 1935 the Japanese utilized a cipher machine 
called Ango Kikai Taipu. That term came to be known by the US 
code-breakers as “Red.” Red’s code was broken in the following 
year. The code that followed Red was shiki O-bun Injiki, which 
came to be known as “Purple.” The Japanese placed great faith in 
“Purple’s cipher. The supposedly unbreakable code was used in 
common diplomatic communications to Japanese embassies across 
the world.
27
 It wasn’t until 1940 that this cipher was broken by 
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the U.S. by constructing “Purple Analog”.
28
 If there had been 
more of an investment in computing perhaps the code could have 
been broken sooner and the U.S. could have reacted in a 
different manner to Japan’s military plans. 
American Progress. In 1937 Bell Telephone Labs had decided 
that machine computing was a worthy project to invest in. Bell 
Labs recruited a little known mathematician and employee, George 
Stibitz, to direct the project. 
 The machine that Stibitz invented was called the BTL I. 
Two years later, in 1939, it was completed at a cost of 
$20,000.
29
 Seeing the cost of construction for the BLT I, Bell 
Labs did not want the program to go any further. Funding for the 
BTL I project was cut and apparently further investment in the 
field, as far as Bell Labs was concerned, was not viable. 
American efforts in this particular area lagged behind Europe 
because the United States was not at war until 1941.  
On December 7, 1941, with the onset of WWII the War 
Department decided that high-speed computing was not only 
necessary to the war effort, but imperative. To this end, six 
more BTL I’s were built, bringing the total cost up to 
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 The machine itself was a fixed, although complex, 
arithmetic calculator, not quite what Alan Turing would have had 
in mind when thinking of the idea of computer architecture. 
Nevertheless, the machine solved circuit analysis problems for 
defense, and transmission of data via teletype. The largest BTL 
was built after the war. By that time it would utilize floating 
point arithmetic and ran at twenty kilowatts of power at the 
cost of $500,000.
31
 The BTL 1's were retired in 1949.
32
 
International Business Machines 
There is a colossus in the computing world and it is 
located in Armonk, New York. Its name is International Business 
Machines, more commonly known by its initials IBM. The company 
was formed early in the century and did its business by selling 
cash registers, but made its fortune by providing tabulating 
services to the U.S. Census Bureau. However, it came to the 
“computing” world late. Usually the name International Business 
Machines is synonymous with the cutting edge of technology. This 
is especially pertinent today, considering that IBM has 
consistently been listed in the top ten supercomputer lists for 
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several years. Furthermore, the performance of IBM’s machine 
named “Watson” this past fall exceeded expectations playing 
Jeopardy against its two foremost champions, and causing a stir 
in the press. But for all of IBMs accomplishments, its 
reputation for leadership in the field of computer technology is 
somewhat undeserved. 
From 1928 to roughly 1936 Vannevar Bush’s Differential 
Analyzers reigned supreme in computing. By 1936, however, those 
analogue machines were quickly becoming extinct. Bush and others 
did not know about the work of Alan Turing and Maurice Wilkes. 
In the field of computing many advances happened by accident and 
discoveries were independent of one another. IBM decided in 1938 
to build what it felt was a computing machine that was advanced. 
In fact it was not as advanced as Colossus, and would be devoted 
purely to scientific work. The computer was officially 
designated the Automatic Sequence Controlled Calculator Mark I, 
though the machine would be more commonly be referred to as the 
Harvard Mark I. 
While a 20
th
 Century industry, IBM for the most part held 
values matched that matched those of its founder Thomas J. 
Watson, a man whose worldview belonged to the 19
th
 Century. IBM’s 
business is “business” and business is to be done with as many 
customers as possible as long as it makes profits allowing the 
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company to grow. This was the philosophy of Thomas Watson. 
Companies are not human beings, although in many cases they are 
legally treated as such. Thus, companies lack a moral center. 
However, because the character of IBM was tied so tightly to 
Watson himself, its political and moral center was amorphous and 
at times mercurial. By the time that IBM was considering 
constructing the Harvard MK I near the end of 1937, the company 
was doing business in Europe and with Nazi Germany. This was not 
uncommon. Other companies such as General Motors, Ford Motor 
Company, Standard Oil and ITT did business with the Nazis. IBM 
had the distinction of accepting through Thomas Watson Germany’s 
Cross of Merit. This was the Nazis second highest honor, which 
could be given to someone that was not a citizen of the German 
state.
33
 The award caused quite a stir in America. With each 
egregious action by the Nazis, that medal caused more attention 
to be focused on Watson and IBM. Watson’s business ethic at the 
time was peace through trade. This also was not uncommon. Others 
such as Joseph P. Kennedy had espoused the same idea.
34
 But by 
1940 it was apparent that the Nazis would not have the idea of 
peace whether it was good for business or not. Watson returned 
the medal and then committed to the war effort stating: 
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International Business Machines Corporation has 
offered its full manufacturing facilities to the 
federal government for national defense purposes... 
IBM is prepared to change over at short notice to the 




 Various IBM machines were used during the war, many for the 
same tasks as others, such as code-breaking and trajectory 
plotting, but IBM never sold its machines to anyone and the U.S. 
government was no exception. All throughout the war and beyond, 
the government would have to rent all IBM machines. One would 
think that IBM might forego this policy during wartime, but it 
did not. This pointed to an oddity in IBM’s political stance. 
 Aiken and Mark I. In 1937 Harvard physicist Howard Aiken 
contacted IBM to propose a new machine for the purpose of 
solving differential equations. IBM became interested because 
non-linear differential equations were very difficult to solve 
on a Differential Analyzer. Furthermore, the ASCC would be great 
publicity for the company and its commitment to furthering 
science. In December of 1937 Aiken took a training course to 
familiarize himself with IBM machines. What was interesting 
about the Mark I is that the construction of the computer was a 
collaborative effort between Harvard and IBM. The materials to 
build the machine would come from IBM, but it was to be 
                       




constructed at Harvard. This would be the beginning of the 
relationship between academia and the computing industry. At 
that time there was no academic field known as “computer 
science.” Unfortunately, as with all experimental methods, the 
first ones tend to be difficult.  
 Although the Mark I was proposed in 1937, Thomas Watson did 
not give his personal approval to the project until February 16, 
1939.
36
 Nevertheless, Aiken visited IBM’s Endicott Labs between 
January 31 and February 3, 1938. During that visit he was 
informed by Watson himself that before entering the labs he had 
to sign a non-disclosure agreement.
37
 This was and is typical 
procedure for IBM that has a reputation for tight security 
measures. One is not even allowed to go to the bathroom alone 
while on the IBM grounds one must be with an employee at all 
times.
38
 Aiken, being a somewhat disagreeable personality took 
offense and protested in a most inflammatory declaration that he 
would not sign any such thing.
39
 This began one of many showdowns 
involving Aiken and IBM and most specifically, Thomas J. Watson 
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himself. The animosity between Aiken and his co-workers had 
detrimental effects not only on Aiken himself and the company, 
but perhaps the war effort as a whole. In fact, to this day IBM 
renounces Aiken’s status as an employee of the company.
40
 
 The Mark I, at first glance, seemed to be a much more 
advanced machine than what had come before. It was capable of 
solving Problems in chemistry, quantum theory of hydrogen and, 
of course, advanced mathematical problems involving atomic 
physics.
41
 Despite its abilities, no one quite knew what to do 
with this machine, and because of America’s participation in the 
war, the Mark I project was low on IBM’s list since the company 
had shifted it production facilities to the creation of tanks, 
bomb sights and rifles.
42
 This plus the strained relationship 
between Aiken and Watson more than likely had a bearing on the 
development of the Mark I. The project was not discontinued. IBM 
had invested heavily in it laying out an initial budget of 
$15,000 to be followed by another $185,000 in subsequent years. 
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 Another setback came when the war began. Aiken became a 
commander in the Navy, and since the Mark I was not completed, 
IBM transferred its outdated Hollerith Tabulators and a high 
speed calculator, the Aberdeen Relay Calculator, to the Aberdeen 
Proving Grounds replaced the Mark I in aiding the calculations 
for the Manhattan Project.
44
  It would be an additional two years 
before the Mark I would do its initial calculations. 
Furthermore, these first calculations had nothing to do with 
wartime necessities. The example of the Mark I’s first 
calculations is indicative of problems that concerned the use of 
supercomputing not only during the war, but also during the 
entire Cold War. During the war the computers and their 
applications were considered classified, as was the entire field 
of mathematics itself.
45
 Due to this, the first operations of the 
computers often occurred before the machines were unveiled and 
became known to the public. For example, even the Mark I, which 
did not initially aid in problems having to do with the war 
effort, was publicly announced at Harvard on August 7, 1944, 
still during the war, but this announcement came after its first 
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 Furthermore, the Mark I was delivered 
to the Naval Mine Warfare School around or about the spring of 
1944, where Aiken himself was serving.
47
 It was only during this 
time, in 1944 when another computer luminary, John von Neumann 
would do implosion calculations on the Mark I. These 
calculations had to do with the atomic bomb; however, no one but 
von Neumann knew that at the time.  
  The Mark I hardly was cutting edge technology; IBM was and 
is still notorious for not taking risks on technology. It was 
then and is now a conservative company that waits until 
computing trends have already been established and builds upon 
those principles. Thus, the Harvard Mark I was a comparatively 
slow machine producing only 3.3 operations per second. It did 
aid in the war effort, though only in a small way. And yet it 
would not be fully “retired” until 1959, well into the Cold War. 
Because of its relatively small role it is difficult to assess 
its overall usefulness. Furthermore, the Mark I architecture 
relying on electromagnetic relays to do its computations was a 
“technological dead-end.”
48
 Within two years the overall 
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computing world would change its entire architectural basis 
making the Mark I if not obsolete, then, for the most part, 
irrelevant. 
 ABC Computer. The next leap in computing came in the form 
of the ABC computer. The ABC was named for the last names of its 
inventors and creators John Vincent Atanasoff and Clifford 
Berry. John Atanasoff was a mathematician and physicist. 
Together with Clifford Berry, who was one of his graduate 
students, he decided in 1939 to build a “digital” computer. To 
this date computers had been “analog” computers, which was the 
standard thinking of computer architecture during the 1940s. 
These machines had serious limitations such as complex 
programming, inability to store data, and general unreliability. 
On the other hand, a “digital” computer was more reliable and 
provided storage. The financial backing to construct the 
computer was given to Atanasoff and Berry by Iowa State 
University.
*
 Patents, it was agreed, would be shared between the 
University and the creators of the ABC. In 1939 a prototype of 
the ABC was constructed, but it prototype was extremely limited, 
only capable of addition and subtraction. Still, the machine 
overall had potential. Further funding came from Research 
Corporation in the amount of $5,330 not an insignificant 
                                                                        
 






 The ABC was completed in 1942, but it did not see any 
use in the war effort because of legal infractions and the 
patents on the machine were never applied by the University, 
thus the machine gathered no information, but did gather dust in 
a basement of the University. Atanasoff was bitter over the 
outcome and eventually moved on to participate directly in the 
war effort, working at the Naval Ordinance Laboratory. 
Incidentally, Atanasoff, after the war had the Naval 
Distinguished Service award conferred upon him for this work.
50
 
The fate of the ABC would not be fully resolved until 1973 in a 
lawsuit. Even though the ABC did not see any “action” during 
WWII it is fair to say that if it had been utilized, the results 
would have been noteworthy because of the ability of the 
computer to store data. This ability would have removed the 
necessity of the operators of the machine to do further 
redundant calculations before having concrete answers. It might 
seem irrelevant to include the ABC as a significant player but 
its architecture would be a part of every computer from the time 
of its inception to the present day. Therefore, the ABC deserves 
recognition. 
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The computer pioneer for the Nazis was a man by the name of 
Konrad Zuse. Zuse was born in Berlin on June 22, 1910. He had 
always been something of a dreamer (this is ordinarily the case 
with computer scientists) and did not show any particular talent 
in his schoolwork. He attended the Gymnasium Hosianum. At the 
age of sixteen he knew that he wanted to be an engineer focused 
on city planning. He did show some brilliance, and at the age of 




After the exam he then attended the Technical University in 
Berlin. Again he did not find the traditional forms of 
engineering interesting. He did not have any gravitas for 
classical forms of architecture, i.e. Greek columns and the 
like. He also did not like engineering statics (the effects of 
physical force on structures), the field of friction, and 
movements on physical constructions. Traffic problems in cities 
caught most of his attention, as well as photography. A fan of 
science fiction, Zuse considered the realm of outer space. The 
practical outcropping of this interest led him to think about 
rocketry. However, he apparently lost interest in this as well: 
                       





These things lay too far in the future to keep hold of 
my attention. Then, when the V2 missiles appeared 
towards the end of the Second World War, I figured 
that a moon rocket would have to be about as high as 
Cologne Cathedral and, above all, at least as 
expensive; an estimate that was essentially confirmed 




His interest in the field of rocketry may have been 
fleeting, at the time of his attendance at Charlottenburg, but 
it would return at a later date, during the war. In 1935 Zuse 
obtained employment with the Henschel Aircraft Company, as a 
structural engineer. The company was founded by Georg Christian 
Carl Henschel in 1890 at Kassel.  The Henschel Company became 
one of the largest locomotive manufacturers in Germany by the 
beginning of the 20th century.  Early in 1935 Zuse was employed 
there. The company gained its reputation building tanks, 
designing and manufacturing the prewar Panzer I. During World 
War II Henschel was involved in large-scale production of the 
PzKpw III, and the Tiger I in 1941. Henschel was the primary 
manufacturer of the Panzer VI. Together with chief designer 
Erwin Adlers, he also designed aircrafts, the most important 
being the Hs123 Bi-Plane Bomber, the Hs126 airplane used for 
reconnaissance missions and the Hs129 tank-buster. The team also 
designed and built experimental guided missiles such as the 
                       





Schmettering, the Henschel Hs293 glide bomb, and the Henschel 
Hs294 anti-shipping glide bomb. During 1945, the company's 
factories were one of the most important bomber targets in the 
war, and were nearly destroyed. 
When Zuse left his job he was thinking about computing 
technology. There is not much outside information about Zuse. 
The information that we have about him and his work comes from 
his own recollections in sparse interviews and his own book. 
Because of this, there are inconsistencies about his role with 
the Nazis and the role of his machines during World War II. For 
example, he stated:  
 We students at the Technical University observed this 
new political doctrine [National Socialism] of 
salvation very dispassionately. Their Bible, Hitler’s 
Mein Kampf, was read by some here and there but it was 
not really taken seriously.
53
 
   
This is interesting considering that he went to work in a 
munitions factory that produced advanced weaponry for the Nazi 
war effort. He was originally inducted into the army as a mere 
soldier, but he did not stay there and probably did more damage 
to the allies than if had stayed a mere soldier. It would have 
been nigh unto impossible for Germany to have a rocket program 
and an advanced jet program without the use of some kind of 
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computing machine to work out the differential equations that 
would have applied to the pertinent aeronautic problems.  
Zuse began work on his Z1 computer in his parents’ 
apartment with the help of his fellow students. They provided 
the much needed labor sometime in 1935.
54
 Upon completion of the 
Z1, Zuse demonstrated it for the aeronautical research 
institute. The institute had interest in the machine and, 
apparently Zuse was able to hire more help to create new 
machines.
55
 The notable thing about Zuse’s machines Z1 through Z4 
is that they were highly advanced for their time, anticipating 
technology that would arise about fifty years later. The 
machines were constructed to utilize what is known as a floating 
point operation. This means that the machine can handle 
infinitely large numbers before and after the decimal point 
notation, but the calculations can take longer. Nevertheless, 
the loss of speed was made up by the complexity of the 
calculations that the computer could solve. The practicality and 
desirability of this might have been obvious to people such as 
Turing or John von Neumann, but they eluded the Nazi regime’s 
attention, for the leaders failed to understand its importance. 
For example, when Zuse applied to be excused from his service as 
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a soldier, about the time that the Z2 was completed, he was told 
by his commander:  
 What does it mean here one it says your machine has 
applications in aircraft construction? The German 
Luftwaffe is top-notch, what needs to be calculated 




Eventually Zuse was excused by being a structural engineer 
by the Henschel Aircraft Company. Nevertheless, Zuse later 
returned to Henschel. By this time Zuse had created the Z3, 
which was used to solve quadratic equations, an operation that, 
as Zuse put it, “Was an essential step in the computation of 
critical flutter frequencies of aircraft.”
57
 This is important 
because it illustrated the necessity of the computer to solve 
these aeronautic design problems and it also shows that someone 
was interested in the computer enough to keep investing in the 
project to contribute to wartime necessities. Zuse mentioned 
that the Z3 project was of a “low priority.” The government 
still did not see the potential of the machine itself. But this 
is unlikely because of the example set by the interest in the 
Z2, which led Zuse to request reassignment. The allies, of 
course, had invested heavily in computing for the necessity of 
solving aeronautic problems. Henschel Aircraft had designed the 
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Hs123, 126 and 129 planes as well as the Hs293 and 294 glide-
bombs, particular types of projects that would have required 
advanced specific computation.  
Another inconsistency with Zuse’s claim about governmental 
disinterest spoke to the matter of atomic calculations. By 1944 
the German Aeronautic Institute was under the aegis of the 
military. It was then that Zuse’s projects gained attention as 
higher priority projects. America needed computing power to 
devote to calculation for the Manhattan Project. The Nazis were 
also engaged in atomic projects, and while it was true that they 
fell behind significantly in those projects, the mere existence 
of them was enough to rattle the nerves of the allies. Zuse once 
again stated that his machines were not put to these tasks. He 
also recounted that when his projects came of higher priority 
classification, he became able to procure radioactive 
materials.
58
 It seems unlikely that the machines were not used 
for the purpose of atomic calculations, otherwise, why would 
Zuse and his aides have need for such materials? By that time 
the war was coming to an end. In the midst of invasion, Zuse’s 
machines were shuffled around Berlin to avoid capture. That was 
another example of governmental interest and importance. Why 
would the Nazi army waste precious labor to move a machine 
                       




around the city, which was not important, when soldiers could be 
used for fighting the enemies encroaching on their capital? 
Eventually the Russians did manage to capture one of Zuse’s 
machines. Zuse himself stated that he was not confident that the 
Russians knew what it was and knew how it could be utilized.
59
  
Finally there was the matter of the V-1’s and V-2’s. Zuse 
denies that any of his machines were put to this task as well. 
He states that he only met Wernher von Braun during their escape 
to Munich.
60
 However, historian Donald Cardwell in his book 
Wheels, Clocks and Rockets: A History of Technology states that 
Zuse’s machines were definitely used on both the V-1 and V-2 
projects.
61
 It is not clear why there is an inconsistency between 
Zuse’s account and Cardwell’s statement, but Zuse’s account has 
been allowed to stand by the computer science community. Perhaps 
an explanation could be based upon idolization, which is 
frequent in the discipline of computer science. In any case, it 
is true that neither the V-1, V-2 nor for example, the 
Messerschmitt 262 jet, could have won the war for the Nazis.
62
 
Those weapons, however, could not have functioned without the 
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solution of linear and non-linear differential equations. Those 
equations could not have been solved manually given the war time 
crises where time was a luxury.      
Zuse’s computers, despite being so advanced, had some of 
the same problems endemic to the Differential Analyzer and the 
Harvard Mark I. Like Vannevar Bush before him, and IBM’s 
machine, Zuse preferred electromechanical architecture.
63
 The 
notion of digital properties of the computer was not enticing 
enough for him to consider, and again these machines were 
rendered insignificant within a few years. 
The truth of Zuse’s account is not as relevant as the 
effects of his machines on the part of the Nazi war effort. If 
Zuse is correct, that the government had little interest in his 
computers until much later in the war, then it is easy to 
understand that victory in the war belonged to those who saw, 
understood and invested in the “thinking machines.” The Nazis 
came to the game late and paid the price for their 
shortsightedness. 
The Atomic Bomb. 
In the case of the war effort against the Empire of Japan 
in the Pacific, the Japanese had no computing projects and no 
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atomic projects to speak of. What information they did have came 
from their German allies, since the Nazis did not put the proper 
priority on their atomic project the consequence for the Axis 
allies was their defeat. As far as the Japanese were concerned, 
there could be no time to catch up to the allied efforts in both 
areas. Thus, the Americans reached the conclusion of their 
atomic efforts first. In July 1945 the Trinity Test was a 
success. By the time of completion of the atomic bombs, the tide 
had irrevocably turned against Japan and “unconditional 
surrender” was put forth as the only acceptable military and 
diplomatic conclusion to the war. When this was not forthcoming, 
on August 6, 1945 the first atomic bomb was dropped on 
Hiroshima. The blast was equal to 13 Kilotons of TNT. All things 
up to 1,600 feet away were incinerated. The blast killed 
approximately 100,000 people. For those who believe that there 
was some controversy in the use of this weapon, consider that 
when President Truman was returning from the Potsdam Conference 
he was told of the devastation unleashed upon Hiroshima, and he 
excitedly exclaimed: “This is the greatest thing in history!”
64
 
Despite the results of the first bomb, unconditional surrender 
was still not forthcoming. A second bomb was dropped on 
Nagasaki, killing 40,000 people and injuring another estimated 
                       





 It was only then that acceptable surrender came and 
World War II came to a conclusion. 
According to David Holloway in his book Stalin and the 
Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956, states that 
Stalin had not given real support for his atomic projects until 
after the United States used the bomb on Hiroshima.
66
 He also 
states that it was simply the lack of radioactive materials that 
kept the Soviet Union behind in the development of the atomic 
bomb.
67
 This one-dimensional explanation is not sufficient. While 
it is true that the lack of materials play a role in stunting 
Stalin’s atomic program, it is also true that without the aid of 
supercomputing the bomb could not be properly developed. One 
cannot discount U.S. investment in computing machines that made 
the atomic device possible within the required time to end the 
war.     
This is not to say that investment in the computer was the 
single variable that secured ultimate victory, but its role was 
a significant variable. Without computing power, cannons could 
not be aimed and fired with any accuracy. Radar would not have 
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been developed. Bombsights would not be accurate. Newer and 
faster planes and rockets would have taken longer to develop. 
Because of all these necessities the role of computers in the 


















Kennan and the Machine: Two Grand Strategies  
1947-1949 
 
 It did not take long from the dropping of the atomic bombs 
on August 6
th
 and August 9
th
 of 1945 respectively before the next 
enemy was rearing its head. It is fair to say that there has 
been a healthy dislike for Communism in America if not before 
World War I, as a doctrine of thought, certainly after the war 
with the Red Scare of 1919. In fact, during the intervention of 
the Entente powers after the war and during the Russian Civil 
War, it was the United States’ contingent of troops that was the 
second largest, only to be outdone by the Japanese. The 
battalions from 339
th
 Infantry Regiment were sent to stop the 
spread of Bolshevism in September of 1918.
68
 The Russians would 
never forget this.  
The Second World War, however, made strange bedfellows, no 
more than for the Soviet Union. Stalin sanctioned an alliance 
with Nazi Germany, the Molotov-von Ribbentrop Non-Aggression 
Pact on August 23, 1939, which promised the Soviets a good 
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portion of the Baltic States: Estonia, Finland, Latvia and 
Lithuania. Of course the treaty was rendered useless when the 
Nazi military machine entered Soviet lands on June 22, 1941. 
Stalin needed aid and found them in the Allied powers. However, 
with the grand Axis Powers defeated, there was nothing to hold 
an alliance together between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. President 
Truman, who had no foreign policy experience, relied heavily 
upon his military and especially George Catlett Marshall, who 
felt that the alliance during the war had been too gracious.
69
 
Truman listened and, by this point, looked askance at the 
relationship with Stalin. By early 1946 the president needed new 
information on the Soviets and on February 22, 1946 he received 
it from George Frost Kennan in what became known as “The Long 




 As with all historical events, the Cold War had no real 
definitive separation from its previous era. It is the same for 
computers and strategies. Similar to international relations, 
computing would go through a vast change in 1946 on the eve of 
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what historians generally agree was the beginning of the Cold 
War, with the advent of ENIAC.  
 The years between 1942 and 1944 were watershed moments for 
the Cold War. The new weapons for the coming conflict were being 
invented: jets, missiles and atomic bombs. These were weapons 
that were punctuation marks on World War Two, but were integral 
to the Cold War. Surprisingly, a new doctrine for the coming 
conflict was being created as well. Usually, the premiere 
strategy for the Cold War is “Containment” articulated by George 
Frost Kennan. Therefore, Kennan is considered to be the 
“architect” of the Cold War. This is somewhat misleading on 
several levels. The first of these are obvious. There are 
historians such as Arno Mayer and Kennan himself who, because 
they frame the Cold War as an ideological conflict and one that 
was inevitable, place the Cold War origins much earlier than 
1946-47.
71
 Furthermore, there are those who can point to the 
Teheran Conference held between November 28
th
 and December 1
st
 of 
1943 when Stalin first revealed his desire to seize Eastern 
Europe and let it be known that it was within his purview, or 





 of 1945, when FDR is usually accused, albeit 
unfairly, of “selling out” those domains to Stalin. But the 
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focus on technology I am proposing here shows that the 
correlation between strategy and politics became crystallized in 
1943. In order to fully understand that statement, one must 
understand one man: John von Neumann. 
John von Neumann 
 In 1903 John von Neumann was born in Hungary. Between the 
years of 1911 and 1921 he attended the Lutheran Gymnasium where 
he excelled in mathematics. Von Neumann had a stable childhood, 
something of a rarity in Europe in those days. However, in the 
wake of World War I Hungary became a Communist state under the 
leadership of Bela Kun. When Kun’s government fell Jews like von 
Neumann were blamed and a white terror was set off forcing 
immigration from that nation.
72
  
 Following those events, von Neumann attended University of 
Berlin in 1921 and for the next two years he studied chemistry 
and two years after that, in 1925, he received a degree in 
chemical engineering from the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology. The following year, from the University of Budapest, 
he received his Ph.D. in math with a minor in physics and 
chemistry. Von Neumann owed his extraordinary intellectual 
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capacities to having a photographic memory that became legendary 
in his work.
73
 He began teaching at Princeton in 1930. In 1933 
von Neumann was one of the first professors at Princeton’s 
Institute for Advanced Study. Like many other professors with 
mathematical and scientific backgrounds, von Neumann owed the 
meteoric rise of his career to World War II.  
 During the war von Neumann, predictably, worked on the 
Manhattan Project, but he had started two endeavors, which were 
to have an enormous impact on the Cold War. The first of these 
was what is now called Game Theory.  
 Game Theory. It is necessary to understand that Game Theory 
has nothing to do with “games” per se. It has more to do with 
mathematical representations of human interactions. Game Theory 
has a rich history that dates back to the Eighteenth Century, 
when Karl Leibniz thought that there might be a utility in 
studying military affairs with a particular explanation using 
mathematics. This was in 1710, and three years later James de 
Waldergrave came up with an idea of what we call minimax 
(hereinafter Minmax) strategy. Minmax is a strategy in which 
there is an outcome in strategy of “maximum utility or 
                       






 This was first enunciated by Emile Borel between 
1924 and 1927 in a series of papers.
75
 Unfortunately for Borel, 
he was never able to make Minmax a complete mathematical 
theorem.
76
  It was not until 1943-1944 that John von Neumann and 
economist Oscar Morgenstern, who were both at Princeton’s 
Institute for Advanced Study, enunciated the modern version of 
Minmax in their book titled Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior.  
 In von Neumann’s and Morgenstern’s “two player games,” the 
“game” is one of competition and expectation. The nature of 
competition is obvious in that both players are completely 
opposed to one another and that every move that a player in the 
game makes must be to his own greatest benefit and to the 
destruction of his competitor. The actions of the opposition are 
not known and so each move is based on one player’s expectation 
of the other’s movements. It is important to note that each 
player is also assumed to be a rational player i.e. out for his 
own best interests, an easy enough thing considering the role of 
human nature and its survival instinct. Despite not knowing the 
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other players moves, because all actions are completely 




 Game Theory as Grand Strategy. The best example of where a 
two-player, zero-sum game fits into the Cold War is in the 
theory of deterrence. Deterrence, in its most simple definition 
and as it pertained to the Cold War, was to discourage the 
Soviet Union from embarking on a nuclear strike against the 
United States and our allies by pure fear of having a nuclear 
counter-strike directed against their nation and perhaps their 
satellite nations. Although the definition of what constituted 
“deterrence” changed vastly over half a century’s time, this was 
the nature of the conflict between the two nations during the 
Cold War era. 
Games of competition are not the only ones covered in von 
Neumann’s work. There are also games of cooperation. The most 
common game of cooperation is called “The Prisoner’s Dilemma.” 
The specific origin of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is unknown, 
but the most refined game came out of the RAND Corporation. The 
rationale behind the dilemma was that there was some concern 
with John Nash’s equilibrium theory. The idea was to find that 
there were scenarios in which the players of the game were non-
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cooperative. The easiest expression of this was the idea of 
prisoners that had been caught in the commission of a crime. 
There was no deeper meaning behind the use of prisoner’s, just 
the example. In fact the outcome of the game was a positive 
refutation of Nash’s theory.
78
 
The dilemma can best be described in the following manner: 
two suspicious opponents, each without knowledge of the other’s 
possible reaction (unlike the game of pure competition where the 
possible reactions are known due to the nature of that scenario) 
vote against their own best interest in order to avoid an 
undesirable outcome. In short, this is a negative response, or 
irrational playing to avoid ultimate conflict. Graphically 
represented the dilemma looks like this: 
We’ll call this game “Nuclear War.” The aim of this 
scenario is that both the United States and the Soviet Union 
cooperate in order to avoid nuclear conflict. 
 





                       















 The optimal situation is when both nations cooperate i.e. 
decide that nuclear war is to be avoided: 
Cooperation/Cooperation. However, in this game, moves are not 
known, but extrapolated from a series of facts, or what von 
Neumann termed “expectation.” Cooperation cannot ultimately be 
relied upon. For example, if the United States or the Soviet 
Union decides to “Defect” from the cooperative scenario the 
player that defects will have the upper-hand, in this case the 
larger nuclear arsenal, which constitutes deterrence. However, 
the cooperative player sensing its apparent disadvantage will 
become diffident and escalate to match or overtake the opposing 






















first seems to be the very scenario of the Cold War arms race 
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.  However, the object of the 
game is not simply the deterrent effect on the opposing player, 
but creating an atmosphere of grudgingly, albeit unknown, 
cooperation to avoid nuclear war. Unfortunately, there is the 
possibility of both players deciding to defect from the main 
principle of the game scenario and of course, in that case, the 
two players decide to launch nuclear strikes against one 
another. Interestingly enough, considering the very nature of 
the game as a two-player system, it is best expressed as a 
mathematical model. As we have seen, up to this point, the 
“thinking machines” have designed the atomic bomb, a great 
mathematical feat. They are also well suited to playing a 
mathematical two-player game, a binary game, if you will. This 
is the entire basis of Boolean logic, first developed in 1847.
79
 
A computer uses “logic gates” to perform its functions. In 
philosophy, this would be designated as truth tables i.e. true 
or false. In the case of the machines it is designated as 1 or 
0, determining an open or closed circuit.
80
 In short, they can 
play “nuclear war.”  
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 Math and the Cold War. Then the question is what does this 
mean for “Grand Strategy?” The first thing is that there is a 
definite mathematical component to the Cold War. However, is 
this mathematical construct the real grand strategy for the Cold 
War? If this is the case then who is the real father of the Cold 
War, Kennan or von Neumann?  
It is easy for people who are unfamiliar to the intricacies 
of the Cold War to look at it broadly and say: “It was merely an 
“arms race.” It was certainly more complex than that but the 
nuclear arms race was central to the Cold War. The fear of 
nuclear weapons kept the war from widening. It is true that 
conventional wars ran concurrently with the Cold War. One must 
also consider that an estimated 22 million people lost their 
lives involved in the Cold War in those concurrent conflicts.
81
 
The nuclear weapon and heavy armaments were not the only weapons 
used during the fifty year conflict. One hardly needed the power 
of a supercomputer to design or, in some cases re-design, light 
weaponry. However, it would be more than fair to say that if the 
arms race was a significant variable to consider during the Cold 
War, then definitely von Neumann would have to be the one and 
only “architect” of the Cold War. Cold War grand strategies are 
multivariate, grand theories are pertinent, but not concrete. In 
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diplomacy one cannot negotiate for what one cannot enforce. Thus 
in the case of game theories and other mathematical models, one 
cannot diminish von Neumann and a host of others, both human and 
machine, that were integral to the Cold War, and to ignore this 
fact is to irresponsibly delete a crucial piece of information 
that could have changed history. But were these computers used 
for that purpose i.e. nuclear escalation and cooperation 
scenarios and were they utilized for other purposes such as 
other rational “war game” scenarios? 
 Before attempting to answer those questions once again we 
must consider the material side of history. 1946 marked not only 
a transitional period of the geopolitical world from war to 
post-war, but also the world of computing. The Differential 
Analyzers and electromechanical calculators, such as the Harvard 
Mark I that had been used during World War II were quickly 
becoming obsolete. They were no longer able to provide the speed 
and reliability to effectively handle the complexity of new 
problems. A new approach had to be found. This new approach was 
“digital” computing, which was embodied in ENIAC. 
 Digital Computers. ENIAC, or Electrical Numerical 
Integrated and Calculator, was the first, truly digital 
computer. The late Historian David Halberstam, in his book The 
Fifties, gave a small treatment of the ENIAC on his way to the 
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UNIVAC, which will also be discussed later. Halberstam’s 
treatment however gave short shrift to this discovery. Like 
other historians Halberstam mistakenly gave credit for the 
creation of the ENIAC to John von Neumann. In fact von Neumann 
had little to do with the machine itself.  
ENIAC came into being as the labor of two men, J. Presper 
Eckert and John Mauchly. Eckert was born in 1919 in 
Philadelphia.  He received a Bachelor of Science degree in 
engineering from the University of Pennsylvania, Moore School of 
Electrical Engineering in 1941. His Master’s degree came two 
years later in 1943. Eckert’s partner in this endeavor was John 
W. Mauchly. Mauchly was born in Ohio in 1907. He attended Johns 
Hopkins University originally pursuing an engineering degree. He 
then switched his major to physics. Similarly to other 
scientists analyzed here, his work required a great deal of 
complex calculations. With war on the horizon, he took a defense 
training course in electronics with the Army that was offered at 
the Moore School. The Army needed to create firing tables. In 
August of 1942, Mauchly gave a proposal called “The Use of High 
Speed Vacuum Tube Devices for Calculation” to the Army for an 
electronic calculator that would fulfill their needs to create 
the tables in a small amount of time when compared to the 
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Analyzers, which were then in use.
82
 Mauchly’s proposal was 
rejected by the Army. Another proposal was given to the Army in 
1943. The recipient of the proposal this time was Herman H. 
Goldstine, ,a mathematician and a lieutenant in the Army. He saw 
the potential of the project and accepted it. At that point, the 
Army gave the ENIAC project number W-670-0RD-4926, and a $61,700 
starting budget. By the end of the project ENIAC cost $486,804.
83
  
 Despite the fact that ENIAC was too late for true wartime 
participation, at the end of the war the Army wanted ENIAC to 
produce results on a new problem, namely thermonuclear weapons. 
The hydrogen bomb had been considered because the atomic bombs 
that had been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, although very 
destructive, were of limited explosive and radioactive yield. 
The hydrogen bomb would have unlimited yield. This new weapon 
seemed necessary because of a combination of Cold War caution 
and fear of the Soviets, or just simply because it was there to 
be made. What was clear was that it was Cold War and perhaps the 
need for deterrence required a fusion device that held no bounds 
for destruction. This hellish creation brought about by Edward 
Teller was only possible because of the power of ENIAC: “[They] 
had to calculate what was happening inside the reaction at 
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increments of one-ten millionths of a second.”
84
 Furthermore, 
ENIAC was sent to Aberdeen to also check weather patterns to 
predict the effects of fallout.
85
 
 So the ENIAC computer was the invention of Eckert and 
Mauchly. John von Neumann was brought into the project at a 
later date by Goldstine.
86
 Goldstine, who worked closely with von 
Neumann and was in awe of him, gave von Neumann and 
interestingly, himself the credit for ENIAC: “It was he [von 
Neumann] who took the raw idea and perfected it.”
87
 The veracity 
of the claim was in question. But von Neumann was very much 
involved with the next supercomputing project W-670-ORD-4926: 
the Electronic Discrete Variable Calculator, EDVAC.  
 Once again the latest machine, ENIAC, proved insufficient. 
According to an informal report by J. Carson Mark of the Los 
Alamos Scientific Laboratory: ENIAC was the most advanced 
computing machine in the country of that time, an indeed, until 
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 And yet calculations done on the ENIAC were 
becoming too complex for a machine only:   
 Capable of doing 5000 addition cycles per second and 
do the work of 50,000 people working by hand.  In 30 
seconds, ENIAC could calculate a single trajectory, 
something that will take 24 and 20 hours with the desk 





The Report on EDVAC. The calculations for ENIAC 
increasingly had to be parsed out, meaning they had to be split 
into several groupings so that the computer could carry the 
load.
90
 At a certain point this must have been anticipated. 
Similar to the situation when Vannevar Bush inspected the IBM 
machines at the proving ground before World War II, when they 
were found to be lacking, the Army must have learned from that 
experience and decided to not rely on one type of machine. So 
the Army accepted a proposal for EDVAC. It was submitted to the 
Army in June 1945, before ENIAC was officially in operation. The 
EDVAC was to be built at the University of Pennsylvania’s Moore 
School where ENIAC had been built and so von Neumann, Mauchly 
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and Eckert were still in close proximity to each other. The 
preliminary events that brought EDVAC into being are somewhat 
murky. As was not the case with ENIAC, EDVAC really had to be 
“sold.” The purpose of EDVAC was to solve: “non-linear partial 
differential equations.”
91
 These are the types of equations that 
ENIAC would have choked on if they had not been parsed. In any 
case, the “pitch” to the Army came from the First Draft of a 
Report on the EDVAC. This document was what led Eckert and 
Mauchly to ultimately split from von Neumann and Goldstine. 
Apparently, the outline of what the EDVAC architecture was 
supposed to be was the idea of Eckert and Mauchly, but in the 
report their contributions to the project were stated as merely 
“suggestions.”
92
 Furthermore, Goldstine made this seem as if he 
and von Neumann were throwing them an intellectual “bone.”
93
  
John von Neumann had worked on the logic systems of the 
machines, but the real importance of von Neumann’s efforts came 
when “selling” the machine. The Army already had ENIAC, and 
although ENIAC did not officially come “on-line” until February 
14, 1946, it had run calculations in 1945. Apparently it was not 
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uncommon to retro-date an operational date. This was for obvious 
reasons of “national security.” In any case, it would not have 
been completely clear to the Army why they needed EDVAC. After-
all, these computers required hefty investments, and 
justification would be necessary. Von Neumann had a role with 
the military since 1941 and his word would lend the report 
credibility. Eckert and Mauchly had no other option than to 




Interestingly this was the first time that the inner 
systems of the computer were likened to the human brain. Neurons 
and circuits would now be the same. This would have serious 
ramifications for supercomputing. The idea was underlined in a 
Silliman lecture at Yale University later, just before von 
Neumann’s death, and it has shaped the computer industry as a 
whole ever since.  
The Supercomputer Gap 
One of the big myths of the Cold War was the supposed 
“Missile Gap.” The concept itself was revealed in 1961 but the 
notion was ever-present. The missile gap was the supposition 
that the Soviet Union had surpassed the United States in its 
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nuclear forces. Of course we now know this was not true. To 
understand just how far-fetched this “gap” was one only has to 
look at the list of the U.S. atomic arsenal from 1945 to 1950. 
It was as follows: 
Complete Number of Bombs Mid-Year 
    Year     Number of Bombs 
 
1945 About 2 
1946 About 6 
1947 About 7 
1948 Between 7 & 50 
1949 Between 50 & 240 
1950 Between 292 & 688 
 
Source: Poundstone, 163. 
 As we can see the United States had quite an atomic arsenal 
even before the Soviets tested their atomic device. There was no 
gap in atomic weapons as was conceived in the collective minds 
of U.S. scientists and some political insiders. However, there 
was a supercomputing gap that was very real. It was this 
supercomputing gap that had serious implications for the outcome 
of the Cold War.  
73 
 
 Computing on a vast scale began early for the United 
States. However, it is also necessary to examine the position of 
the main antagonist namely the Soviet Union in the conflict. 
 Sergei Lebedev. If there was a single avatar of Soviet 
computing, on the level of a, Vannevar Bush or Alan Turing, it 
was Sergei Lebedev. Lebedev was born in 1902 in Siberia. His 
higher education began at the Baumann Institute in 1923, where 
he studied high voltage technology. In 1928 he was a research 
assistant at the V.I. Lenin State Electrical Engineering 
Institute and by 1939 he defended his doctoral thesis.
95
 Like 
Bush, by the 1930s Lebedev, had been working on analog machines, 
but the Soviet machines were inferior. At this early stage, the 
Soviets pursued supercomputing. Vast projects for hydro-electric 




 The first supercomputing gap disfavored the Soviet Union. 
Unlike the western allies, who had put a lot of stock in the 
power of computing to develop new and better weapons, the Soviet 
Union had put these types of projects on hold in order to 
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prosecute their portion of the war. It’s true that Lebedev had 
worked on problems of trajectory for tanks guns and other 
weapons, but for the most part, computing played a lesser role 
for the Soviets since the Nazi invasion. The Second gap came 
after the war. The Soviet ambassador to the United States 
Nikolai Novikov interpreted U.S. designs on September 27, 1946 
in his telegram to Stalin:  
 The foreign policy of the United States, which 
reflects the imperialistic tendencies of American 
monopolistic capital, is characterized in the postwar 




 The supremacy, of course, applied to weaponry as much as to 
economics but the U.S.S.R. had no serious foundation in 
computing in order to properly engage the United States in the 
arms race. It was clear, however, that they had considered the 
situation and feared the power of the U.S. in both strategic and 
scientific areas. Novikov wrote: 
For this purpose, broad plans for expansion have been 
developed and are being implemented through diplomacy 
and the establishment of a system of naval and air 
bases stretching far beyond the boundaries of the 
United States, through the arms race, and through the 
creation of ever new types of weapons.
98
    
  
                       





Nevertheless, the importance of supercomputing did not sink 
in for the Soviets until a much later date.  
This is one main reason for the Soviet lag in developing 
the atomic bomb. Although the Soviets had apparently a more 
developed spy network, their computing lag was a significant 
variable in holding back their progress until August 1949. This 
is not to say that the Soviets stole all their computing 
technology from the west. For example, the principle of a binary 
“flip-flop” was invented in the Soviet Union two years before 
the United States had it.
99
 A principle of computing and actually 
having a computer, however, are two different things. Lebedev 
was developing analog machines in 1945 whereas the United States 
had been doing this same work in 1928. And yet there is some 
contradictory evidence about the history of “Analog Computing” 
in the U.S.S.R. According to Doctor Boris Kogan, a Soviet 
computer scientist who won many state prizes for his 
contributions to the discipline before emigrating to the United 
States, the first analog computers did not appear in the Soviet 
Union until the time between 1947 and 1949 when the EMU-1 was 
constructed. It is somewhat unclear if Kogan is referring to 
completely “analog” computers or “hybrid” machines in the same 
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class as the Harvard Mark I.
100
 In either case, the Soviets were 
not in a position to compete with qualitative developments in 
the west. Furthermore, the Soviets had to catch up in their 
quantities of computing machines. This problem with the 
difficult calculations necessary to produce a bomb with any 




 The Soviets did attempt to purchase an ENIAC machine. This 
overture was almost ridiculous, considering that the U.S.-Soviet 
wartime alliance was crumbling by February 1946, and that the 
United States was already working on the hydrogen bomb. This was 
the first time that the United States blocked the sale of a 
supercomputer, and it would not be the last time. So, the Soviet 
computer scientists were now isolated from both within and 
without. The Soviets at that point were unable to glean any 
insight from other works in the computing field. It seems that 
“containment” was able to produce results in more ways than one.         
Greece and Turkey. In the meantime, things were heating up 
on the geopolitical arena. At the end of the Second World War 
Stalin had agreed to pull his troops out of Turkey, Greece and 
Iran. This was to be done by 1946. The U.S. was concerned about 
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this because of the need to have open access to the Suez Canal. 
It became more apparent as time progressed that the Red Army 
would not be withdrawn. In this climate the Truman 
Administration felt compelled to act. Thus on March 12, 1947 
President Truman delivered an address to a joint session of 
congress during which he requested aid be given to both the 
nations of Greece and Turkey. $400 million in aid was given to 
both nations with begrudging of some people in congress.
102
 
George Kennan thought that the stance that the president had 
taken was “too strong” and that it would antagonize the Soviets 
and push them towards action.  
 Bureaucratic disagreements were matched by those within the 
scientific community as well. The feud between Eckert and 
Mauchly and Goldstine and von Neumann had forced each grouping 
to go their separate ways: Eckert and Mauchly decided to go into 
the private sector forming the computer company UNIVAC. At the 
same time von Neumann was still involved with EDVAC and had also 
decided to return to Princeton and the Institute for Advanced 
Study where he took up the role of mathematician. He would 
remain primarily connected to the institute the rest of his 
life, while still being involved with governmental projects as 
well as supercomputing projects.  
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 The Marshall Plan. In the meantime, the Marshall Plan had 
been implemented offering monetary aid to the war torn nations 
of Europe and interestingly enough the Soviet Union as well. The 
Soviets, however, did not accept the offer viewing it as a means 
to undermine Soviet strength.  George Kennan supported this 
economic plan wholeheartedly. This was not difficult to 
understand, considering the gist of his Mr. X article in Foreign 
Affairs was basically a description of the weaknesses of the 
Communist economic system: 
 Both the maintenance of internal political security 
and the building of heavy industry, has been carried 
out at a terrible cost in human life and in human 
hopes and energies. It has necessitated the use of 
forced labor on a scale unprecedented in modern times 
under conditions of peace. It has involved the neglect 
or abuse of other phases of Soviet economic life, 






 Kennan believed that this condition could be exploited and 
bring about a downfall “overnight” of the Soviet Union. Of 
course Kennan was completely wrong about a quick dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, but the Marshall Plan certainly did go far in 
upsetting Soviet leadership.   
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Just after mid-year on July 26, 1947 The National Security 
Act was accepted and in the following month was amended and put 
into effect. The point of the Act was to: 
 In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of 
Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the 
future security of the United States; to provide for 
the establishment of integrated policies and 
procedures for the departments, agencies, and 
functions of the Government relating to the national 





Thus the Central Intelligence Agency and the National 
Security Council were created.
105
 The restructuring of American 
foreign policy with containment strategy was to hold the Soviets 
in stasis. In past conflicts arms races produced wars. Germany’s 
Blue Water fleet preceding World War One is an example. 
Conventional forces could produce mass destruction but not 
destroy the human race in one fell swoop. During the Cold War 
extinction of the human race was a distinct possibility. The 
fear of atomic strikes created conditions so that containment 
was enforced. The scientists and the supercomputers created a 
weapon that translated into fear. In turn that fear produced 
conditions that required caution and rationality. Thus national 
security structures were created to serve strategic theories and 
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those theories were bolstered by military investments in 
scientific computing. 
IBM SSEC. In the midst of this grand systematic 
transformation of governmental and policy structure, IBM was 
playing “catch up” with the world of electronic computing. It 
needed to re-establish its leadership in the field. To this end 
the company embarked upon the Selective Sequence Electronic 
Calculator. The SSEC was an ambitious computer, for IBM. The 
machine also had an ambitious budget of $950,000 the equivalent 
of over $9 million dollars today. The machine itself was to be 
roughly 250 times faster than the previous IBM computer, the 
Harvard Mark I.
106
 In fact the machine did live up to its 
potential for the most part. The SSEC was used on problems from 
planetary orbits to the composition of atomic fields.
107
 At the 
zenith of its operation it worked on the HIPPO Problem 
(thermonuclear calculations) that von Neumann and Edward Teller 
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From 1946 through 1950 a notable list of persons worked on 
a problem they called “Super.” Among them were: Edward Teller, 
Enrico Fermi and John von Neumann.  Super was a codename for the 
mathematical research on the possibility of a thermonuclear 
explosion, specifically: 
 Any likely type of thermonuclear system. Among such 
lines of necessary background theoretical work may be 
mentioned (i) work on capacities and equation of state 
materials, (ii) great numerical refinement of the 
picture available of the processes occurring in a 
fission explosion, and (iii) advances in the general 
area of computational ability, both in the matter of 





HIPPO was an integral part of the “super” problem. Von 
Neumann was involved in every way.
109
 The machine computations 
for the problem were done on ENIAC, but the problems had to be 
cut to fit on the machine. ENIAC was a general purpose computer, 
but not very flexible in its workings. The SSEC, which was 
favored by von Neumann, was better suited for the problem. But 
the SSEC had a problem. As in the case of the ASCC, IBM was 
cautious in its architecture, using tried and true methods in 
                       
108 Mark, “A Short Account of Los Alamos Theoretical Work on Thermonuclear 
Weapons,” Pp. 2. 
 
109 Bashe, IBM’s Early Computers, 57. 
82 
 
machine calculations. In other words, the SSEC was a 
conservative, hybrid machine, not fully electronic. The persons 
working on “super” found the machine to be reliable in its 
calculations, but “cumbersome.”
110
 Unfortunately, the SSEC was 
quickly outdated. 
In the first year of George Kennan’s containment policy the 
supercomputing world did not do much to affect policy. These 
effects would only be apparent later. Nevertheless, the United 
States, between 1945 and 1947 had a distinct advantage in 
“electronic” computing that was yielding tangible mathematical 
results. This is not to say that the first year of “containment” 
was much ado about nothing in the field of computing, but it was 
a slow year for the United States. The Soviets showed no serious 
interest in scientific computing during this time and American 
efforts seemed sufficient. This would not be the case during 
1948. 
The Berlin Airlift. 1948 was a year of serious crisis 
during the Cold War in which both the Middle-East and Europe 
were involved in turmoil. On April 18, 1948, the Christian 
Democrats (DC) won Italy's national elections. Their victory was 
seen as the first major step forward for the CIA. This operation 
proved that covert operations could be done easily, effectively 
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and cheaply as compared to using US troops. On May 14, 1948 The 
British mandate over Palestine ended and the U.S. had to 
consider support of the newly created Israel. Kennan was not too 
keen on the issue, but the government’s concern over Soviet 
intervention was very real.
111
 Furthermore, the first Berlin 
Crisis began on June 24, 1948, when the Soviet Union instituted 
a blockade on the occupied city to protest Western efforts to 
integrate their zones of occupation in western Germany. The 
Administration in Washington D.C. knew that it had to act, 
however it did not wish to provoke the Soviets into a full blown 
war. General Lucius Clay did push for a military response, 
promoting the idea of sending tank divisions straight into 
Berlin.
112
 The U.S. tactically hinted that a nuclear retaliation 
was more than possible.
113
 Both Kennan and Nitze advocated a 
withdrawal of the occupying forces in Berlin.
114
  Ultimately, the 
US reacted using The Berlin Airlift. From June 24, 1948 to May 
12, 1949 B-29s were used to deliver supplies to keep the West 
Berliners alive. This was not only a good strategic move, in 
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that it did prevent war, but a great propaganda move for the US, 
because the Communists looked weak.  
The Berlin Airlift is on point with the idea of soft power 
as described by Joseph Nye Jr. in his book titled Soft Power: 
The Means to Success in World Politics. According to Nye it was 
this type of action i.e. indirect confrontation that was an 
integral part of the Cold War. To resort to both direct and 
indirect action in the face of Soviet aggression was both 
ingenious and effective. Nye credits Kennan for this approach, 
although it is uncertain that Kennan would have agreed. 
Nevertheless, soft power did have its role to play. But soft 
power might have had a far smaller impact, if it hadn’t been 
backed up by hard power elements, and even more, by scientific 
power which fused together aspects of hard and soft power.  
Nye tends to downplay the use of hard power while elevating 
the effectiveness of soft power. His assessment of hard power 
was that it provided the essence of military containment while 
soft power in the form socio-cultural transmissions to both the 
allied nations and certain sectors of Communist nations 
undermined the workings of the Soviet state. Nye’s argument is 
somewhat problematic especially if applied to the early period 
of the Cold War in 1948. By his own admission soft power “eroded 
85 
 
the Soviet system from within.”
115
 Erosion is a key word. 
Erosion, in this case, the slow disintegration of a system takes 
time. At the time of the airlift time was not a luxury that the 
United States possessed. The airlift was a gamble and still a 
projection of hard power. It was uncertain that it would not 
provoke the U.S.S.R. but the consequences of direct 
confrontation were certain. On the other hand, the known 
commodity of hard power the military and most specifically the 
power of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, is what really made the 
Soviet Union buckle under its own weight. The nuclear arms race 
had both technological and economic consequences that were not 
sustainable by the Soviet Union. 
Princeton Class Computers. Indeed, on the technical front, 
there was a shake-up that would determine the architecture of 
not only supercomputers, but all computers to the present day. 
By the time that ENIAC had begun running its first public 
calculations, the Moore School of Engineering had lost its 
cutting edge in computer technology. The feuding between Eckert 
and Mauchly on the one hand and von Neumann and Goldstine on the 
other had taken its toll. This left von Neumann to find another 
place to hang his technological hat. He ultimately decided to 
return to Princeton at the Institute for Advanced Study.  
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 Princeton was a place known for its academic achievements 
for people in the liberal arts and other fields, rather than for 
technological projects that would have practical applications. 
The conflict between lofty ideas in the classroom and gritty 
engineering work often did not mix.  Nevertheless, von Neumann 
had proven his worth in both areas and thus pulled a lot of 
weight in both the academic, as well as governmental and 
military spheres. In truth, Princeton was glad to welcome him 
home and when he pitched his next project at a price tag of 
$300,000 the University immediately came up with a third of his 
proposed budget upfront.
116
 His project would be a new machine 
without a real moniker as of yet. It would become known simply 
as the IAS machine.  
The IAS would be a further jump in technique from the 
existing ENIAC or EDVAC. Those computers both required rewiring 
to program for calculation. The IAS would not. At this point the 
“von Neumann” architecture would be put to the test: true high-
speed electronic computing with advanced, for the time of 
course, random memory storage, which was a huge roadblock in 
early computing. The IAS was something of an anomaly. It was 
conceived by von Neumann himself. The concepts he applied to the 
construction of the machine rather than the machine’s actual 
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performance. These concepts represented a true leap forward. The 
machine’s calculating time was much slower than it should have 
been.  
There was real beauty in the IAS, however: the potential of 
its architecture, which was imitated by following generations of 
computers. Thus, a series of “Princeton Class” machines 
proliferated with names such as ORDVAC, which was delivered to 
the traditional home of military computing, the Aberdeen Proving 
Grounds, MANIAC, which went to Los Alamos, AVIDAC at Argonne 
National Labs, ORACLE, which was sent to Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, ILLIAC at the University of Illinois (Urbana), and 
finally IBM’s entry into Princeton Class machines was the 701. 
The IAS was not only a national phenomenon, it extended well 
beyond U.S. borders.
117
 SILLIAC was at the University of Sydney, 
WEIZAC in Israel, PERM in Germany, and BESK in Sweden.
118
 The 
western world now clearly had a distinct quantitative advantage 
over its eastern counterparts. Interestingly enough, at least 
one author claims that some machines were being made in China 
before its fall to Mao Tse Tung’s Communists, and more boldly 
states that the Soviet Union’s BESM was a descendant of the 
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 One claim is unlikely and the other 
is not true. China was not in an economically stable to position 
to focus on such projects. That the IAS was the parent of the 
BESM is not completely verifiable. According to Boris Malinovsky 
who worked with Sergei Lebedev, while the two machines were 
similar, the architectural layout was arrived at 
independently.
120
 The fact remains that the Soviet Union now 
became aware of the potential of supercomputing.  
Soviet Ideology and Computers 
The Soviets entered the supercomputer race against the west 
late in 1948. Lebedev’s computer, the MESM, was merely conceived 
in that year, but not constructed for various reasons. One 
reason was that many scientists in the Soviet community did not 
see the ramifications of supercomputing. Another reason was that 
the Soviets had a problem that was endemic of the commercial 
personal computing field during the 1980’s. This problem was, 
and is to the present time, called NIH or Not Invented Here, and 
it owes a lot to hubris.
121
 In short, the Soviet scientific 
mindset was one where ideology played a pivotal role in its 
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 If something was not discovered, invented and or created 
by Soviet science then it was not worth pursuing at best, and at 
worst it could be seen as detrimental or in some cases 
treasonous. The exception was espionage efforts at Los Alamos. 
The atomic bomb was a hard example of overwhelming power and 
therefore had to be acquired at all costs. On the other hand, 
the benefits of supercomputing were not immediately apparent.  
In a closed system there was a lack of flow in information. 
To say that the field of computing in the Soviet Union had a 
serious case of NIH is something of an understatement. This is 
one of the reasons MESM arrived so late for the Soviet Union, 
Lebedev had to come up with his designs independently of western 
efforts.
123
 An example of the principle is seen in the 
competitions for state prizes in science: 
 Lebedev failed to receive the State 
Prize…Unfortunately, the Board of Directors of the 
Ukraine Academy of Sciences, which at the time was 
headed by a biologist, did not understand or perhaps 
did not even attempt to understand the significance of 
Lebedev’s work. The Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Ivan Dimitrievich 
Nazarenko, who visited Lebedev’s laboratory in the end 
of 1950, failed to properly endorse Lebedev’s work 
either. After familiarizing himself with the MESM and 
the prospects for advancement and application of 
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computer technology, he expressed his surprise and 
delight in one word: “Sorcery!” Leaving the 
laboratory.
124
    
 
It is hard to imagine that any scientific endeavor could 
thrive in such an environment, much less one such as computing, 
which is based heavily in abstractions. Even Stalin himself 
thought that the combination of hard mathematics and ideology 
was literally laughable.
125
 This is not to say that there was not 
the same type of competition in the western world. But there 
certainly was more scientific independence, which was a boon to 
computing overall. The NIH in the Soviet Union is hardly a 
surprise. In a society based in severe bureaucratic conflicts 
the distinctions within the scientific community would be much 
sharper. In sum the Soviet computer scientists were besieged by 
their own governmental structure. 
The philosophical principle behind the Soviet Union was an 
economic eschatology; materials would move history in such a 
direction that a global Communistic society was a fait accompli. 
Many historians as well as academics from other disciplines have 
debated the honesty in fact, that Lenin, Stalin and others had 
for the Marxist underpinnings of their nation, this debate we 
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need not repeat here. Suffice to say that economics was at the 
heart of the matter and that the Soviet economy was not an open 
system. In the end, the inability to trade with others of equal 
or better economic strength was fatal to the nation. The same 
could be said of Soviet computing efforts.  
Although Soviet computing circles knew of ENIAC and its 
apparent capabilities, the actual layout of the machine was as 
unobtainable to the Soviets as the machine itself. Furthermore, 
although many discoveries in the field of computing were 
achieved independently, having knowledge of others’ efforts 
certainly would have aided the Soviet scientists. But works such 
as von Neumann’s were not obtainable until much later.
126
 The 
inherent closed Soviet system along with the external conflict 
with the western world kept Soviet computing isolated and 
perhaps stunted when compared to the efforts in the west. 
Joe I. The Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb on 
August 29, 1949 in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan. The American 
reaction to this momentous event was somewhat mixed. It would be 
easy to say that the American public was seriously scared of 
this, and certainly Congress was of this mindset, but both the 
CIA and President Truman himself were not going to be as easily 
shaken by the event. The CIA and Truman had understood that 
                       




atomic secrets could not remain secrets forever. For its part, 
the CIA had been wrong in its estimates about just how long it 
would take the Soviets to create the weapon. They assumed that 
the date would be around or about 1953. Apparently, there was 
evidence to the contrary that was ignored by the intelligence 
agency.
127
 Despite this it seems that their reaction was 




 I believe the American people to the fullest extent 
consistent with the national security are entitled to 
be informed of all developments in the field of atomic 
energy. That is my reason for making public the 
following information… Ever since atomic energy was 
first released by man, the eventual development of 
this new force by other nations was to be expected. 
This probability has always been taken into account by 
us… This recent development emphasizes once again, if 
indeed such emphasis were needed, the necessity for 
that truly effective and enforceable international 
control of atomic energy which this government and the 





It was in the same month that BINAC was delivered to 
Northrop Aircraft. The Binary Automatic Computer was a project 
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for Northrop that began in 1947 because the company needed a 
computer to deliver a new missile, the SNARK. It was also, more 
than likely, to detect and measure Soviet atomic experiments. 
The BINAC was constructed by Eckert and Mauchly who had moved 
into the commercial sector, but who, wisely, were not above 
taking military contracts. Unfortunately, Eckert and Mauchly’s 
ventures were not without trials and tribulations that went 
beyond their feud with Goldstine and von Neumann. By this point 
during the Cold War, anti-Communism had taken a significant hold 
on the governmental structures and was aimed at those who were 
involved with the government in the smallest of ways, much more 
with those who were involved with top secret projects like 
BINAC. Unfortunately for Mauchly, those outside direct 
governmental service must have a background check. The Army 
Intelligence Division had carried out an investigation of Eckert 
and Mauchly’s company and found persons that were suspect, 
including Mauchly himself.
129
 The accusations rested upon simple 
evidence such as supporting the liberal Henry Wallace. Mauchly 
had belonged to a group the “American Association of Scientists” 
and supported civilian control of atomic energy. This 
affiliation triggered an FBI investigation of Mauchly and the 
others. Fortunately all were cleared of subversive activity on 
November 11, 1948 and were allowed to continue with the BINAC 
                       





 If Mauchly had not been cleared his partnership with 
Eckert more than likely would have ended thus handicapping 
future supercomputing projects. Furthermore, Eckert would have 
been under scrutiny and thus would have handicapped the State 
Department in their future use of Eckert to examine Soviet 
computing efforts.
131
 The BINAC project was pivotal in a 
political as well as a scientific way. The power of anti-
Communism in Americas was as powerful as the ideologies that 
motivated the Soviet Union and in the same manner could have 
obstructed scientific progress as in the Soviet Union, but this 
case proves that measured against the importance of scientific 
breakthroughs, ideological censorship took second place in the 
United States.  
Strangely, BINAC was to be made under some very stringent 
specifications. Firstly, the computer had to be incredibly 
accurate, so much so that it would have to eclipse other 
machines by far.
132
 Secondly and oddly, Northrop wanted the BINAC 
to be able to fit and be used in an airplane. Northrop paid 
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Eckert and Mauchly $100,000 to develop the machine.
133
 
Unfortunately, the project was plagued by problems. At best 
computers, even today, are fragile machines and at worst 
temperamental. Building a piece of “big iron” (the nickname for 
these early mainframes) that could be moved would be almost 
impossible. Another problem was that BINAC was considered to be 
nothing more than a side project for Eckert and Mauchly: their 
attention was never fully devoted to the computer, and they were 
just looking for capital to throw into UNIVAC. In the end, the 
BINAC was completed at a cost of $280,000 and so it was vastly 
over budget and, more importantly, it never worked correctly.
134
 
Northrop ended up putting the machine in storage, never to be 
utilized.
135
 Up until this point, scientific and military 
computing required heavy investment, but it had always provided 
what it had promised. In this case, BINAC was a miserable 
failure. Unfortunately, this was the first time that the 
computing field had failed to deliver and it would not be the 
last time. During this same time Containment suffered another 
blow.   
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By the autumn of 1949 Mao’s Communists were getting the 
better of the fight with the Kuomintang (KMT) forces. By October 
of the year Chiang and the KMT forces were pushed off the 
mainland and retreated to Taiwan and on October 19, 1949 China 
fell into the hands of the Communists, and the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC-Communists) was declared. Obviously the U.S. would 
not recognize the PRC provoking Mao into strengthening his ties 
to the Soviet Union.  
 As with other crisis moments in the Cold War, events in 
China prompted the search for speed in the development of 
weaponry. By 1949 the U.S. still had a clear advantage. The 
development of these weapons could not have been achieved in an 
order of magnitude necessary without the use of machine 
calculation, which came from the supercomputers such as ENIAC, 
EDVAC and the IAS Princeton Class machines. The U.S. military 
saw the practical use of the computers and invested heavily in 
those projects to develop their atomic bomb program. The Soviets 
atomic developments came from their espionage networks and not 
from advanced computing, which although began in 1948 under the 
aegis of Sergei Lebedev, was not on a realizable path until a 
later date. This is why the United States had such a 
quantitative and temporal lead in the area of atomic weaponry, 
which was vast. In short, the U.S. military had invested and the 
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investment paid off with significant results. Events in China 
further prodded U.S. military projects the notion of monolithic, 
global Communism presented the need for more military might. 
Conventional forces and atomic stockpiles would have to be 
increased as well as investments in supercomputing. 
 Containment Crumbling. While the mathematical aspects of 
the Cold War were moving ahead, George Kennan's containment 
strategy was beginning to disintegrate. The first Soviet atomic 
test Joe I, as noted, came as a shock to American public and the 
political sector of society who thought that this would come 
much later. But the scientists guessed that this was about the 
time that the event would happen. This awareness, plus the "Loss 
of China" were chipping away at Containment. Furthermore, the 
tenets of Containment were unclear. Kennan, as a theorist, was 
similar to Karl Marx in that Marx talked a lot about "class," 
but never truly defined what class meant. In this way 
Containment was similar: no one truly understood what Kennan's 
strategy was and maybe he did not understand it, in a mature 
way, himself. Many times these viewpoints only become clear at a 
later date. One thing is for certain: Kennan preferred economic 
defenses rather than direct military offensive postures. This is 
why he did not agree with the NATO military alliance. In short, 
time was running out for both Kennan and his grand strategy. He 
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was living in a world in which the climate of fear had just 
escalated and caused further transformations in the American 
mindset as we1l as the political structures.  
It would not take much more aggression to destroy the first 
grand strategy, which was not based in numerical prowess, of the 
Cold War. At the onset of the "official" Cold War a strategy had 
already been developed by von Neumann and his colleague Oscar 
Morgenstern, Game Theory, which provided a mathematical 
structure for dealing with the Soviets. The "Two Player Game" 
scenario, The Prisoner's Dilemma fit well into managing the 
atomic competition, which created the central characteristic of 
the Cold War. This, of course, raises the question of who was 












NSC 68: Rollback 1950-1952 
Into the Whirlwind 
 
By 1950 Kennan’s Containment policy was still ongoing. The 
Marshall Plan was still in effect, until the end of the Truman 
Administration, bringing desperate economic aid to a still 
recumbent Europe. Also the North Atlantic alliance had been 
formed in 1949. With the fall of China to Communism, however, 
the Administration had given some pause for thought to the 
efficacy of containment. Of course the political backlash of the 
“Who Lost China” issue from the Republicans, and the Red-Baiting 
by McCarthy did nothing to help our national security policy to 
that point.  
Containment vs. NSC 68 
Containment was being re-evaluated also because Under-
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, whose star was rising, was 
never convinced about its effectiveness: 
 His [Kennan’s] recommendations… to be good of heart, 
to look to our own social and economic health, to 
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present a good face to the world, all of which the 




While Acheson was not convinced about Containment, Kennan’s 
replacement as head of the Policy Planning Staff revealed even 
more doubts. Paul Nitze did not believe, as Kennan did, in 
nuclear disarmament and reliance on other methods to deal with 
the Soviets. He considered this method to be “impractical.” 
Furthermore, Nitze thought that this soft approach would make 
overtures more difficult.
137
 At the inception of containment in 
1946 and 1947, the government and President Truman in particular 
did not see any reason to stop pursuing experiments to bring 
about a thermonuclear weapon while continuing to gather 
intelligence on the maneuverings of the Soviets. It was obvious 
that Truman wanted a more hawkish stance against the Soviets. In 
the light of events in Greece, Turkey, China, and the Joe I test 
Kennan’s “unsound” plan for nuclear weapons had to be abandoned. 
Nitze drafted a new stance in National Security Document number 
68 (hereinafter NSC 68). The policy now was truly a global 
policy and made military force a primary character, departing 
from Kennan’s emphasis on economic policies. On April 14, 1950 
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NSC 68 was adopted as the new alternative to George Kennan's 
policy of Containment. Under the section titled “TERMS OF 
REFERENCE,” the document stated: 
 These objectives on our strategic plans, in the light 
of the probable fission bomb capability and possible 




The document attributed the primacy not only to 
militarization, as NSC 68 is typically characterized; but to 
atomic and nuclear weapons as well. The document continues: 
 More fundamental decisions (a) as to whether, in the 
event that a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves 
successful, such weapons should be stockpiled, or (b) 
if stockpiled, the condition under which they might be 
used in war, if a test of a thermonuclear weapon 
proves successful, the pressures to produce and 
stockpile such weapons to be held for the same 
purposes for which fission bombs are then being held 
will be greatly increased...A general reexamination of 
this country’s strategic plans and its objectives...to 
consider national policy...with respect to possible 





The document assessed the geopolitical conditions. In 
section IV titled: "The Underlying Conflict in the realm of 
Ideas and Values between the U.S. Purpose and the Kremlin 
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Design" the binary nature of the conflict was completely 
established: 
The Kremlin regards the United States as the only 
major threat to the conflict between the idea of 
slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin,... 
the polarization [is] the exclusive possession of 





Of course the conclusion was based on an educated guess 
about Stalin’s intentions and global ambitions. In light of the 
Soviet's first atomic test in August of 1949, von Neumann's 
"Prisoner's Dilemma" now seemed a reality. Stalin probably did 
not wish to use his atomic arsenal except in the face of U.S. 
aggression in kind. This was a reasonable extrapolation on the 
parts of both parties: a type of "expectation" on both sides of 
the conflict. If this is in fact the structure of the scenario, 
then both a state of "competition" and a state of "cooperation" 
existed on the issues regarding atomic and nuclear arsenals; 
that was the very character of the dilemma.  
The structure of the Cold War, with its primacy on the 
quantity and progressive quality of nuclear weapons made 
equations increasingly difficult to maintain within the human 
sphere. This was not only true in the building of the arsenals 
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but in the overall ability to provide global security. In short, 
if there were no arsenals there would be no security for the 
United States and its allies. Given the rising Cold War tensions 
and conflict the two sides felt the need for speed in 
calculation to maintain what they considered the advantage. To 
this end, the Soviet Union entered the Supercomputer Race. Their 
entry was late and therefore there was a "Supercomputer Gap" 
that had a direct impact on the outcome of the Cold War in favor 
of the United States. 
In the early days of the Cold War there was a fear that 
Communism was monolithic, its scope global in nature. Certainly, 
there was evidence for this perception. Stalin held sway over 
Eastern Europe, both Greece and Turkey were involved in 
struggles against Communist movements, Berlin was blockaded, and 
China had fallen to Communist forces. These events had prompted 
the United States to adopt a new geopolitical strategy to roll 
the Communist forces back by adopting NSC 68. The new policy 
would have its first test in the Korean War. 
  The Korean War and Turing. Before World War II the U.S. 
had interests in Asia; however, President Roosevelt realized the 
problem of defending them. In the post-war world the U.S. 
position on Asia was initially characterized by FDR's 
internationalist, anti-colonial stance. He wanted to eliminate 
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the threat of what was seen as western imperialism. With the 
fall of China and the establishment of the PRC Truman was no 
longer in the mood to be magnanimous. The heightened fear of the 
rise Communism in Asia was well founded, even if Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson was not sensitive to this. On June 25
th
 1950 
North Korean forces invaded the non-Communist South. In the 
beginning of the war the Communists pushed the South Korean 
forces back to Pusan, nearly off the peninsula. Then the Inchon 
landing turned the tide for U.N. forces commanded by General 
Douglas Macarthur. The U.N. forces pushed the Communists back to 
the Yalu River bordering on China. The PRC sent troops to 
reinforce the North Koreans. Eventually the conflict between the 
two forces held along the 38
th
 parallel, where it would freeze 
into a stalemate for the following two years. The conflict 
proved that conventional forces would not always be effective, 
and so the need for nuclear arsenals was a likely substitute. 
With the Korean War as the ultimate justification for the 
policies laid down in NSC 68, the flood gates were now 
irrevocably opened to supercomputing projects.  
Not all of the advances in supercomputing occurred because 
the United States held a position as leader of the “free-world.” 
The other major western nation, Great Britain, also held a 
prominent role in this scientific field. At the end of World War 
105 
 
II Winston Churchill’s “Wizards” were discharged and operations 
at Bletchley Park were dismantled as well as the computers, most 
notably Colossus. The genius behind that work, Alan Turing ended 
up at the National Physics Laboratory at Teddington (hereinafter 
NPL), where he began to plan and construct a new machine called 
ACE. The ACE (Automatic Computing Engine) was to be the first 
“brain,” as Turing called it when he originally drew up the 
plans for the machine to do complex calculations all at once 
rather than parsing out information. The work of programming the 
computer was daunting and the NPL in the end decided not to 
build the ACE to Turing’s specifications. The ACE was eventually 
constructed at the NPL and initiated its first calculation on 
May 10, 1950 without Turing.
141
 Frustrated, Turing Left the NPL 
and returned to academia in 1947. At Cambridge he did hold 
positions not in mathematics or computing but neurology instead. 
This may seem odd, but perhaps it was this oddity that sealed 
Turing’s reputation for all time in the field of computers. 
In October of 1950, Turing wrote an article that asked a 
simple question: “Can machines think?” Turing came up with some 
interesting insights about the question. He said that ultimately 
the question is the wrong one to ask. The computer could not 
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experience the world as a human could. This did not mean there 
was no similarity between what the machine could do and what 
humans did. In a contest of mathematical skills Turing said that 
a man would: “clearly make a very poor showing… given away by 
his slowness and inaccuracy.”
142
 He laid out a “game,” which he 
called: “The Imitation Game.” First, he said that only digital 
computers could play this game because only they could “mimic 
the actions of a human computer very closely.”
143
 Then in a 
section titled Contrary Views on the Main Question, he laid out 
what was and is still called “The Turing Test:” 
 I believe that in about fifty years’ time it will be 
possible to programme computers, with a storage 
capacity of about 109, to make them play the imitation 
game so well that an average interrogator will not 
have more than a 70 per cent chance of making the 




    
The Turing Test was now set in stone as an ultimate goal of 
computing. The idea of the independent electronic brain would 
have its benefits. The computer already had a strong advantage 
in speed of mathematical operations, but the possibility of the 
actual ability to “out-think” a human being could have a great 
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impact on strategic games. The military applications were 
obvious at that point and investment was forthcoming and 
plentiful. The discipline was a new outcropping of the Cold War. 
The viability of artificial intelligence to aid in Cold War 
efforts remained to be seen, but the possibilities were there. 
Meanwhile, tried and true efforts and tactics still remained. 
Engineering Research Associates. Admiral Chester Nimitz, 
from his experience during the war recognized the importance of 
computer technology. After-all, the Navy was a serious investor 
in the technology, which had paid off a thousand-fold for them 
in the area of code-breaking. To this end, the Admiral contacted 
his lieutenants William C. Norris and Howard Engstrom in late 
1945 to gather together a group to continue work on such 
projects. Finding financing for such a venture was not easy work 
and the men were at their wits end to find a way to do what the 
Admiral wished. In the end, understanding that the Soviets were 
likely to become aggressive in the post-war era, Nimitz brought 
the men to James V. Forrestal, who had not, at that point, 
become the first Secretary of Defense, aided them in their 
quest. Forrestal’s aid translated into an initial investment of 
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$300,000 and then an additional 10,000 to form Engineering 
Research Associates (hereinafter ERA) in January 1946.
145
 
ERA was open to projects from any area, including private 
businesses; one of their first projects was called “Project 
Boom.” Their task was to engineer an underground test 
explosion.
146
 Certainly not a project meant for use by commercial 
industries. It was obvious to the engineers at ERA that “Boom” 
was for the military.  In these early days of the Cold War it 
was hard to tell if ERA was really a private concern or another 
extension of the government. For example, military personnel 
were assigned to ERA to guard the entrances and exits as well as 
the work areas. The work was supervised by a captain of the 
Navy. The company was to develop computer memory that would aid 
in cryptology. In the first year of its operation the National 
Security Agency (hereinafter NSA) oversaw the work. ERA’s inner-
workings had to be a closely guarded secret even from other 
governmental agencies. ERA’s contracts were granted from the 
Navy, but they did some work for the Air Force in explosion 
testing, with the NSA watching very closely. Furthermore, ERA 
had no official budget, so other agencies could not trace its 
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 Various memory devices were created at ERA for the 
specific purpose of Soviet code-breaking. One of them, codenamed 
DEMON produced results, until February of 1949, when the Soviets 
changed their system.
148
    
Nevertheless, ERA still produced what was necessary for the 
NSA, in the form of a new computer called ATLAS. ATLAS was 
delivered to the NSA at the end of 1950 where it would work on 
cryptanalysis 24 hours a day needing minimal maintenance.
149
   
Soviet supercomputing and espionage. By this time the 
United States and many of its western allies in Europe were 
immersed in computing projects, most of which were for 
scientific and military purposes. The Soviet Union was still 
struggling to get its first digital computer on-line. By 
November of 1950 the Malaya Elektronnaya Schetnaya Mashina or 
“Small Calculating Machine” (hereinafter MESM) was in its 
initial testing stages.
150
 It had taken the Soviets quite some 
time to understand the need for high speed computing to keep up 
with the west. One reason for this again was the extent to which 
ideology figured into Soviet science itself. There had been 
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serious conflicts in that area ever since the time Bolsheviks 
had consolidated their power in Russia. In July 1948 Trofim 
Lysenko, a biologist, came out against western sciences as a 
bourgeois concept and therefore unacceptable for the needs of 
Soviet society. Science had to be rethought, following dogma 
rather than experimentation. Projects had to first be 
rationalized to fit the ideology and then justified in some way.  
Of course, this self-imposed limitation affected Soviet 
computing for quite some time. Nevertheless, by 1950 the Vice 
President of the Ukrainian Academy of Science and Director of 
the Mathematics Institute, Mikhail Lavrent’ev stood up for 
computing projects. He wrote directly to Stalin, a risky move 
indeed, in which he explained the necessity for computing 
projects in defense projects which spoke directly to the Soviet 
Union’s national security.
151
 Stalin, finally understanding the 
connection between computing and more and better nuclear 
weapons, moved quickly. Lavrent’ev was assigned a directorship 
over two massive supercomputing projects.
152
      
Due to the Soviets’ late entry, the gap between nuclear 
arsenals in the United States and the Soviet Union was as vast 
as the supercomputing efforts in both nations; and while the 
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Soviets were still stumbling, the United States showed no signs 
of slowing down in either area. 
Things for the supercomputing efforts in the Soviet Union 
certainly would have been aided by the espionage efforts in 
which the Soviets had invested a great deal since the wartime 
period. The famous Rosenberg case, Rosenberg v. United States, 
346 U.S. 273 (1953) is the most notable example of this effort 
along with the cases involving Klaus Fuchs and Kim Philby. 
Julius Rosenberg and Ethel joined the Communist Party sometime 
in 1939. They learned of vital information in the Manhattan 
Project at the New Mexico atomic research facility. 
Unfortunately, the authorities did not learn about the atomic 
espionage efforts until 1948, when code-breakers working for the 
U.S. Army decrypted about 3000 of the codenamed Venona cables 
between Soviet intelligence agencies in Moscow and spies in the 
United States.  The cables led to David Greenglass, Ethel’s 
brother, who had worked as a machinist at Los Alamos during the 
war. A message to the Soviets was dispatched by Lieutenant 
General P.M. Fitin on September 21, 1944:  
 Julius Rosenberg recommended the wife of his wife’s 
brother, Ruth Greenglass… She is 21 years old, a U.S. 
Citizen [and] a [member] of the New York Communist 
League since 1942. [Ruth] learned that her husband had 
been called up by the army but he was not sent to the 
front. He is a mechanical engineer and is now working 
at the Atomic Energy Project plant in Santa Fe, New 
Mexico. Bernard Schuster is the member of the 
Communist Party line Julius Rosenberg is in touch with 
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Schuster they meet once a month for the payment of 
dues. Schuster is interested in whether or not we are 
satisfied with the collaboration.
153
   
 
In a roundabout way, Soviet efforts to obtain the atomic 
secrets were less productive than if Moscow had obtained the 
secrets and blueprints for one if not all of the U.S.’s 
supercomputers. Certainly there would have been some 
complications in doing this, but they were not anymore 
insurmountable than obtaining atomic information. One thing is 
for certain: although the machines were at National laboratories 
such as Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and Livermore, the planning and 
construction of the computers were often at American 
universities, such as the aforementioned Moore School at the 
University of Pennsylvania (ENIAC) or at Harvard (Mark I, II and 
III).
154
 Soviet agents had penetrated American universities at 
least since the 1930’s. In the wake of the Great Depression, the 
feeling among many American leftist intellectuals was that 
Communism was indeed the wave of the future and that to bristle 
against the ideology was utter “stupidity.”
155
 To this end, the 
U.S.S.R. created various fronts for their campaign to recruit 
sympathy for their cause especially in labor movements and the 
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 Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin’s chief of the 
Cominform once stated very confidently: 
Communist parties of Europe have achieved considerable 
successes in conducting work among the Intelligentsia.  
Proof of this is the fact that in these countries the 






The spread of Communism was not confined to the nations of 
Europe. In fact, New York was once described as: “the most 
interesting part of the Soviet Union.”
158
 Soviet espionage 
efforts were more mature than American networks. From 1917 to 
1929 the United States had an outstanding cryptographic 
intelligence department, MI-8, also known as the Black Chamber. 
They had broken codes from various nations, including the Soviet 
Union. But that department was dismantled in 1929 because Henry 
L. Stimson, the new Secretary of State, was offended by the very 
notion of the department’s work, stating “We will do better by 
being an honest simpleton in the world of nations than a 
designing Sherlock Holmes.”
159
 In 1931, however, Soviet codes 
were under scrutiny by the government. The efforts against the 
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Soviet Union at the time were considered to be of low priority 
and ultimately unsuccessful.
160
  American espionage efforts 
stagnated between the wars. On the other hand, Soviet efforts 
were undone by the very movement which had created them. In this 
case, the revolutionaries ate their own. The combined effect of 
the show trials in the late 1930s, Stalin’s own treatment of 
autonomous Yugoslavia, and then finally the detonation of the 
Soviet bomb made Communist sympathizers in the U.S. 
disillusioned with the ideals of Communism, as represented by 
the Soviet Union. Still the Soviets could have increased their 
efforts to procure the necessary items to produce a digital 
machine, but decided to devote more attention to the atomic 
project in Los Alamos. Due to the Soviets’ focus on the atomic 
bomb they widened the Supercomputer Gap, again to their 
detriment.   
 The Defense Calculator. Meanwhile, in October of 1951 IBM 
once again entered the fray. IBM decided that it would mass 
produce the 701, otherwise known as the “Defense Calculator.”
161
 
The construction of the 701 was predicated on the following: 
 When the outbreak of hostilities in Korea made the 
production of the devices embodying all of these 
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IBM promised the Naval Ordinance Laboratory that the 
machine was 25 times faster than its previous machine, the SSEC, 
because the Defense Calculator utilized germanium diodes rather 
than vacuum tubes. IBM further impressed the Navy by 
highlighting the machine’s versatility and ability to do 
calculations on an unprecedented scale: 
 used for calculation of radiation effects in atomic 
energy; for aerodynamic computations for planes and 
guided missiles, including vibration and stress 
analysis, design and performance computations for jet 
and rocket engines, propellers, landing gear, radomes, 
etc.; on studies related to the effectiveness of 
various weapons; and on steam and gas turbine design 
calculations.
163
   
 
The computer was indeed impressive, though IBM would not 
deviate from its standard practice of renting its computers as 
it had during World War II. The defense calculator had been 
specifically presented to the government as a scientific 
computer that was capable of new complex calculations, and IBM 
purposefully sped up production of the 701 because of the crisis 
in Korea.
164
 The Navy would have to pay a hefty price for new 
technologies, at least from IBM. The price tag was $11,900 
monthly depending on how much storage capacity was needed based 
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 Despite the overall price, the 
Navy signed contracts for the computer which ended up being 
called Naval Ordinance Research Calculator or NORC, to be 
delivered to its research laboratories.
166
 The Air Force also 
ordered 701’s.    
Approximately, two months after the delivery of NORC, the 
Soviets’ MESM began its first calculations. It was almost 1952, 
and the Soviets had their first digital computer. At the end of 
1951 the west was so far ahead it would be hard to imagine that 
the Soviets could ever catch up. To put this into perspective, 
the United States alone had at least nine major supercomputers. 
Some authors indicate an even higher number: ENIAC, EDVAC, The 
IAS Machine, IBM’s ASCC, SSEC, The Defense Calculator (NORC), 
University of Illinois ILLIAC I and II, and ERA’s ATLAS. 
Overseas the United Kingdom had three major supercomputers: 
EDSAC, the Manchester Mark I and ACE all faster than the Soviet 
MESM and all working on military escalation.   
This is not to say that Lebedev’s MESM was not impressive 
especially considering the lack of resources at Lebedev’s 
disposal, but once the Soviet government committed to the 
computing projects, it also expected incredible results. On 
January 8, 1951, as the MESM had just begun its work, Lebedev 
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was called before the Scientific Council of the ASU Institute of 
Electronic Technology and Heat-Power Engineering to answer 
questions about his project. He was asked quite simply how the 
MESM compared to machines in the West. Lebedev answered: 
 I have data on about 18 machines created by the 
Americans, but this information is primarily 
advertisement, without any notion about the way they 
were built.  We must catch up with foreign 
construction in building computing machines.  We need 
to do this quickly. According to the foreign 
literature of design and implementation of a machine 
takes 5-10 years, but we want to make it happen in 2.  
For a comparison of MESM's characteristics to American 
computers, the multiplication time on ENIAC is about 






MESM lacked speed. Lebedev accelerated his programs to two 
years to try to catch the Americans. One thing is for certain, 
Lebedev severely underestimated not only the time it took for 
the west to construct a machine, but also the time it would take 
the U.S. to develop new computer technologies that would keep 
the Soviet computer efforts “contained,” if you will. 
 
 
The RAND Corporation 
 
If there is any one place that is more important to the 
Cold War than, let's say, the NATO headquarters, it is the RAND 
Corporation. There is also no other place that was not a direct 
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arm of the government or the military that had an effect on 
United States policy than RAND, and it is here that the 
particulars of Paul Nitze's NSC 68 fell into place, at times 
with the pure brute force of calculation.  
RAND began its life, as most things during the Cold War, by 
the grace of 50 U.S.C. 401 (1947), otherwise known as the 
National Security Act of 1947. Other than creating the National 
Security Agency, the Department of Defense and the Central 
Intelligence Agency, it also split the Army Air Corps away from 
the Army and created the United States Air Force. Even before 
the Act, General Henry "Hap" Arnold was advocating such a split 
as was recommended by a research group that was part of Douglas 
Aircraft Company at that time, December 1945, called "Project 
RAND."  
Like George Patton and Nimitz before him, Arnold saw the 
advances in science during the Second World War. He had seen the 
proximity fuse that had come to life as a result of Vannevar 
Bush's Office of Scientific Research and Development. More 
importantly, he saw the dire need to continue such research in a 
quiet manner. To this end RAND became independent of Douglas 
Aircraft on March 2, 1946. By taking this step, Arnold ensured 
that the think tank would be independent. Its researchers could 





 RAND was set apart. RAND’s infrastructure was informal 
and had a small collection of researchers, only 200 by 1948. In 
this way it was similar to Princeton's IAS.  
It has been said of IBM that is not a company based on 
computers and technology, but rather "solutions.”
169
 RAND is the 
same in this way: 
 RAND studied systems and ways of doing things, rather 
than particular devices, particular instrumentalities, 
particular weapons, and we are concerned not merely 
with the physical aspects of these systems but with 




This orientation towards research and "solutions" created a 
need for more than just scientists, mathematicians and 
physicists in the strict sense of the word. RAND pulled from 
various sources to craft solutions: it included economists, 
engineers, chemists and psychologists.
171
 Before RAND had even 
become incorporated on May 14, 1948, it was already well on its 
way in doing what its mission statement declared: "To further 
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and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, 




Just to put the think tank into context, RAND stands for 
Research and Development, but it has often been quipped that it 
really stands for "Research and no Development." The question 
is: If RAND does not "develop" where does the fault in that lay? 
For example, RAND's first report titled Preliminary Design of an 
Experimental World Circling Spaceship, was 236 pages of research 
on the feasibility of space flight both in the theoretical 
aspects as well as the practical engineering side of such an 
undertaking as the deployment of satellites and other such 
orbiting spacecraft. The report was ignored and only gained its 
importance more than a decade later.
173
 The fault in ignoring the 
report is irrelevant; what was worthy of note is that 
development could and possibly should have come on the heels of 
the report. In short, RAND had fulfilled its purpose.  
Because of the nature of the problems set in front of RAND, 
calculation was set at a premium. One year after the report on 
spaceflight was issued, RAND hired a distinguished consultant: 
it was John von Neumann, who joined them on December 16, 1947.  
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Why von Neumann? Before we answer that question we must 
assess the state of supercomputing at RAND during those early 
years. Although RAND was interdisciplinary, the institute was 
heavily disposed to mathematics and science. It needed the 
fastest, most advanced computers just as well as Los Alamos and 
the other labs working on atomic and nuclear problems. RAND 
started out with an analog computer, a Reeve's Electronic Analog 
Computer, or REAC for short and six IBM 604s. The IBM 603 could 
do 6,000 calculations per hour and its multiplications alone 
were done at a speed of .027 seconds. According to IBM, its 
customers liked the 603 and its improvement, the 604. Northrop 
Aircraft had purchased one in 1948 to aid with its research to 
run calculations that previously took weeks to solve. Its speed 
was due to new mini tubes.
174
 Furthermore, according to Herbert 
Grosch, a scientist at IBM's Watson Laboratory, the 604 was "six 
or seven times faster than their 602 and 602a and ten times 
faster than their aging 601 line."
175
 IBM had also touted the 603 
and 604 lines with a huge advertising campaign that lured many 
businesses to rent the computer. No doubt that this campaign was 
what caught the eyes of RAND, which needed speed. Despite the 
grandiose touting by IBM of its computer, RAND was soon 
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regretful of its decision to rent the computers. Within two 
years RAND apparently needed more computing power, or maybe they 
didn't. 
It was up to von Neumann to verify how badly needed that 
power was. RAND had all this impressive computing power but the 
scientists ran into mathematical "brick walls" where it seemed 
no computer could solve the problem but... 
RAND was working on a problem so complex that no 
existing computer could handle it, and they asked von 
Neumann's help in designing a new, more powerful 
computer. Von Neumann asked that they first tell him 
the problem. The scientists' explanation took about 
two hours, accompanied with furious scribbling on a 
blackboard. Von Neumann just sat there with his head 
buried in his hands. At the end of the explanation, 
von Neumann scribbled something on a pad of paper in 
front of him. "Gentlemen," he said, "you do not need a 




 JOHNNIAC. Despite von Neumann's impressive abilities, by 
1950 the researchers at RAND understood that they indeed did 
need more computing power. They screamed that reliability was a 
serious problem and that this must be resolved.
177
 Considering 
that University of Illinois and Argonne National Labs both had 
Princeton class machines based upon von Neumann's IAS computer 
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and were more than satisfied with their abilities, RAND decided 
that they would build their own machine: the JOHNNIAC, named 
after von Neumann. 
 Because of its architecture, the JOHNNIAC would be easy to 
use, faster, and more reliable. Another decision to build rather 
than purchase or rent was that IBM's employees and RAND's 
engineers were butting heads over most trivial issues, and other 
manufacturers were not prepared to ship machines to RAND at that 
point.
178
 Over the next several years RAND did purchase and rent 
other computers, including IBM's 701 Defense Calculators, but 
RAND was still not satisfied with their performance. In RAND's 
early years the JOHNNIAC was their star performer.
179
 RAND 
considered the cost of renting the 701s versus constructing the 
JOHNNIAC, but in the end the 701's were labeled "rich man's 
machines.” That rental would cost RAND an estimated $380,000 
without considering maintenance
180
; this was almost within the 
range of all of RAND's expenditures for its employees in 1950.
181
 
RAND’s grudge with IBM notwithstanding, the time needed to 
construct the JOHNNIAC had to be considered. John Williams, who 
was the head of the mathematics division of RAND, calculated the 
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construction time would be two and two-thirds years to build the 
machine. But the job was done before that time frame, proving 
that not only Williams but also Lebedev were incorrect in their 




RAND and NATO vulnerability. So, why is all of this 
important to the overall scheme of the Cold War? The answer in a 
word was: "defense." More specifically, calculation and speed 
favored the American strategists’ inclination towards a 
peripheral strategy, placing the U.S. first strike ability and 
self-defense above the forward defense of NATO. RAND’s penchant 
for statistics privileged this scenario. Every piece of data 
that figured in RAND's assessments went through computers and 
for the early years the JOHNNIAC in particular. The Airforce, 
which relied heavily on their brainchild, had more or less taken 
over the responsibility of first strike bombers in attack 
scenarios as well as defensive ones, and they needed assessments 
and advice. RAND's data and assessments carried a lot of weight. 
So, when two RAND researchers, Albert Wohlstetter and Harry 
Rowen wrote their recommendations to the Airforce titled 
Campaign Time Pattern, Sortie Rate, and Base Location the 
Airforce took their recommendations very seriously. 
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Wohlsetter's and Rowen's report suggested that a first 
strike against the Soviet Union could not be a "Sunday Punch," 
meaning that one massive strike was not practicable and would 
most likely be ineffective, considering the effect of the two 
bombs striking Japan in 1945 left certain materials intact. This 
being the case, that one had to consider several strikes and 
military maneuvers requiring time to do reconnaissance for other 
strikes, recuperative ability of airbases and making sure that 
targets were "killed dead," i.e. unable to resurrected. 
Furthermore, the report conveyed a real concern about air 
engagements at a one to one basis. In the end, the report 
concluded that the cost of bombers in the U.S. and Europe were 
the same, but the ability to recuperate would be a factor and 
thus the bomber strike force would be better served by being in 
the U.S.
183
 This report was delivered to Nitze, who took it very 
seriously. The effect of the report would essentially leave NATO 
forces in Europe "out in the wind," vulnerable to attack both 
from the air and on the ground. Time would work against Europe 
and possibly seal its fate. Especially the inability of the 
continental powers to protect themselves would not have helped 
their self-esteem both as regional and global powers.  
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France had pressed hard since the end of the Second World 
War to regain its credibility since surrendering to the Nazis in 
1940.
184
 In the postwar period France was in a difficult 
position, as far as its national identity was concerned; it had 
to show dignity and pride and at the same time cultivate U.S. 
favor; Italy was in no better position. This left both nations 
in an awkward position vis-a-vis their membership in NATO. At 
this early stage of the Cold War both Italy and France were left 
vulnerable when they needed reassurance and at least some 
semblance of their own ability to participate as full partners 
in international affairs. Nevertheless they were charged with 
responsibilities whether they were prepared to handle them or 
not. For example, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program’s 
Article 3 called for all signatories to resist armed attack; it 
also noted that the signatories would have to: 
 Gain time for reinforcements to arrive and for 
cumulative effect of the strategic air offensive to be 
felt...the North American Area, its "initial basic 
understanding is to initiate the strategic air 
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The cost of refueling bombers from U.S. airbases cost about 
the same as in Europe and so it did not matter where the 
airbases were located. The report did state a serious concern 
about one-to-one air combat. This being the case, the task of 
mounting initial air offensives was the responsibility of the 
"European nations."
186
 The language used in the document points 
to the fact that the U.S. would be responsible for atomic 
offensives, and more importantly that these offensives, although 
they would be carried out with deliberate speed, would take time 
to reach the U.S.S.R. and would leave Europe in a vulnerable 
position.  
Bull Computers. France did not put forth a serious effort 
to engage in an atomic program. The definitive decision was made 
after the Suez Crisis in 1956. France did, however, pursue 
supercomputer projects. Compagnie des Machines Bull produced an 
experimental model, Gamma-2 in 1949. But the company’s engineers 
needed aid. They received it from Remington-Rand (ERA had been 
purchased by Remington by this time), Howard Aiken, and J. 
Presper Eckert. Gamma-3 was built in 1952 followed by the Gamma-
E.T. in 1957. These computers did not possess the power of their 
American contemporaries. It was not until Bull produced the 
Gamma-60 in 1958 that it had a computer that could match some of 
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the IBM computers. The first atomic test by France occurred in 
February 1960, much later than the Americans and the Soviets. 
But the test only occurred after the Gamma-60 was created.  
Whether or not France’s vulnerability prompted it to pursue 
supercomputing and initial atomic projects is unknown. But 
circumstances do indicate that possibility.  
Ultimately, it cannot be known if NATO nations would have, 
in reality, been sacrificed by U.S. domestic defensive interests 
because there was no nuclear exchange during the Cold War. 
However, the analysts at RAND clearly were recommending that the 
government do so. 
  Whirlwind I. While RAND was considering the utilization 
of atomic forces across the globe, the Air Defense System 
Engineering Committee (hereinafter ADSEC) met for the first time 
in late December 1950, to consider one of the most important 
projects of the entire Cold War. The committee understood that 
it needed digital computers to handle air defense problems. This 
was especially true given the need of jet fighters to intercept 
high-altitude bombers. Despite advances in rocketry since WWII, 
delivery systems were, still in the minds of the military 
forces, focused on bombers. Bombers or missile delivery systems 
notwithstanding, the United States still did not have an 
adequate air-defense system. During the war there had been some 
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detection equipment but, with the end of the war, these systems 
had been retired in the wake of demilitarization. Project 
Whirlwind was under the direction of Jay Forrester at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Whirlwind was a 
computer that was to handle air-traffic problems. The project 
was originally under the auspices of the Navy. The Air Force had 
looked at Whirlwind in a cursory manner and had decided to look 
further. Whirlwind was a large-scale machine capable of speeds 
unimagined to that point, and so, on January 20, 1950 the Air 
Force notified Forrester that they needed Whirlwind to 
coordinate air defense problems.
187
 As we have previously seen, 
the military had been investing in computing projects since the 
early 1930's; but it was with Project Whirlwind that the Air 
Force started its heavy investment in earnest. For example, for 
the fiscal year in 1951 1,650,000 was given to Whirlwind alone 
($14,608,242 adjusted 2012).
188
 Furthermore, by this time the 
armed forces were taking the initiative by granting funds to 
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Given the stringent goals of Whirlwind, i.e. the complete 
defense of the United States, it was understood that this 
computer would have to be like no other before it. Anyone who 
owns a Windows PC knows first-hand how frustrating it is to have 
their computer “crash.” It is even worse when, because of the 
crash, your data is irretrievably lost. If a computer like 
Whirlwind crashed the consequences for the entire world would be 
disastrous. So, the computer needed an unprecedented amount of 
reliability: 
 Reliability was essential…”a single error of anywhere 
in the machine can destroy the entire calculation.” A 
practical computer should tolerate no more than one 
error per 100 billion (i.e., 10 to the 11th power) 
operations equivalent to one wrong number every two 





No one would deny that Forrester and his team understood 
what would be at stake if Whirlwind failed in its assigned 
tasks. Another problem, which might have seemed frivolous or the 
stuff of science fiction now became a practical problem in 
reality when concerning Whirlwind: the ability to “think.” As we 
know, Turing had addressed that very question. He wrote that in 
time a computer might be able to think, but not at the present 
                       




time. Similarly, the people working on the Whirlwind had the 
same problem: 
The computer could not think, in the sense that 
humans do; however, if it were programmed 
carefully enough in advance, step by step, it 
could be made to calculate and choose among the 
alternatives provided in, say, combat operations 
or “the supporting activities of logistics, 




The solution to this “thinking” problem was perhaps the 
largest gamble concerning Whirlwind. The computer needed the 
ability to anticipate scenarios before they happened in a way 
that the same function in the human mind would be called 
intuition. This was completely impossible for an electronic 
brain, but it was an adequate solution in place of a true 
“thinking” machine. This could be done through statistical 
analysis and prediction that had been created and refined since 
the early 1200s.  
Whirlwind was in the process of becoming a nerve ganglion, 
in the parlance of many persons who dealt with computers. In the 
early “Bedford Tests” in 1951 Whirlwind was connected to sensors 
that tracked aircraft. The computer was reaching its potential 
to the relief of those who worked on the system as well as those 
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who had invested in it. Because of the success of the machine, 
the project would continue and grow. 
The Thermonuclear Era 
During the same time, the United States was to outpace its 
Soviet competitors once again. The break-neck pace of the 
supercomputers was paying off; the U.S. was leaving the Atomic 
Age behind and entering the Thermonuclear Age. The atomic bombs 
to this point were fission weapons. In short, fission is the 
process of splitting an atom to produce a reaction. The problem 
is that the atomic yield, i.e. the power of the explosion is 
limited. On the other hand, a fusion device has an unlimited 
yield and furthermore, the destructive power of the radioactive 
fallout was not really fully understood at that point. 
With the transition of atomic to thermonuclear powered 
weapons more controversy was generated not only within the 
scientific community, but also among the political circles 
within the United States. Most are familiar with the division 
between those who were sympathetic with Robert Oppenheimer and 
the supporters of Edward Teller. The question of more bombs or 
fewer bombs is not adequate to describe the fervor that the 
thermonuclear weapon produced. For example, Vannevar Bush who 
headed Manhattan completely approved of the development and use 
of the Atomic Bomb; however, he lobbied very strenuously to 
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avert the testing of a thermonuclear device. Apparently he felt 
that an explosion of such a device would place the United States 
into a permanent conflict with the Soviet Union.
192
 He simply did 
not realize the state of the conflict had already congealed into 
a state of permanency. One of Dean Acheson’s science advisors 
harbored similar feelings.
193
 Kennan had also lobbied very hard 
against the development of the weapon, much less the testing of 
such.
194
 Despite these pleas President Truman would have none of 
this and so, on November 1, 1952 at 7:15 in the morning 
Operation Ivy came to a conclusion with the detonation of “Mike” 
on Elugelab Island, Eniwetok Atoll. The power of the explosion 
is somewhat uncertain, estimates being between five and 100 
megatons. Radiation was expected and so the pilots monitoring 
the explosion, which transformed Elugelab from an island to a 
two mile crater, had to be protected. Red Flight, which was the 
first monitoring B-36, took in three to four roentgen levels. 
Just to put this into perspective, of the following flights, 
white flight took in .5 to 1 roentgen, and blue took .2 to .4.
195
 
Nevertheless, the scientists were pleased because the pilots who 
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had been provided protective clothing had a reduction in 
radioactive exposure four or five times less than expected.
196
 
Despite the elation of a successful test and lower radiation 
exposure to the pilots, the notion that one could be happy about 
low radiation levels to the pilots seems ridiculous. 
Nevertheless, the United States apparently was “on top” again in 
the nuclear weapons arena. The machines not only paid off in the 
creation of the thermonuclear weapon, but also now became an 
irreplaceable part of the overall thermonuclear machine that the 
U.S. had no intention of relinquishing to the Soviets. The 
Soviets had just entered the Supercomputer Race and their early 
efforts were impressive, considering the bureaucratic 
difficulties that they faced. On both sides of the Cold War 
calculations now were too complex to solve, much less entrust to 
human beings. Human produced atomic calculations were now a 
thing of the past.   
  IBM and Ike. Almost every presidential election during 
the Cold War depended heavily on aspects of foreign policy. To 
play with Carl von Clausewitz maxim that “War is Politics by 
Other Means” during the Cold War, “Politics is Foreign Policy by 
Other Means.”  The foregoing maxim could not have been truer 
than in the presidential election in 1952. Dwight David 
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Eisenhower was sought out by both the Democrat and Republican 
Parties. There were reasons for this. Eisenhower had impressive 
credentials. First and foremost he was a war hero, commanding 
Operation Overlord on D-Day. His other credentials were equally 
impressive: he was a former assistant to General George Catlett 
Marshall as well as a special assistant under General Douglas 
MacArthur during the depression; he obtained his fifth star 
general’s rank in 1945; he was president of Columbia University 
from 1948 until 1950 and he was reactivated by President Truman 
to become the Supreme Allied Commander for NATO. These 
qualifications made Eisenhower particularly attractive. He was 
able to build his political base from various segments of 
American society: the military, the general public, and big 
business. It was one business in particular that Eisenhower 
received somewhat more personal aid. That was IBM.   
IBM was making money “hand-over-fist” in the post-war 
world. This was especially true since the outbreak of Korea. The 
various agencies dealing with nuclear arsenals had flocked to 
buy computers and of late the 701.  
To IBM Eisenhower had looked particularly good as a 
possible candidate since 1948; at least this is how Thomas J. 





 In an effort to further ingratiate himself 
with the former general, he offered Ike the presidency of 
Columbia University. Eisenhower had turned Watson down during 
the previous years at feeling that he had neither the 
credentials nor the ability to run a university. However, when 
Eisenhower also turned down the possibility of a candidacy in 
1948 he had put himself in a place where Watson could leverage 
both the general and the university into the position. In the 
end, it was only Eisenhower and not the University that needed 
convincing. The trustees of Columbia unanimously voted for 
Eisenhower in 1947 and he would take over in October of 1948.
198
        
Eisenhower was a life-long Republican, but in the end he 
chose the Republican Party due to a complex rationale. 
Eisenhower was not a rabid enemy of the policies of the New 
Deal, but he absolutely had little regard for President Truman. 
Nevertheless that fact did not make his choice of the Republican 
Party a fait accompli.  
When Eisenhower was appointed the commander of NATO forces, 
he met with the person most likely to be the top Republican 
choice for the presidency, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio at the 
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 Taft was a Republican of the old style, meaning that 
he was a firm isolationist in regards to world affairs. 
Eisenhower had hoped to glean the senator’s support for NATO 
forces. This support did not come to pass.
200
  Eisenhower 
realized that Taft’s isolationist style of republicanism was 
unrealistic in the context of new geopolitical realities and 
thus a real threat to the United States in the Post-War World: 
“This aroused my fears that isolationism was stronger in 
Congress than I had previously expected.”
201
 At this point he 
understood that he had to stop both Taft and Truman at the same 
time. Thus, he became the Republican Candidate and an asset not 
only for the Republican Party but IBM as well. However, just 
because IBM had Ike did not mean that they could not be 
sidetracked in the supercomputing world. 
In 1949 the Air Force presented a contract to the Eckert-
Mauchly Computer Corporation for the construction of the BINAC 
supercomputer. BINAC had been a failure on a grand scale for two 
separate reasons. Firstly, the Air Force’s specifications for 
BINAC were too grandiose. The computer had to be self-checking 
and furthermore it had to be mobile, while maintaining accuracy. 
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These two things were, at the time, unattainable, for any 
computer. Secondly, Eckert and Mauchly, while accepting the Air 
Force contract, did not put in a serious effort into BINAC. The 
reason for this was the two wanted to concentrate on computing 
in the private sector after their falling out with von Neumann. 
Both scientists wanted to divert the funds from the BINAC 
project to a new machine that could be mass-produced and 
marketed to not only the military and its scientists, but to 
various businesses as well. This computer would be a Universal 




UNIVAC. From the beginning UNIVAC seemed to have an evil 
star passing over it. The Eckert-Mauchly Computer Corporation 
was fine at creative engineering, but lousy when it came to 
finances. When Eckert and Mauchly went out on their own they 
obtained their first capital from their families. The two pushed 
very hard to sell the first UNIVAC’s and the first was delivered 
to the U.S. Census Bureau in March of 1951 with the funds being 
sent from the U.S. Army.
203
 Unfortunately, UNIVAC was not a “hot” 
commodity and so Eckert and Mauchly considered selling the 
machine to other nations. They of all people should have known 
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better than to even attempt this move, considering their 
experiences with ENIAC and BINAC being classified projects. The 
United States government predictably blocked the sale of the 
computer to foreign nations for reasons of national security.
204
  
Although the government had blocked the sale of ENIAC to foreign 
nations, there was surprisingly no real legislation in place to 
do such a thing. By the time that the sale of UNIVAC became an 
issue, the legislators had started to take some action. In the 
Marshall Plan there was an amendment that would not allow the 
sale of commodities that: “would be ordinarily refused a U.S. 
export license.”
205
 Furthermore, the CIA and the Department of 
State came up with two categories of commodities that could not 
be sold. Computers fell into the category of:  
Equipment and items ‘primarily used in the production 
of munitions or which very importantly contribute to 






And so under that amendment the potential sales were 
blocked, and because this was under the provisions of the 
Marshall Plan, it applied to allied nations as well. UNIVAC was 
in serious trouble and so the company was sold to Sperry-Rand 
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(not to be confused with the RAND Corporation). IBM was another 
possible buyer, but because they were also under scrutiny by the 
U.S. government for illegal practices, they were out of 
contention.
207
 In order to drum up business for UNIVAC, Sperry-
Rand, which by that time became Remington-Rand, decided on a 
public campaign to tout the computer’s abilities. The executives 
at Remington-Rand pitched the idea of UNIVAC predicting the 
results of the election based on early returns to Columbia 
Broadcasting, CBS who were interested in the idea. Up to 
election night all the pundits were calling for a close election 
between Eisenhower and Stevenson. UNIVAC disagreed with them. 
Based upon only five percent of the returns UNIVAC predicted a 
landslide victory for Eisenhower.
208
 CBS was certain that the 
computer had to be wrong and this would be an embarrassment for 
both them and Remington-Rand and refused to let the report go 
public.
209
 Later when it was apparent that the results that 
UNIVAC had predicted were correct, 98% correct in fact, the 
prediction was then released.
210
  In the end, Stevenson lost the 
election. The Electoral College vote was 442 for Eisenhower and 
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89 for Stevenson and 55% to 44% in the popular vote. UNIVAC had 
predicted 438 to 93 in the Electoral College.
211
 
The outcome was that UNIVAC did sell. Not only had the 
Census Bureau purchased, but other UNIVACs were sent to Los 
Alamos and later would be at the White Sands Missile Range in 
New Mexico. UNIVAC, however, was never the biggest or most 
impressive machine on the planet. Many of the other systems 
outperformed it by leaps and bounds. What was more important 
about UNIVAC is that it made a serious impact on the American 
consciousness. The “Giant Brain” was further proof of American 
ingenuity and superiority in a time of international competition 
against a nation that touted its superiority; UNIVAC was another 
challenge to those claims. 
In conclusion, the first Grand Strategy of the Cold War, 
Containment was not convincing to those within the Truman 
Administration such as Secretary of State Dean Acheson and then 
Kennan's eventual successor Paul Nitze. The coffin-nails for 
Kennan's policies were the "Fall of China" and then the Korean 
War. NSC 68 placed atomic weapons at the forefront of United 
States Cold War Grand Strategy. Because of the primacy and 
centrality nuclear weapons, supercomputers became an ultimate 
necessity, justifying all investments in said projects and to 
any amount. This was not only true of U.S. efforts. At this time 
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Great Britain was also making headway with supercomputing 
projects under the continued efforts of Alan Turing, who was 
also proposing that theoretically computers could "think." This 
also went squarely along with the organic analogies that were 
put forth by von Neumann and others.  
By this time the Soviets finally understood the benefits of 
supercomputing through correspondence between Lavrent'ev and 
Josef Stalin who, in the end, was not as ideologically dogmatic 
about mathematics as he was in politics. Despite a solid 
commitment to supercomputing, Soviet efforts in this area were 
independent, both because of ideological reasons, as well as 
more practical ones. Perhaps the Soviet Union's computing 
projects would have been better served if they had put the same 
effort into absconding with supercomputer plans as they did with 
atomic bomb plans. They would have had plenty of opportunities 
to do this because their spy networks had penetrated 
universities where many supercomputers were being constructed. 
This would have immensely aided their efforts to catch up with 
the U.S. Unfortunately, the Soviets did not do this and 
ultimately Lebedev's MESM supercomputer was slower than U.S. 
machines and there were not enough MESMs to match the output of 
the plethora of U.S. supercomputers which blossomed in the 
United States.  
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The supercomputers were also being put to greater use in 
the strategic arena as well. The "think tank" RAND had been 
founded to provide solutions for the military's questions about 
Cold War problems. RAND firmly believed in statistical and 
systems analysis and, to find these mathematical solutions, the 
institute invested heavily in supercomputers and every piece of 
data that RAND researchers used in creating their solutions were 
analyzed by the JOHNNIAC. Specially built by RAND and named 
after John von Neumann, JOHNNIAC became their main investment. 
RAND created the tactical plans used to bolster NATO strategies 
in Europe. Unfortunately for the NATO allies, RAND's calculated 
strategies resulted in the policy to keep U.S. bomber forces 
stationed in the United States rather than sending them to 
Europe. This effectively left NATO forces out in the wind in 
case of Soviet attack. Both the Airforce and Paul Nitze were 
convinced by RAND's efforts and proceeded accordingly.  
By 1951 a new supercomputing project began. One of the most 
ambitious projects of the Cold War, Project Whirlwind was to be 
the main part of a network, which would act as an early warning 
system to control U.S. defensive forces. Whirlwind's creators 
understood that, because of the computer's massive 
responsibilities, it had to be reliable to degrees never 
attempted before. Furthermore, there were serious considerations 
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about the ability of Whirlwind to "think," in Turing's sense of 
the word. Ultimately, Whirlwind's creators came to the same 
conclusion that Whirlwind could not "think," but it could have 
the ability to anticipate, to consider what was happening during 
attack scenarios. More and more significant aspects of the Cold 
War were being handed over to the supercomputers and at the same 
time marginalizing human abilities.  
During the same time the computing industry was making an 
impact on the political and psychological arenas as well as in 
the military and strategic areas. Because the Korean War seemed 
to have no real end in sight, President Truman was becoming 
increasingly unpopular. Dwight Eisenhower had been sought out as 
a candidate by both parties in 1948. Eisenhower decided instead 
to become the President of Columbia University, which had been 
arranged by the CEO of IBM Thomas J. Watson. This formed an 
enduring relationship between Eisenhower and IBM, which would 
have crucial implications for the handling of the Cold War. This 
is not to say that IBM's vaunted power always prevailed. The 
company was somewhat "blindsided" by UNIVAC in the 1952 
election. The UNIVAC predicted a landslide victory for 
Eisenhower and was 98% accurate in that prediction, when none of 
the human pundits believed that this could be the possible 
outcome. Although UNIVAC's usefulness in military circles was 
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limited, its public impact was immense. UNIVAC placed a 
permanent footprint on the American consciousness in the belief 
of the abilities of the "Giant Brain" and thus giving Americans 
a psychological boost over the Soviets, which was needed in 
light the Soviet advances in the last several years of 

























Some S.A.G.E.ly Advice 
 
  
President Eisenhower came into office with the sweeping 
landslide that UNIVAC predicted. Before the president could even 
set a new line for the nation’s foreign policy he had to deal 
with the Korean War. The war had been one of the largest issues 
in his press campaign: the “K” in K-C2. In a speech given on 
October 25
th
 1952, just before the election Eisenhower gave a 
scathing critique of the Truman Administration’s conducting of 
foreign policy: 
 A small country, Korea has been, for more than two 
years, the battleground for the costliest foreign war 
our nation has fought, excepting the two world wars. 
It shall been the burial ground for 20,000 American 
dead. It has been another historic field of honor for 
the valor and skill and tenacity of American soldiers… 
I shall go to Korea… Carefully, then this new 
Administration, unfettered by past decisions and 
inherited mistakes, can review every factor-military, 
political, and psychological-to be mobilized in 
speeding a just peace.
212
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 Several things can be gleaned from this speech beside the 
fact that Eisenhower and a good portion of the American public 
felt that the Truman Administration had failed to- as Eisenhower 
had put it- “outwit the totalitarian mind.”
213
 Another thing is 
that the candidate was very much concerned with the cost of the 
war that he felt was avoidable.
214
 And yet another was that he 
was willing to leave all options on the table, including the 
nuclear option.
215
 The question at that point was how seriously 
did Eisenhower consider the use of nuclear weapons? The evidence 
that has been considered in order to find a final answer to the 
question is inconclusive. According to Michael G. Jackson in his 
article “Beyond Brinksmanship: Eisenhower, Nuclear War Fighting, 
and Korea, 1953-1968,” Eisenhower while participating in 
National Security Council meetings staunchly upheld the 
possibility of nuclear engagement.
216
 Furthermore, in the event 
that a possible armistice could be signed and China intervened, 





 Supra.  
 
214 Supra.  
 
215 Reed, Thomas C. At the Abyss: An Insiders History of the Cold War. New 
York: Ballantine Books, 2004, Pp. 96.  
 
216 Jackson, Michael G. "Beyond Brinksmanship: Eisenhower, Nuclear War 
Fighting, and Korea, 1953-1968." Presidential Studies Quarterly 35, no. 1 
(2005): 52-75, Pp. 55.  
148 
 
there definitely would be nuclear retaliation.
217
 Even the 
hawkish Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was not sanguine 
of a reaction of this nature.
218
 On the other hand, Campbell 
Craig in his book Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and 
Thermonuclear War argues that Eisenhower was convinced by Dulles 
to adopt Massive Retaliation as a cornerstone of the 
Administration’s foreign policy.
219
 What both Jackson and 
Campbell agree on is that the deterrent value of Massive 
Retaliation was what cowed the North Koreans in 1953.
220
 
 In any case, when Eisenhower did take over the office of 
the presidency, he was dropped into a much more complex 
situation than just a primary standoff with the Soviet Union. He 
now had a second front of the Cold War in Asia, which was 
completely undesirable to him. Furthermore, since the 
proclamation of the State of Israel in 1948, the Middle-East had 
become a veritable “hornet’s nest.” The Islamic nations despised 
the United States for its support of the new Jewish State, 
making the number of allies in the region quite small. Iran 
under the leadership of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was anything but a 
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strong leader and so his nation would require U.S. vigilance. 
Furthermore, West Germany would become part of NATO in May of 
1955, which would heighten tensions with the U.S.S.R. on the 
main front of the Cold War. It was apparent that the new 
Administration would have to be more active than the last.  
Stalin’s Death and Soviet Computing 
The Eisenhower Administration would catch a break in 
Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953. Generally, this event could 
only be seen as a good thing and perhaps even a “public service” 
to the world. Certainly during this time the Soviet Union would 
have to straighten out its political affairs, before embarking 
on a new foreign policy. The leadership of the nation fell to a 
troika composed of Nikita Krushchev, Georgi Malenkov and 
Lavrenti Beria. In the wake of Stalin’s demise many anti-
Communists welcomed the chaos within the Soviet Union. Not 
everyone was of the same mind. The new Secretary of State, John 
Foster Dulles for example, feared the leadership of Nikita 
Khrushchev, for he understood his personal foibles: 
I’m not worried about calculating people. Stalin was a 
calculating man. What I am worried about is a 
miscalculation that might bring on war. Khrushchev is 
150 
 
not a calculating man. He is excitable, irresponsible, 




Dulles’ concerns were reasonable but he failed to 
understand was that even the most temperamental Soviet leader 
was involved in von Neumann’s dilemma as the second player in 
his game. Supercomputers made calculations that enhanced 
thermonuclear weapons on both sides. And in this scenario war 
was to be avoided at all costs. The foreign policies that were 
crafted created a rational structure for deterrence.
222
  
In the midst of leadership succession, Soviet efforts in 
supercomputing were flourishing. Smaller computers such as the 
M-1 and M-2 were developed by Isaak Bruk and Mikhail Kartsev.
223
 
The M-1 was utilized for the solution of multi-dimensional 
matrices at the Institute of Energy of the U.S.S.R. Academy of 
Science. The M-2 had a wider scope, not only being used at the 
Institute of Atomic Energy, but also at the Institute of 
Theoretical and Experimental Physics, the Institute of Problems 
of Mechanics, the Airforce Academy as well as the Artillery 
Academy. Specifically, however, the M-2 was used for missile 
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 The utilization of the M-2 showed that the Soviets had 
finally and definitively understood that in order to match the 
western nations, weapon for weapon, and maintain their own 
security, they had to also match the west computer for computer. 
While the M-1 and M-2 were relatively advanced machines they had 
their limitations. More performance was needed. And so the 
Soviet government approved two new supercomputing projects of 
massive proportions Lebedev’s BESM and SKB-245’s Strela. 
 Meanwhile, the U.S. computer projects were showing no signs 
of slowing their pace. In January Argonne National Laboratory 
had a Princeton class machine AVIDAC, its first electronic brain 
followed in March by ORACLE.
225
 As with other supercomputers, 
these two machines had been put to the task of nuclear 
experiments, but AVIDAC and ORACLE were not working on pure 
theoretical problems, nor were they working on first strike 
capability. Because of their work the U.S. Naval forces would be 
able to widen their scope of intelligence gathering and attack 
capabilities in the creation of America’s first nuclear powered 
submarine, the Nautilus.
226
 By the end of March, Nautilus’ 
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reactor had been completed and tested, and in January of 1954 
the nuclear- submarine would go into active service.
227
 The Navy 
now had a weapon that required no refueling, which meant 
unlimited range of attack and thus changing the nature of 
submarine tactics and strategies. 
 The Death of Analog Machines. In the midst of the 
burgeoning advances in digital technology from ENIAC to the 
Princeton class and now the experimental Whirlwind I machine 
there was a “last gasp” from the proponents of analog computers. 
As guided missile systems progressed from theory to practical 
use the dialog focused on the issue of reliability. In an 
article presented at the Eastern J.C.C. Proceedings Bernard 
Loveman took up the case for the Reliability of a Large REAC 
Installation. Project CYCLONE was to create simulations on 
engine control, stability and navigation.
228
 Loveman pointed out 
several shortcomings concerning the operation of digital 
machines, especially in light of such delicate problems such as 
the ones that would be presented to Project CYCLONE. His first 
criticism was somewhat questionable: he noted that problems on 
an analog computer could be solved in a minute or occasionally a 
minute and a half, whereas a digital machine could take up to 
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 He also stated that electrical current 
problems could cause error that would “invalidate” all 
calculations up to that point. He concluded that Project 
CYCLONE’s time-schedule of fifty hour per week would be better 




 But Loveman’s original premise had no basis in fact, 
especially in light of the advances in digital computing. During 
the same time the National Bureau of Standards had been since 
1950 running a SEAC computer on a 24 hour day, seven days a week 
schedule.
231
 Loveman did not take into account the flexibility of 
the SEAC machine, which had undergone several expansions to meet 
new requirements.
232
 It is true that SEAC had down time, but this 
was limited by its self-checking abilities.
233
 This ability had 
been attempted by BINAC, but had been an apparent failure at 
that time. As to the problem caused by unstable electrical 
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currents, after two years of service the techniques established 
to deal with the problem had virtually eliminated the issue.
234
  
The issue of SEAC’s value could be called into question, 
because it was only in operation at the National Bureau of 
Standards and not for use on military projects. This supposition 
is wonderfully deceptive. The SEAC was also loaned out to 
“unspecified” governmental agencies, such as the NSA, whose 
matrix calculations were solved within fifteen seconds per 
calculation and not the 100 hours that Loveman proposed in his 
report.
235
 This unspecified connection is definitely murky. The 
SEAC was capable of being operated by a teletype terminal at 
another location far from the computer itself. This capability 
would not be significant for its work at the National Bureau. 
But these capabilities would be necessary for military 
applications especially in areas of remote guidance that were 
already being researched in connection with the aforementioned 
Whirlwind I. In any case, flexible digital computers such as 
SEAC sealed the fate of analog computing in significant military 
and strategic projects.  
 Khrushchev’s Support of Supercomputing. The promotion of 
Krushchev to leadership, even in the early days of the troika, 
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was a boon to Soviet computer science. Krushchev had supported 
Mikhail Lavrent’ev since 1949 when the scientist showed him the 
MESM, and thus was not diffident about bringing about two 
powerful supercomputers to the forefront.
236
 
 The first project was the BESM, Bystrodeeistvuiushcaia 
Elecktronnaia Schetnaia Mashina, or the high speed electronic 
calculator. It was supported by Stalin and commissioned  by 
the Institute of Precision Mechanics and Computer Technology in 
1951 to be put into operation by 1953. The BESM was the 
brainchild of Lebedev. By this time however Lebedev, the leader 
in Soviet computing, had rivals. The other project was the 
Strela computer or the “arrow.” Strela was conceived at the 
Nauchno-Issledovat’elskii Institut Schetnovo Mashinostroyeniya-
NII Setomash, (hereinafter SKB-245) and the Zavod Schetno-
Analiticheskhik Maschin or the Calculating Machine Factory.
237
 
The project was headed by Mikhail Lesechko, Iurii Bazilevsky, 
Bashir Rameev and Lev Gutenmakher. All of them had impressive 
credentials within Soviet computing circles. Despite their 
unquestionable talent, Lebedev had the advantage of having 
Lavent’ev on his side, and because of this Lebedev was able to 
recruit from the best talent pool that the Soviet Union had to 
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offer to create the BESM.
238
 Understanding the benefit of the two 
projects, the Soviet leadership created six computing centers: 
the Chief Directorate of Artillery, the Soviet Naval Academy, 
the Ministry of Aircraft and Defense, the Institute of 
Aeronautical Hydrodynamics, which was working on problems of 
nuclear physics and two unnamed organizations.
239
 Unfortunately, 
as with any other project of this magnitude, competition became 
fierce. The project leaders at SKB-245 accused the BESM computer 
of being nothing more than a carbon copy of American machines, a 
very scathing and dangerous accusation at the time.
240
 If the 
BESM was a “carbon copy” of American machines it was a poor one. 
David Holloway states that the “BESM was close to matching the 
performance of the IBM 701.”
241
 This could not be further from 
the truth. The 701 operated 16,000 to 17,000 operations per 
second. BESM, and for that matter Strela paled in comparison, 
operating at far lower speeds. BESM was only capable of 600 to 
800 operations per second.
242
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The rivalry between Lebedev’s group and SKB-245 was not any 
different than those that occurred in the western nations; but 
there were only two main supercomputing projects in the Soviet 
Union at the time, and this rivalry could not be afforded. 
Nevertheless, it existed and in the end Lebedev’s BESM won out. 
The outcome was, at first glance, a little strange. In 1953, 
when both machines were put into service Strela was so much more 
powerful, and it certainly had the speed that is the ultimate 
worth of a supercomputer (after all it did 70 million 
calculations in a ten hour period, and this was the equivalent 
of 100,000 of human calculations) why did the BESM win out?
244
 
One reason was that the Strela was constantly being modified 
right down to the deadline in 1953 and, because of these 
modifications the project did not meet its deadline. It ended up 
being delivered almost a year late.
245
 More importantly, the 
Strela was not able to do the equations that it had been 
designed to solve, namely nuclear fission equations; so in this 
respect the Strela was more or less useless.
246
 Another more 
important reason is that the project went into cost overruns, 
the death knell of most military projects. In the end, the 
Strela cost 800 rubles in 1954 while the price of an analog 
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machine cost the government less than half as much. Furthermore, 
while special purpose computers could be bought for prices 
ranging between 1,000 and 3,000 rubles, these machines turned 
out to be more reliable than the Strela.
247
  
 Despite its shortcomings, the Strela was put into service 







 degrees. Bazilevsky was from then on called a “Hero of 
Socialist Labor.”
248
 The computing failure of the Strela did not 
affect its political success. This was especially important for 
Bashir Rameev, whose father had previously been tagged by the 
government as an “enemy of the state;” this success in a sense 
rectified that problem.
249
 Another reason for the Strela to be 
put into service was a practical one. Again, with only two major 
projects, the Soviets could afford neither a scientific failure 
nor a political one whether it was in a domestic arena or an 
international one.  
 Beria and Missed Opportunities. Lavrenti Beria had been a 
member of the Politburo in 1946 and was chief of atomic energy 
development, which would have brought him into connection with 
Soviet computing circles. Beria’s outlook on science in the 
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Soviet Union was typical in that during the 1930s and 1940s he 
along with the majority of Soviet bureaucrats and scientists 
sided with the Lysenko-ists condemning western science.
250
 
However, Beria was a calculating man, like Stalin himself, and 
was also governed by practicalities. As chief of the atomic 
projects, he understood “ways and means,” so to say, meaning 
more computers… more missiles. In fact, Beria had Mikhail 
Lavrent’ev, who had been in charge of Sergei Lebedev’s projects, 
also oversee the Soviet H-Bomb project at Arzamas-16.
251
 
Eventually Beria did attain his goal of becoming chief of the 
NKVD (the KGB was not founded until 1954). His tenure would be 
cut short. After the death of Stalin and the struggle for power 
within the Kremlin in the aftermath, Beria did the unexpected. 
At the time Walter Ulbricht had incited riots within East 
Germany. Conditions quickly became volatile and the Soviet Union 
was forced to step in. Beria himself proposed a sort of 
rapprochement that would create a somewhat more independent East 
Germany.
252
 He would forfeit his position and his life at a 
meeting of the Presidium on June 26, 1953 Beria was charged with 
being an imperialist and a traitor to the state and was 
summarily executed. For Soviet computing it was a missed 
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opportunity to branch away from purely military projects and 
towards a wider variety of scientific projects, which were 
happening in the West. Instead Soviet computing would continue 
to be singularly linked to military projects.  
The “New Look” 
In the West, before the actual death of Beria, formal talks 
began to consider the admission of West Germany to NATO. 
Eisenhower’s administration had committed itself at the outset 
to matters of foreign policy. Despite actual involvement in 
world affairs up to this point, there had been no change in 
policy at the NSC. However, on October 30, 1953, in NSC document 
162/2 there emerged Eisenhower’s “New Look.”  
 The New Look was as much of an economic plan as it was a 
strategic stance in which to prosecute the Cold War.
253
 Truman’s 
149/2 through 153/1 was superseded because they lacked clarity. 
Supporting everyone everywhere was not realistic in the mind of 
Eisenhower. The former general and commander of NATO forces was 
completely familiar with the financial, strategic and political 
costs of an expansive global foreign policy that made little or 
no distinction between means and ends. NSC document 162/2 read:  
                       




 The United States must maintain a sound economy based 
on free private enterprise as a basis for high defense 
productivity… The economy of the country has a 
potential for long-term economic growth. Over the 
years an expanding national income can provide the 
basis for higher standards of living and for a 
substantial military program. But economic growth is 
not automatic and requires fiscal and other policies 
which will foster and not hamper the potential for 





 The new policy also took into account the continually 
developing weapons systems. Eisenhower understood that they were 
becoming more complex by the day, and a new type of 
scientifically oriented personnel was now required to be part of 
U.S. national defense.
255
 As to the Soviet Union the policy 
called for: “A strong military posture, with emphasis on the 
capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive 
striking power.”
256
 Specifically, the Administration policies 
were based on the effectiveness of spies and missiles to promote 
a more efficient and effective U.S. national strategy.  
 Previously RAND had suggested in their reports that it was 
not sufficient to have a “Sunday Punch” nuclear strategy. There 
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is no doubt the president knew this, and so the question was: if 
“Massive Retaliation” was not the “Sunday Punch…” then what was 
it? 
The importance of “credibility” as a commodity of an 
effective foreign policy can be overstated. This is something 
that Eisenhower possessed more of than many of his predecessors 
did. This was including FDR who while politically adept did not 
have military experience, and certainly more than those 
presidents that succeeded him. He was not only a general but 
“the general” of the allied forces; this carried a lot of 
weight. It also helped that his Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles was humorless. When these men spoke they meant what they 
said. They were good strategic players in the realm of 
international affairs. Possibilities were what gave Massive 
Retaliation its credibility as a policy. It was not the action, 
but the threat of action that was important against the opposing 
superpowers.
257
 Vojtech Mastny in his book The Cold War and 
Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years stated that it was the 
United States’ increasing reliance on nuclear forces that 
concerned the Soviets most.
258
 Also Eisenhower’s use of the CIA 
with other, smaller countries was effective in promoting free 
                       
257 Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: The Penguin 
Press, 2005, Pp. 68. 
 
258 Mastny, Vojtech. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1996, Pp. 78. 
163 
 
anti-Communist nations. It did not matter that often these 
nations were anything but free. As long as the nations remained 
staunchly anti-Communist, that was enough to satisfy the needs 
of the United States. Finally, the “New Look” focused on 
espionage efforts and missiles, not only because they were 
effective measures, but also because this switch in policy away 
from the use of conventional forces promised to be healthier for 
the U.S. economy in the long run.  
Atoms for Peace. Like Truman before him, Eisenhower’s 
primary focus would be on the Soviet Union and the arms race; 
but where the Truman Administration was rigid in its diplomatic 
efforts, Eisenhower could afford to be somewhat more flexible.  
In front of the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 
1953 Eisenhower delivered what would become known as the “Atoms 
for Peace” speech. In the speech Eisenhower spoke of the 
dreadfulness of nuclear conflict and the sincerity of the United 
States to act “swiftly” and in a resolute manner in the face of 
aggression.
259
 He further stated that: “The retaliation 
capabilities of the United States are so great that such an 
aggressor’s land would be laid waste.”
260
 This put all on notice 
of his plans for Massive Retaliation, as noted in the “New 
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Look.” His tone then softened to point out that this conflict 
was not what the United States was after. Rather, Eisenhower 
proposed negotiations with France, Great Britain and the 
U.S.S.R. in order to: 
Make joint contributions from their stockpiles of 
normal uranium… to an international agency… under the 
aegis of the United Nations…The atomic energy agency 
could be made responsible for the impounding, storage 
and protection of the contributed fissionable and 
other materials providing special safe conditions that 




Eisenhower made it clear that the U.S. was willing to work 
towards conciliation with the Soviets on certain issues such as 
nuclear weaponry. This is to say that Eisenhower’s Massive 
Retaliation was not inevitability as he saw it. Still the Soviet 
Union continued to be mired in internal conflicts and certainly 
not trustful of U.S. intentions. Truth be told, such an open 
plan would not have been beneficial to the Soviets. In such a 
scheme the weaknesses of the Soviet military would have been 
laid bare. Internationally, the Soviets could thus be exploited 
and internally the nation that had prided itself on its military 
might being equal to that of the West would suffer a credibility 
blow. In short, the belief in the strength and inevitability of 
a Communist world would be called into question and under this 
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type of scrutiny could possibly dissipate. Moscow was thus 
forced to reject the proposal.  
Kenneth Osgood in his book Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s 
Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad argues much the 
same, but he questions the sincerity of the proposal. From his 
point of view the proposal was specifically designed to be one-
sided so that the Soviets would reject it, for the purpose of a 
propaganda coup.
262
 That may be true. It would not be the first 
time that a party to an agreement sought to take his best 
advantage of the negotiations. But humans, for all their 
talents, are not prescient. There was always a chance that the 
Soviets could have accepted the proposal, for whatever their 
rationale might have been. Again the possibility of the Soviets 
accepting the agreement was slim because the U.S. outnumbered 
them in the quantity of bombers, Inter Continental Ballistic 
Missiles (ICBMs), and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles 
(SLBMs).
263
  Hard or soft power notwithstanding, the U.S. was 
simply in a better position to make the offer. 
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Computers and American Espionage. In this context, 
Supercomputing became even more connected to the development of 
nuclear weapons. Under these conditions, supercomputers seemed 
unlikely to contribute to the second prong of the 
Administration’s policy: covert activities, especially of those 
activities relating directly to the Soviet Union. In fact, this 
was not the case.  
Although the utilization of spies seemingly fulfilled Ike’s 
need for inexpensive ways of prosecuting the Cold War, while 
still remaining fiscally responsible, this is not actually the 
case. It is often expensive to recruit human intelligence, and 
even then there is an issue of trust, meaning that human spies 
can be lured away and many times difficult to control. How can 
one actually trust those that are capable of doing the task that 
you have set them to? Furthermore, there are also problems 
regarding placement of the spies.
264
 This can not only be costly, 
but can also present tactical problems. Another problem with 
spying the Soviet Union is that Russian is a difficult language 
to learn. The cost of teaching a new language is in terms of 
time. At the time, there were only a small amount of people who 
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 This is where IBM stepped in once 
again with a solution. 
IBM developed the 701 defense calculator in 1952, and for 
the most part the machine was an impressive one. But the 
scientific and mathematical aspects of the machine were 
inadequate for the RAND Corporation. Furthermore, RAND deemed 
the computer to be too expensive, a “Rich Man’s” computer. This 
is ultimately what pushed RAND into building the JOHNNIAC 
instead. But the 701 remained valuable for one task: it excelled 
in language translation.  
On January 7
th
 of 1954 the result of IBM’s Georgetown 
experiments were released to the world. The IBM 701 had 
successfully translated Russian.  
In 1949 the Georgetown University Institute of Languages 
and Linguistics was founded as part of its School of Foreign 
Service. The person that headed the Institute was Leon Dostert, 
a former OSS officer and Eisenhower’s interpreter during World 
War II.
266
 Dostert and Cuthbert Hurd of IBM decided to include 
language translation among the functions of the 701. This 
decision was motivated by the lack of information about the 
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Soviet Union. The machine was touted to be able to translate 
German, French and other languages. Russian however, was chosen 
for obvious reasons. The ability to translate languages for a 
person is a tedious task to say the least and the ability to 
have a computer to do this would have benefits. The problem is 
that translation for a computer is a complex task requiring 
hardened specificity. Nevertheless, when the outcome of the 
experiment was released it caused quite a stir. According to 
IBM: 
 A girl who didn’t understand a word of the language of 
the Soviets punched out the Russian messages on IBM 
cards. The “brain” dashed off its English translations 
on an automatic printer at the breakneck speed of two 
and a half lines per second…More than sixty Russian 




Unfortunately, one of the drawbacks here was not only the 
limited amount of people who could translate, but also the 
limited amount of data. Much of the information that the U.S. 
had on the Soviets came not from espionage activities but from 
various collections of literature.
268
 Interestingly, the reliance 
on Russian literature for data may not have been as much as a 
handicap as one might think. Historian John Lewis Gaddis in an 
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interview about his new book, George F. Kennan: An American Life 
stated that Kennan’s understanding of Russian literature, not 
politics, uncovered the Russian national character.
269
 Despite 
the 701’s shortcomings, the public response to the 701’s 
performance was generally favorable and reporters who covered 
the event were excited. The London Financial Times thought that 
the machine was “remarkable” in its performance and the 
simplicity of its translation program.
270
 This is not to say that 
all were pleased about the 701’s efforts. More than a few of the 
observers that were computer knowledgeable felt that the 
computer could be put to better use: 
 A number of reports picked up the observation made by 
the developers that the expensive 701 computer was 
overdesigned for language translation; it has too many 
functions not essential to this task that were built 




It is true that if the 701 were to spend the bulk of its 
time translating Russian that the scientific functions should 
have been marginalized if not completely removed. Certainly one 
could look at RAND’s assessment of the machine to see that in 
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competition with the Princeton class computers it was severely 
lacking; so limiting the 701 to translation made perfect sense.  
The translation by the 701 of Russian to English produced 
tangible results that were used to further gather information 
about the Soviets. Not only could literature be translated but 
whatever information could also be gleaned from human 
intelligence and transmitted back to the United States could be 
translated quickly. Because the results of the Georgetown 
experiment were openly announced in public, there were also 
diplomatic repercussions: in short the Soviets panicked. 
Lebedev’s BESM was to also have the capability to translate 
English into Russian. This task was assigned to Yuri Panov, a 
professor at Moscow State University. Unfortunately for the 
Soviets, their computers could not perform this task for another 
two years. Once again they were outmaneuvered by computer 
scientists in the west who had free reign to explore and develop 
new technologies. 
American Philosophy and Technology. Just a month after the 
Taiwan crisis, supercomputing in the United States began to take 
an alternate route in its approach to the Cold War. On October 
1, 1954 IBM introduced its 705 computer. Unlike its 
predecessors, the machine was not specifically meant for 
military use, but for business purposes. Much of Eisenhower’s 
171 
 
162/2 focused on having a healthy economy. Certainly the faux 
pas by Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, who famously 
stated “What’s good for General Motor’s is good for the 
country,” was an indicator of the vitality there was in post-war 
economy that had been tagged as “conspicuous consumption.”
272
 The 
move of supercomputing into the private sector became a two-
pronged attack against the Soviets, even if it was 
unintentional. America, at least since the Age of Jackson has 
been geared toward the type of philosophical dynamism that John 
Foster Dulles spoke of in 1952 in an interview for the Longines 
Chronoscope.
273
 In the U.S. there always has been an emphasis on 
management and technology that has shaped a national character. 
What immediately comes to mind is Frederick Taylor’s Principles 
of Scientific Management: 
The best management is a true science, resting upon 
clearly defined laws, rules, and principles as a 
foundation. And further show that the fundamental 
principles of scientific are applicable to all kinds 
of human activities, from our simplest individual acts 
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 Century moved along the notions of efficiency 
and predictability through the use of technology by the U.S. 
created a type of hyper-capitalism in the nation.
275
 This 
economic-technological union could not be matched by the Soviet 
Union despite their own focus on efficiency proposed in the most 
intricately managed GOSPLAN (Gosudarstvennyy Planovyy Komitet) 
schedules.
276
 The 705 model was not the first supercomputer meant 
for the open market. Eckert and Mauchly had tried with UNIVAC 
unsuccessfully. With the IBM name behind the 705, businessmen 
could trust that the computer was here to stay. More 
importantly, the computer in the business sector represented the 
ultimate rationalism that Americans consistently sought. This 
created societal conditions that concretely favored technology. 
The United States had never gone through the same negative 
experiences via technological progress such as with the Luddites 
in Great Britain in 1811 and 1812. In America there had been no 
great social dislocation. This fostered a real collective belief 
in data and the computer’s ability to provide the ultimate 
rationalization. To the American the lure was simply 
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 In the context of the 1950s it was a boon to the 
United States’ struggle against the U.S.S.R.  
The Darmstadt Conference 
Considering the very public announcements about the 
advancements in computing in the West, the Soviets had to react, 
lest they would lose the credibility contest. To this end, in 
the same month as the 705 was announced to the public, the 
Soviets also announced that they had a national program for 
supercomputers. By the end of October, the International 
Federation for Information Processing (hereinafter IFIP) had 
been formed with the help of UNESCO. It was more or less an 
organization comprised of Europeans, even though the idea behind 
the organization was Isaac Auerbach, an American.
278
 The first 
IFIP conference was held in Darmstadt, West Germany at the 
Technische Hochschule. Overall this first conference was a 
success: there were many papers presented and creative 
partnerships were forged especially between the Germans and 
Americans.
279
 In an unprecedented way, the Soviets were invited 
to participate as well, and unlike many political summits, the 
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Soviets attended the conference. The two major competitors in 
Soviet computer science, Sergei Lebedev and Iurii Bazilevskii, 
creators of the BESM and the Strela respectively, traveled to 
West Germany to make their announcement and present information 
about their work. One of the main reasons for Soviet attendance 
was a report that was delivered to the Institute of Precision 
Mechanics and Computer Technology: 
 The gap between the United States and the Soviet Union 
in the area of digital computers and control devices 
continues to grow. We are falling behind in the number 
of machines, as well as in their technical parameters. 
We are also falling behind in production technology 





Despite their attendance at the conference, Lebedev and 
Bazilevskii were not allowed to disclose all the information 
about their work. Nevertheless, they did boast that the BESM was 
the fastest computer on the European continent. But the speed of 
the BESM was not to be compared to the U.S. Naval Ordinance 
Research Calculator and many others that were being produced in 
abundance in the United States.
281
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Open Skies. Meanwhile, a more traditional diplomatic even 
was taking place. On July 21
st
, 1955 Eisenhower introduced his 
“Open Skies” proposal at the Geneva Summit. Open Skies proposed 
that there would be mutual flight surveillance between the U.S. 
and the U.S.S.R. The rationale behind this was to make known the 
nuclear capabilities of each nation and to reassure each of 
them. The proposal was made to Soviet Premier Bulganin and to 
General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev, fearful of 
exposing Soviet weaknesses, rebuked Eisenhower’s offer as a 
thinly veiled excuse for the US to gain an advantage over the 
USSR. The outcome of Khrushchev’s rejection was that opinion of 
the Soviet Union dropped significantly in Western Europe.
282
 
Also, Khrushchev unknowingly revealed to Eisenhower that he had 
risen to the ultimate political position in the Soviet Union.  
The proposal of Open Skies would have been a dramatic 
diplomatic victory in the area of nuclear diplomacy. 
Unfortunately, nothing would come of the proposal until near the 
end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the proposal did have a 
significant impact on those who had attended the IFIP. Many 
attendees both western and Soviet who had felt that the 
conference fulfilled a type of diplomatic victory of its own 
that was as important as the nuclear diplomacy that was being 
                       
282 Osgood, Total Cold War, 194. 
176 
 
discussed at Geneva. Considering the essential role of 
supercomputing to the Cold War, perhaps they were correct. 
The Warsaw Pact 
  In Moscow, despite the domestic infighting between 
Khrushchev and Malenkov, foreign affairs remained a focal point 
of the direst nature. The two leaders were definitely skittish 
as to the military and diplomatic moves in the United States and 
Western Europe. As with Stalin, the new leaders of the Soviet 
Union sought a security zone. The Soviets saw not a perceived 
threat but a very real one in the NATO Treaty. To this end, the 
Soviets implemented the East European Mutual Assistance Treaty; 
it was signed on May 14, 1955 by the USSR and Eastern European 
Satellite Nations as a military alliance system to confront NATO 
in the event of “imperialist” aggression. In strategic and 
political terms, this move marked merely a consolidation of what 
the Red Army had done since the end of World War II. The Treaty 
in fact did nothing more than produce a façade of unity against 
the western powers. In the face of the Warsaw Pact, not all of 
the NATO members were in agreement. For example, British Prime 
Minister Anthony Eden put forth a plan to reduce tensions 
between the NATO members and the Warsaw Pact nations by cutting 
armed forces and creating a hard agreement on a buffer zone 
between the two military alliances. Eden also somewhat naively 
177 
 
proposed free elections in Germany. He believed that Khrushchev 
“was not another Stalin.”
283
 John Foster Dulles believed that if 
the Soviets were willing to quickly settle on the matter this 
would be a concrete sign of Soviet weakness; but Eden’s plan was 




On February 25, 1956 the political picture in the Soviet 
Union became more clarified. Nikita Khrushchev delivered the 
20th Party Congress Speech, which soon became no longer secret. 
Khrushchev thoroughly denounced Stalin and renounced Stalinism 
as a platform of the Soviet Union:  
Stalin on the other hand used extreme methods and mass 
repressions a time when the revolution was already 
victorious, when the Soviet state was strengthened, 
when the exploiting classes were already liquidated, 
and socialist relations were rooted solidly in all 
phases of national economy, when our party was 
politically consolidated and strengthened itself both 
numerically and ideologically… he often chose the path 
of repression and physical annihilation, not only 
against actual enemies, but also against individuals 
who had not committed any crimes against the party and 
the Soviet government.
285
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Khrushchev continued saying: “Stalin thought that now [he] 
could decide all things alone and all he needed were 
statisticians.”
286
 The things that Stalin did not discount were 
the very “scientific” nature of the Soviet state and the use of 
mathematics in a political manner. Again, this was not just the 
ideological side of Stalin but the practical one as well; the 
tyrant was devoted to the cold rule of numbers. Khrushchev’s 
speech was soon broadcast by Radio Free Europe, as a propaganda 
coup. The CIA apparently obtained a copy of the speech by 
Israeli secret services. For the citizens of the U.S.S.R. this 
seemed to be the beginning of a time of détente and openness 
with Russia, and in this political situation the citizens of 
Poland wanted change by 1956. Unfortunately for the Polish 
peoples they completely and utterly misjudged Khrushchev, 
perhaps thinking him reasonable. Khrushchev saw the 
demonstration as a threat to Soviet power and the Red Army was 
sent to Warsaw to consolidate Soviet control of the country. At 
a time of apparent upheaval this might have been an opportunity 
for Eisenhower and NATO, but nothing was done. Eisenhower and 
Dulles refused to send armed forces into Poland because they 
believed this would have facilitated a third World War. Thus, 
Poland remained in the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet crackdown in 
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Poland dampened western hope of a type of rapprochement with the 
U.S.S.R. Ideology and nationalism still drove the Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, domestic politics continued to rule its foreign 
policy. If anything was left of Stalin after Khrushchev’s 
speech, it was a continuation in foreign policy which still was 
in the hands of Vyacheslav Molotov. It did not remain that way 
for long. Molotov was eventually replaced by then chairman of 
the Soviet council of ministers Nikolai Bulganin. 
New Leaders and Linkage to Computer Science 
Bulganin and Time Sharing. Nikolai Bulganin had risen 
through the ranks of the Soviet system in a remarkable way, 
holding most of the important political positions. In 1955 one 
of the functions of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 
which Bulganin held, was the overseeing of supercomputing. This 
had its benefits and pitfalls. One of the problems was the 
distribution of computer time. At this point there were few 
machines and many calculations to be made for the military 
forces. A computer time sharing scheme was an unfortunate 
necessity and regular reports had to be transmitted to Bulganin 
who was in charge of the distribution of computer time.
287
 But 
the computing complex ultimately benefitted from having powerful 
patrons in Khrushchev and Bulganin, who both understood the 
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importance and necessity of supercomputing to the state. It was 
during this time that the SESM and the M-3 came to fruition and 
the Soviets were beginning to “catch and overtake” their western 
rivals in a narrow but significant sense. 
SESM Propaganda. The SESM or Spetsial’naya Elektronno 
Stshetnaya Mashina was a special purpose machine devoted almost 
entirely to the solution of linear algebra problems.
288
 There is 
not much known about the SESM other than its specific functions 
and one other notable feature. All other computers, up to this 
point, even Soviet ones, had been based upon the von Neumann 
architecture. SESM did not follow this technological scheme. 
This may seem an esoteric point; but it is important to remember 
that Soviet science had to set itself apart from western 
knowledge for ideological reasons. In Soviet computer science 
von Neumann’s architecture had been a thorn in the ideological 
side. Nevertheless, in the military, so much relied upon speed, 
the Soviet scientists did not have an alternative.
289
 SESM 
provided that alternative, while satisfying the imperative 
ideological need of the Soviets to be different from their 
capitalist rivals. The SESM was also helpful as Soviet 
propaganda. For an unknown reason the SESM was not classified, 
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and so papers on its capabilities were distributed both in 
Europe and the United States. Officially the computer science 
circles in the United States welcomed the news, for it gave them 
a chance for some insight to the advances in Soviet computing.
290
 
During this same year the M-3 supercomputer was added to 
the Soviet supercomputing phalanx. The M-3 was the brain-child 
of Isaak Bruk. The machine was a small computer as compared to 
the STRELA and the BESM, but it was also specialized and a 
significant aid to the larger machines. It was not as fast as 
the others, but it had a quality of the utmost importance in 
computing; it was reliable and efficient.  
1956 was something of a slow year for supercomputing 
projects in America. While the Soviets had taken to the 
international stage at Darmstadt and quickly producing other 
computers, the United States as well as the Soviet Union was 
embroiled in international crises. On October 23, 1956 Hungary 
was in full scale revolt and at the same time the Suez Crisis 
erupted. Unfortunately, Hungary was sacrificed by the 
Administration in favor of Suez.   
In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis in January 1957 the 
Eisenhower Doctrine on the Middle-East was enunciated. It stated 
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plainly that the U.S. would respond to Communist aggression with 
the use of U.S. troops upon request of any government that 
opposed Communism. These words seemed empty to the peoples of 
Hungary, the Administration’s refusal to help U.S. western 
allies at Suez. Eisenhower’s doctrine, while not empty, 
certainly seemed diluted.   
von Neumann’s death. 
The doctrine was announced at the beginning of 1957, a year 
that Cold War America would have liked to forget. Just after 
Eisenhower’s announcement of his doctrine the principle 
architect of the mathematical Cold War died. On February 8, 1957 
John von Neumann succumbed to cancer. Early in 1956 von Neumann 
had lost his physical strength. He was confined to a wheelchair; 
the cancer was quickly eating away at his bones. His spine was 
filled with lesions, and somewhat ironically, the man who had 
been such an integral part of the Manhattan Project was 
subjected to radiation treatments to fight off the malignancy. 
The treatment restored his strength for a time. But, no matter 
how hard von Neumann worked to commit his arguments to paper, 
the disease sapped him enough that he could not deliver his 
final treatise titled The Computer and the Brain.
291
 Yale 
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University published his unfinished work, and despite death, von 
Neumann managed to give a scientific “shove” to the computer 
world and aid the fledgling field of Artificial Intelligence. In 
this work the scientist painstakingly applied an analogy between 
the human brain and all the aspects of computerized information 
processing. Digital switches and chemical neurons would serve 
those same functions.
292
 He cited Turing’s codes as the ability 
to make a machine “behave;” a very human term, in a particular 
manner.
293
 Furthermore, he said that the functioning of human 
processes were largely a statistical method.
294
 Because of this 
work, the notion of computers as intelligent entities became 
more solidified and became a serious intellectual inquiry. 
In the realm of Cold War strategy von Neumann had once 
played a serious role, but as his physical condition 
deteriorated, so did that role. He could no longer contribute in 
that manner, but that did not matter. His contributions had been 
noted and became seriously entrenched in Airforce strategy and 
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Tactics by way of RAND.
295
 Their devotion to the utility of von 
Neumann’s theories cannot be overstated: 
 The doctrine of decision embodied in the ‘Estimate of 
the Situation’ is a conservative one benefiting a 
nation of unquestioned military supremacy. Keen 
military thought should be devoted to the question as 
to whether technology and the trend of world politics 





 The assessment here of the Cold War scenario is that the 
U.S. could not afford to sit idly by in the face of Soviet 
competition. A proactive role had to be the goal of the nation. 
John von Neumann’s technology, whether it was in the world of 
computers, his role in the development of the thermonuclear 
weapon or the development of Game Theory, profoundly affected 
global politics. His role may have been somewhat lost to the 
realm of geopolitics but his legacy was as important, if not 
more important than geopolitical strategists such as Kennan or 
Nitze, or in fact the diplomatic maneuverings of John Foster 
Dulles. Strategic and diplomatic theories without practical 
means of enforcement are empty. The practicalities of 
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enforcement during the early Cold War are what von Neumann 
delivered. 
 Von Neumann was gone but his legacy in computers continued 
at a break-neck pace all through the fifties. Argonne national 
labs produced GEORGE another Princeton class machine that worked 
on nuclear calculations for 24 hours per day.
297
 In the need for 
faster speeds the vacuum tube was becoming more of an 
obstruction rather than a solution by this time. A new 
technology was produced to replace the clunky tubes. The Philco 
Company from the mid-fifties was involved with experiments on 
the surface barrier transistor. The experiments originated with 
the NSA and the official investor was the U.S. Navy. The name 
given to the project was SOLO. The aim of the development of 
what became known as the TRANSAC S-1000 was to provide 
“cryptographic and other security work.”
298
 There were certain 
drawbacks to the use of the transistor. Although the new 
technology would enable engineers to construct faster and 
smaller machines, the transistor could not be replaced like the 
vacuum tubes could. This presented a new problem concerning 
reliability. This certainly was one of the reasons that the 
TRANSAC S-2000 was not chosen to receive a bid that would 
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integrate the computer with the Ballistic Missile Warning System 
(BEWS) that would operate in Greenland and other locations.
299
 
 BEWS was yet another system like the Cape Cod experiments 
handled by Whirlwind I. The Early Warning Automated System 
(EWAS) was on the mind of the entire military complex. Indeed 
there were good reasons for this. As technologies improved in 
the performance in bombers and missiles, it became harder for 
humans to handle defense. A new solution to this problem would 
have to be found.  Enter the SAGE Defense System.  
S.A.G.E. 
 SAGE or Semi Automatic Ground Environment had begun to be 
conceived at the earliest stages of the Cold War. As early as 
1949 the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board found that air 
defense for the United States was “inadequate.”
300
 The same board 
recommended that there had to be large-scale computers placed in 
various locations within the nation and linked to radar systems 
that could locate attacking forces. These computers would 
constantly monitor the airspace around the United States and 
portions of Canada. Of course this began with the aforementioned 
Whirlwind I, which was conceived at MIT. The problems with 
Whirlwind were that it was an experimental system and it was too 
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small in scope to cover the entire U.S. In fact, it only 
monitored the eastern states. A system that was larger in scope 
would be necessary. 
 To say that SAGE was carefully planned would be an 
understatement. MIT was where SAGE was conceived, and the Air 
Force as well as the Army and Navy created the Lincoln 
Laboratory for the specific purpose of creating the SAGE 
system.
301
 Coordination was on a massive scale involving IBM, 
Boroughs Corporation, Western Electric, SDC (Part of RAND) and 
hundreds of other companies to create the system.
302
 In pitching 
the need for a massive system the Air Force made a seriously 
frightening point: 
Even highly skilled men unassisted cannot work fast 
enough to track mass high-speed raids… High-speed 
bombers could be in on us before we could determine 




 At this point, the Air Force outlined the inner-workings of 
SAGE. IBM AN/FSQ-7A (Army Navy Fixed Special equipment) 
computers would be the heart and brain of the system. The main 
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systems were two of these machines, later given the moniker 
Whirlwind II, each weighed 250 tons requiring new command 
centers.
304
 In fact, the SAGE machines were the largest ever 
built. The reliability factor, which was stressed previously 
herein, was meticulously planned. Although SAGE would use tube 
technology that was in the process of becoming obsolete, the 
system was created in a manner that its work was truncated. One 
Whirlwind was operational while another was on constant standby 
in case of failure. This created conditions under which 
Whirlwind II was operational: “far in excess of 99%.”
305
  
 The actual work that SAGE was to perform was defense 
against supersonic bombing runs. What SAGE could do better, 
faster than any human was to respond to attacks. Calculations of 
speed, altitude, distance and other factors now took only 
seconds. SAGE centralized command of all NORAD (North American 
Aerospace Defense Command) combat centers. Its information came 
from various sites such as Texas Towers, Navy vessels, ground 
radar and secondary radar stations. It is important to 
understand that the computer itself directed all the attack and 
defense scenarios.
306
 It coordinated interception through the use 
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of Nike and BOMBARC missiles in the outlying cities as well as 
jet fighters.
307
 Once the attack was repelled, SAGE would direct 
the interceptors to their bases of origin. Maguire Air Force 
base in New Jersey was the first SAGE installation. Although 
Whirlwind II was the main supercomputer that directed the 
defense network, SAGE was also linked to others, most notably 
TRANSAC S-2000, which had been placed in a NORAD defense center 
in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
308
 
 The remaining question about SAGE was a human one. Given 
the use of language by both the Air Force and Lincoln Labs, just 
who was doing the work of defense, SAGE or man? Were soldiers, 
who were still a part of the division of labor, in the system of 
defense? The Air Force stated that SAGE “directed the battles” 
and M.I.T. used the words “minimum level of human involvement.” 
In all due deference to the free-world, it was somewhat ironic 
that the soldiers were being alienated from their labor in the 
manner suggested by the avatar of Communism, Karl Marx. Human 
participation may still have been necessary, but as the ideas of 
machine intelligence matured human interaction was lessened. In 
this particular area, in order to increase efficiency the need 
of machine intelligence was paramount. 
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 It is true that SAGE could not replace human leadership in 
every possible way, but SAGE was directing strike forces, which 
would have normally have been decisions made by high ranking 
soldiers, leaders if you will. As far as a question of shaping 
policy was concerned, SAGE did shape policy in a significant 
manner. Mao Tse Tung once said “Political power grows out of the 
barrel of a gun.” During the Cold War nuclear weapons were the 
central feature of the conflict and the ultimate expression of 
hard power for which no strategy based on soft power would have 
been possible. The analogy presented here is, if nuclear weapons 
were the bullets in the scenario then SAGE was the gun. 
Supercomputers gave the United States political power to enforce 
strategies because of their role in the development of newer and 
more effective weaponry.   
In the final analysis, SAGE performed amazingly well. This 
is not to say that all of the thousands of persons from IBM 
alone were pleased. The scientists and engineers who had worked 
on creating the machines and the various network installations 
were extremely impressed. Except, one particular person at IBM 
had this to say: 
 SAGE was celebrated as one of the great technical 
achievements of its day. But although the system 
worked fine, the arms race made it obsolete before it 
191 
 
was even finished. It could guard against attacks by 




 The person who threw SAGE under the proverbial “bus” was 
the president of IBM itself Thomas J. Watson Jr. His assessment 
may have been essentially correct: SAGE ultimately could not 
protect against attacks by ICBMs, and yet, for 23 years from 
Eisenhower to Reagan, SAGE played a more than significant role 
in keeping America safe from attack. In addition to this, the 
fact that SAGE could operate for those many years consistently 
and efficiently despite outmoded technologies is a testament to 
the efforts of those involved in its planning and creation.  
 The completion of SAGE, although not fully deployed until 
1963, seemed to be something of a comfort. What was not known at 
that point was that the Soviets were making headway in the field 
of supercomputing as well.  
 Soviets Catching Up. Between 1956 and 1957 the Soviet 
computers scientists produced several large-scale machines 
utilized for specific tasks. One of these machines, the VESM, 
was used for English to Russian translation of scientific 
reports. The VESM was also used to compile an “international 
astronomical calendar.” Apparently the data produced from VESM 
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gave the positions of 700 small planets and the areas that they 
would occupy for every forty days in the span of a decade.
310
 In 
1957 two other machines comprised the largest computer complex 
for the Soviets. The M-4 and the M-4m were both meant for 
defense purposes, specifically the radar controlled guidance of 
missiles.
311
 More importantly, during this time Lebedev developed 
the AS-6 machine. Like SAGE, it was a self-correcting machine. 
In case of malfunction in either the main systems or any of its 
adjoining systems, the software would reset with no loss to the 
systems.
312
  The development of the M-4 and the M-4m quickly led 
to the Soviet version of SAGE. The Soviets also created the URAL 
series of mini-computers. It seemed for the time being the 
Soviets had finally caught up to America. Now it was time for 
the Soviets to do what they had always imagined that they could 
do; that was to overtake the West.  
Kissinger’s Critique of Technology 
During this same year there were those within the United 
States who were working to come to grips with the terrible 
weapons that the computers had designed. One of these men was a 
then little known Harvard academic named Henry Alfred Kissinger. 
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 Kissinger had spent his academic career pontificating on 
European Realpolitik in the 19
th
 Century. This seemed hardly 
suited to create a doctrine dealing with 20
th
 Century nuclear 
weapons. Nevertheless, this is what he attempted to do in his 
book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. The argument in this 
book encompassed the idea of limited nuclear war as opposed to 
the doctrine of massive retaliation against the Soviets. This 
was not the first time that this idea was put forth as an 
option. For example, Paul Nitze had argued for this as a 
possible stance against the Soviet Union himself, but for 
whatever reason Kissinger seemed to garner more attention in 
1957 and thus placing his relationship with the much older and 
more experienced Nitze on a negative footing.
313
  
Although the book was a critique of the Eisenhower/Dulles 
policy and ultimately an incorrect analysis, it garnered much 
attention by the administration.
314
 Christian Herter, the 
Undersecretary of State to Dulles, brought it to his attention, 
and the President himself was “very much interested in it.”
315
 A 
memo went out to General Andrew Goodpaster stressing that he 
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should read it as well. Goodpaster pointed out that the work 
had: “many interesting ideas, not all valid.”
316
 The president 
directed the need for Dulles’ attentions as well: 
I have not read the complete book, but I am sending 
you herewith a copy of a fairly extensive brief made 
by General Goodpaster of my office. This at least I 
think you will want to read, and I believe that when 





Much has been made of the book’s critique of Massive 
Retaliation. The book was also much wider in scope than a mere 
critique of the Eisenhower/Dulles policy; it was an outright 
attack on technology as a facet of American foreign policy. This 





 Centuries Europeans had good reason to 
fear the advance of technology, technology was a two-headed 
snake at once displacing them from their traditional social 
positions, alienating them from their jobs and advancing the 
abilities of weapons to cause mass destruction of life and 
property.  
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During WW I new technologies such as, machine guns, poison 
gas, tanks and planes were utilized for war before man’s 
philosophies of the consequences of the new technology could be 
properly assessed. This caused destruction on unprecedented 
levels on battlefields. The war left an indelible mark on the 
European nations. The role that technology played in the war 
left many people to question the benefits of technology versus 
its detriments. The detrimental effects in turn created 
political conditions that were ripe for another war.  
During WWII philosophies may have matured somewhat, but 
technology still outpaced them. With the creation of the atomic 
bomb, Kissinger made this point plain stating: “We’ve had an 
obsession with technology-as if a superior weapon, by itself, 
could get us a strategic advantage.”
318
 His main complaint was 
that the atomic bomb was an end unto itself, sought before 
people had actually thought about how to utilize it.
319
 
Unfortunately for Kissinger, he had come up with a problem for 
which there appeared no comprehensive solution. Nevertheless, he 
howled at the wind of technology, all the while understanding 
its inertia: 
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 The attempt to develop a doctrine for a more flexible 
application of our power is inhibited by many factors, 
however, the chief of which is the very technological 
race which makes it necessary. Were technology stable, 
equilibrium might come about between the power of the 
new weapons and the fear of the consequences. 
Technology is far from stable, however; it is 




 Kissinger understood that obsolescence in this environment 
was timed in minutes rather than years. This condition did not 
always give room for developing intricate and comprehensive 
policies. Indeed, the Cold War seemed to steer clear of them. 
Despite the trouble of presenting a true workable doctrine for 
nuclear weapons, the efforts of intellectuals such as Kissinger 
and others were truly engaged with the problem. 
 Sputnik and the Missile Gap. American foreign policy more 
often than not is reactive in character. For example, one could 
point to the failure to stop Hitler at Munich or the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, which was the ultimate provocation 
necessary to bring the United States into World War Two. John 
Lewis Gaddis in his book Surprise, Security, and the American 
Experience argues that “surprise” is becoming less of an element 
                       







 This was certainly not the case on October 4, 1957 
all of the United States was blindsided once again by the launch 
of the first artificial space satellite Sputnik.  
 The VESM, M-4 and M-4m and the aforementioned AS-6, which 
was produced for space flight control centers had paid off for 
the Soviets.
 322
 Although they were far behind the U.S. in 
production of nuclear weapons, they did concentrate their 
efforts on rockets that could propel objects into space. In 
actuality, the West had little to fear from Sputnik, which was 
essentially little more than a beeping ball orbiting the 
earth.
323
 It only measured the content of the ionosphere. 
However, it caused fervor not only with the American public but 
also with the politicians on Capitol Hill who were not insiders 
in the administration itself.
324
 There are two major Cold War 
myths that came out of this event (certainly there were many 
other ones of minor consequence): the first myth was that the 
Eisenhower Administration was caught unaware by the activities 
and launch of the satellite. The plain fact was that U-2 flights 
over the U.S.S.R. were making the administration quite informed 
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of the activities at the Baikonur Cosmodrome and the testing of 
the R-7 booster rocket. Furthermore, on this same point, the 
U.S. had also been active in testing of rockets.
325
 Certainly 
there had been progress made by both nations since the Nazis had 
fired V-1s and V-2s from Germany to London.  The second myth, 
although suspected previously (albeit spuriously), was that the 
United States was trailing behind the Soviets in its missile 
force. This “Missile Gap” proved that perception is often more 
important than reality. This myth would hold up throughout the 
Cold War, even though the reality was that the U.S.S.R. never 
matched the United States warhead for warhead during the entire 
conflict. Nevertheless, in 1957 the Soviets had their victory. 
In the following year Kissinger released “The Answer to 
Sputnik.” The panic that Sputnik produced caused many 
institutions to increasingly rely in federal funding. For 
example, Harvard University, which produced many intellectuals 
with expertise on national security, such as McGeorge Bundy, 
then the Dean of Harvard’s Faculty of Arts and Sciences, had its 
budget increased from eight million dollars to 30 million in 
federal funds.
326
 Only a small amount of this money went to 
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social science departments. Even an institution like Harvard 
began investing in the hard sciences.
327
 
 The Microchip. 1958 was a slower year for American 
supercomputing: Argonne National Laboratory had created the PACE 
computer, but not much had changed since the establishment of 
the SAGE defense system. And yet, American computer science had 
hit a milestone. By 1958, computers like the TRANSAC were 
beginning to become the norm rather than the exception. 
Transistor powered computers solved reliability issues and, more 
importantly, took up less space. Despite this shift in 
technology, engineers in the field still fretted about what they 
called a “tyranny of numbers.”
328
 What this meant was that there 
was only so much space that transistors could take up and be 
made by hand. The transistors also did not completely solve the 
issue of the tremendous amounts of heat that a computer would 
create.  
In the search for solutions, the U.S. Army invested in the 
Texas Instruments Company to solve the problem. The initial 
solution was what the company called the micro-module. This 
contraption was more durable than traditional transistors; one 
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of TI’s engineers however thought that this was the wrong 
solution to the tyranny of numbers problem. Jack Kilby set out 
to design a set of transistors that could be reduced to being 
etched on a piece of silicon. On September 12, 1958 the 
microchip came into being giving a seemingly unlimited potential 
for future computer architecture.
329
  
Kilby did not deserve all the credit for the microchip. 
Virtually at the same time an engineer at Fairchild 
Semiconductor, Robert N. Noyce, independent of the events at 
Texas Instruments, also created a microchip. Despite the ensuing 
legal infighting began between TI and Fairchild, in the end both 
companies shared a patent for the invention, which was going to 
have a notable impact on defense within the following years.  
 In Washington the tumult over Sputnik did not subside, and 
Eisenhower, although knowing that there was no missile gap, had 
to respond. In order to quell the panic, the president created 
two new agencies to satiate the political elements and show the 
public that the administration was actively pursuing the 
Russians. One agency was very public and this was the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); the other less 
known to the public but more influential was the Advanced 
                       





Research Projects Agency (ARPA). To this day, ARPA (now renamed 
DARPA) identifies its mission in the following way:  
 To prevent strategic surprise from negatively 
impacting U.S. national security and create strategic 
surprise for U.S. adversaries by maintaining the 




 Note how the word “surprise” is emphasized. This points to 
a certain continuity in history. Fool me once shame on you, fool 
me twice shame on me. In any case, ARPA would coordinate defense 
projects for the entire military and assess their necessity. In 
a way, ARPA became the RAND of the defense department. 
  The National Defense and Education Act. Eisenhower did not 
only respond in the executive arena, but in the legislative one 
as well. Ten days before the invention of the integrated circuit 
(the microchip), on September 2, 1958 Congress passed the 
National Defense and Education Act. The Act actively promoted 
the availability of low interest loans for purposes of obtaining 
a college education. Many of the benefactors of this act would 
go on to be successful engineers and scientists, which is what 
the US needed in order to keep up with the Soviets in the space 
and arms races. Only weeks later however, there was a distinct 
feeling that the Administration had put the U.S. on its heels 






vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Indeed an unacceptable geopolitical 
position. 
 Also, in 1958 the PRC made another attempt to intimidate 
the KMT in Taiwan. The shelling of Quemoy and Matsu began once 
again in the second Taiwan crisis. Whether this was a test of 
the PRC’s strength or a sign of a rift with the Soviet Union was 
of no matter; the well being of the KMT was the responsibility 
of the United States. Once again Eisenhower was forced into a 
show of military strength sending U.S. Naval forces into the 
area, and by October the PRC, who had no stomach for a head to 
head confrontation with the United States backed down again. 
During the previous year the PRC had launched the “Great Leap 
Forward.” This was the Communist attempt to quickly 
industrialize the country, to add infrastructure and modernize. 
Unfortunately, the leap forward was in actuality anything but. 
The program succeeded in killing half a million Chinese citizens 
who were unable to produce enough food-stuffs and at the same 
time industrialize the nation. The economic experiment was a 
failure. The rift between Mao Tse Tung and Khrushchev made it 
impossible for the PRC to turn to the Soviets for aid without an 





IBM and Taiwan 
When the KMT forces fled mainland China they faced similar 
economic problems. Taiwan had no infrastructure. The people 
needed hydro-electric dams for power and water. The government 
needed a fast way to undertake a census and create an industrial 
foundation.
331
 The United States picked up the slack on aid to 
Taiwan. The goal, as usual, was to provide a standard of living 
that was superior to the Communist nations, in keeping with the 
strategy first set out by the Marshall Plan. Not only did Taiwan 
receive materials from America, but also the proper techniques 
and machinery to carry out these tasks. This is where IBM 
stepped in.  
During 1958 and 1959 the KMT received several IBM 
mainframes to deal with problems concerning the census, economic 
statistics and accounting problems of all types.
332
 These 
machines were integral to the well being of Taiwan. IBM 650 and 
1620 systems were leased (in keeping with the IBM tradition of 
not selling a computer) to Chiao Tung University in order to 
calculate relationships between their thermal power-plants and 
their hydroelectric equivalents.
333
 In this way, supercomputing 
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had its role in the “butter” portion of the “guns and butter” 
strategy in the Cold War.  
  
Soviet Burst 
In the meantime, the Soviets produced three new 
supercomputers in 1958: the M-20, M-40 and SETUN. The M-20 
computer was developed and utilized at the Institute of Precise 
Mechanics and Computer Technology. It was used in two separate 
nuclear weapons labs.
334
 With 20,000 operations per second, the 
M-20 was more than able to handle the data for these complex 
calculations. What was possibly worse for the United States in 
the arms race was the M-40, which was capable of double the 
operations per second. Its task was anti-ballistic missile 
defense.
335
 Added to this was Lebedev’s BESM-2. The BESM-2 was a 
much more conservative computer operating at only 8 to 10 
thousand per second, but each computer that could be added to 
the overall workload would advance the Soviet arsenal.
336
 
All three of the aforementioned Soviet machines, while very 
capable, were typical von Neumann, binary architecture machines. 
In short, there was no real difference in these Soviet machines 
from their western counterparts, except for the fact that the 
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Soviets were behind in both quantity and tube versus 
transistorized technology. One Soviet machine, however, would 
cause quite a stir in the west: the SETUN. 
 SETUN was created by Nikolai P. Brusentsov at Moscow State 
University. The fact that the supercomputer was constructed at a 
university rather than a military installation was out of the 
norm for the Soviet computing establishment. It was more akin to 
how ENIAC and other machines in the west had begun. The notable 
feature of SETUN is that it was not based in binary logic. The 
computer operated on a ternary logic, meaning three digits 
(1,0,-1) instead of the traditional 1 and 0. The rationale for 
the use of ternary logic was not merely to be ideologically and 
scientifically opposed to the west; the Soviets all thought that 
ternary logic was mathematically simpler for computers to handle 
in various ways.
337
 In fact, the ternary structure had been 
considered for Whirlwind II that powered SAGE, but was 
abandoned.
338
 This fact alone caused serious inquiry in the west. 
As we already know, there had been contact between east and west 
at Darmstadt, when Lebedev had revealed Soviet supercomputing 
efforts. Contacts were then maintained. American scientists were 
sent to the Soviet Union to learn more about the state of Soviet 
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computing efforts. In August 1958 several scientists were sent 
to the U.S.S.R.
339
 They, were shown various Soviet machines: BESM 
I and II, STRELA, the M Series computers, SESM, as well as 
several new series of machines URAL I and II and the Kiev 
series.
340
 Apparently the scientists were shown SETUN and were 
told that the machine was simply an experimental machine used 
for training engineers.
341
 It is possible that this was true or 
at least a partial truth, though documentation and other sources 
were incomplete and or subjected to tampering.
342
 To invest so 
heavily in an experimental machine and then use it for 
specifically training neophyte engineers seemed a waste of 
resources, but it would not be the first or the last time that 
the intractable GOSPLAN schedules would interfere in matters of 
common sense. One thing is for certain: it was the paranoia set 
off by the launch of Sputnik that caused such a heightened 
interest in Soviet computing. In this way the U.S., at least in 
some circles, was caught off-guard twice, first by Sputnik and 
then by the notable advances in Soviet supercomputing that made 
the launch itself possible. The U.S., however, was not in as bad 
shape as one might be led to believe. It was not that the 
                       
339 Ware, W.H. ed., RAND Research Memorandum RM 2451, Soviet Computer 
Technology 1959, March 1, 1960, Pp. x. 
  
340 Ibid, xi. 
 
341 Ibid, 81. 
 
342 Hunger, SETUN, 63. 
207 
 
Sputnik launch was a nothing, but it was also not the horror it 
was made out to be in the actual arms race. The Soviets had 
focused on space flight as a public declaration of their 
superiority, one that they themselves were not sure of. 
Nevertheless, even with the advances in supercomputing efforts, 
the United States held more than a comfortable lead in the arms 
race.  
Dulles Dies 
On May 24, 1959 Eisenhower and the administration suffered 
a blow. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had been diagnosed 
with cancer before and by February he went to Walter Reed for a 
hernia operation. While Dulles was not particularly liked, 
politicians on both sides of the aisle were concerned.
343
 The 
administration needed Dulles to attend the upcoming Geneva 
Summit.
344
 But his cancer had returned. It was hoped that he 
would regain his strength and deal with foreign policy as he had 
done for most of his life, from the Versailles Conference at the 
end of World War I to the thermonuclear era. But it was not to 
be. He lost his strength and by April 16, 1959 he tendered his 
resignation to his president and friend Dwight D. Eisenhower.
345
 
Considering the major role Dulles had played in the 
                       
343 Mosley, Leonard. Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster 
Dulles and Their Family Network. New York: The Dial Press, 1978, Pp. 446. 
 





administration, his death was a disaster. The only saving grace, 
if there was in fact one, is that Eisenhower was in his lame-
duck years of the presidency and the effectiveness of the 
administration would dwindle in any case, but not before other 
events gnawed away at Eisenhower’s power. An event was on the 
horizon that would further curtail the president’s power. It 
involved the loss of an airplane. 
  U-2 and Corona. The benefits of U.S. supercomputing 
efforts were not limited to nuclear weapons alone. The U-2 spy-
plane that could fly at altitudes of 70,000 feet was a product 
of supercomputing. The U-2 had been a great advantage to the US 
during this period. The CIA had been using the U-2s to fly 
espionage missions since the early 1950s. Unfortunately, this 
type of operation became public on May 1, 1960, when pilot 
Francis Gary Powers was shot down over Soviet territory by an 
SA-2 missile while on a mission. Powers who did not take his 
cyanide capsule was captured and put on public trial in the 
U.S.S.R. Khrushchev had the wreckage of the plane on display as 
proof of aggressive U.S. interference. President Eisenhower 
tried to avoid the notion that there was an intentional plan to 
infringe upon Soviet Airspace, but this tactic did not work, and 
when Eisenhower refused to apologize to Khrushchev at their 
Paris Summit for the incident, Khrushchev walked out of the 
summit. This incident worsened U.S. Soviet Relations, which had 
209 
 
been easing somewhat since 1956. All of Eisenhower’s and Dulles’ 
work to bring about Détente with the Soviets had now in one 
event failed. Nevertheless, the existence of the U-2 did not 
deter their continued flights over the Soviet Union and other 
areas. Simply the U.S. now knew that there were risks in 
utilizing the U-2. This also was not as bad as it might at first 
seem. In the wake of the launch of Sputnik, America rushed to 
put its own satellites in orbit. This was achieved with both the 
Vanguard I and II. By the time of the U-2 incident insiders in 
NASA, the Air-Force and the CIA knew that the U-2’s days were 
numbered.
346
 A system of satellites known as Corona had gathered 
more information on the Soviet Union than the totality of the U-
2 program.
347
  This simply meant that everyone who was an 
important insider in the Eisenhower Administration knew the 
actual weakness of the Soviet military machine.
348
 There simply 
was no bomber gap and no missile gap. As a political issue it 
was very much concrete, but in reality it was ethereal as could 
possibly be. 
The Military Industrial Complex. On January 17, 1961 
President Eisenhower gave his farewell speech to the nation. 
Unexpectedly, he warned the American Public to beware the power 
                       








of the burgeoning Military Industrial Complex and be very wary 
of its ability to curtail our liberty in the name of security. 
This was an astounding announcement in light of Eisenhower’s 
career as a General. He, better than anyone else, understood 
that the need for U.S. security at the expense of fiscal matters 
could work against the U.S. in both domestic and foreign policy 
realms. The question remained: “Did anyone listen?” 
During the Eisenhower Administration the United States 
experienced the greatest acceleration of supercomputing projects 
and the culmination of the largest one, the Semi-Automatic 
Ground Environment better known as SAGE. Eisenhower’s “New Look” 
by its greater reliance on nuclear arsenals made the push for 
newer and more powerful supercomputers a necessity to bolster 
his Cold War strategy.  
What might seem strange is that the New Look, a Cold War 
strategy, was aided by historical societal values that placed 
great faith in technology and efficiency dating from the Age of 
Jackson forward. Computers were the definitive example of both 
technology and efficiency. The computers represented the 
ultimate rationality. This experience was different from 
America’s Western European allies. Europe had been involved in 
two world wars, in which technology had played an integral role 
to the detriment of all Europeans. Because of this, all of 
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Europe has had a distinct mistrust of the benefits of 
technology. France is probably the most significant case in that 
the nation lagged so far behind in the ability to create a 
supercomputer combined with its financial troubles and ongoing 
wars in Vietnam and Algeria that its nuclear program did not 
come to fruition during the Eisenhower Administration but in the 
following one.  
The United States’ strong belief in technology also created 
a widening of the scope of the use of scientific computing. 
UNIVAC had predicted the outcome of the 1952 presidential 
election accurately. The computer called for a landslide victory 
for Eisenhower despite the opinion of political pundits who were 
predicting a much closer contest. This demonstration captured 
the public’s imagination about the abilities of the “electronic 
brain.” This in turn translated into a feeling of American 
superiority through scientific advances. IBM was no less 
productive. IBM’s 701 computer, although not suited for RAND’s 
specialized purposes, had a role in an unlikely undertaking that 
was the translation of the Russian language into English. This 
feat aided in American intelligence efforts, which Eisenhower 
valued in his foreign policy. Furthermore, IBM’s 650 and 1620 
models were integral in aiding the creation of infrastructure 
for the government of Taiwan. It was important that Capitalism 
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could provide for its allies in a manner that Communism could 
not.  
The Soviet Union had also made great strides in its 
supercomputing efforts. Sergei Lebedev had created the BESM, 
Iurii Bazilevskii created Strela at SKB-245. The SETUN the first 
supercomputer to utilize ternary logic seemingly fulfilled 
Soviet ideological values to have their computer architecture 
differ from the binary computer architecture in western nations. 
The Soviets also produced other models of supercomputers such as 
the “M” series all of which aided in their military efforts.  
Despite Soviet advances not all was well. Stalin’s death in 
1953 created political instability in the U.S.S.R. A troika was 
formed to lead the nation. The members of the Troika, 
Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Beria all had contact in one form or 
another with the computing community. And the foreign minister 
Nikolai Bulganin who replaced Molotov was intimately involved 
with computing circles by managing their time-sharing schedules. 
This political shake-up seemed to bode well for Soviet computing 
efforts, but it did not. Lavrenti Beria was tempted to make 
reforms in the Soviet political and ideological stance was 
executed for treason. Malenkov and especially Khrushchev were 
not of the mind to make any drastic change in the Soviet 
geopolitical stance. The execution of Beria represented a missed 
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opportunity for Soviet scientists to have greater contact with 
their western counterparts. This kind of exchange would have to 
wait for another two years. Lebedev and Bazilevskii both 
participated in the IFIP Conference in West Germany to publicly 
tout Soviet supercomputing advances. Unfortunately, the two 
scientists were not allowed to disclose their work in any 
meaningful way. Ideology, however, continued to thwart 
scientific advances in the Soviet state. These were advances 
that could have aided the Soviets in immeasurable ways. But in 
the end, by placing such a premium on ideology the Soviets 

















Flexible Response I 
The Dangers of Defection 
 
 As the Eisenhower years wound down and the American public 
was duly warned about the unharnessed spending by the military 
industrial complex, the closest presidential election until the 
one that would take place in 2000 was underway. A young 
lieutenant during WWII who became a US House of Representative 
from 1947-1953 and then Senator from Massachusetts from 1953-
1960, John Fitzgerald Kennedy faced Vice President Richard 
Milhous Nixon. The election was a referendum on Eisenhower’s 
policies over the past eight years and the campaigning was 
particularly hard fought. Kennedy’s platform contended that 
Eisenhower was a “do-nothing” president, and due to his lack of 
responsibility, the country had stagnated militarily, allowing 
the U.S.S.R. to gain an advantage in nuclear armaments. 
Furthermore, Eisenhower had allowed a Communist government to 
establish itself in Cuba a mere ninety miles away from the US. 
According to Kennedy, it was: “Time to get the country moving 
again.” Vice-President Nixon, on the other hand, campaigned 
focusing upon his experience that he had gleaned under 
Eisenhower and his ability to keep the worldwide peace that 
Eisenhower had made a hallmark of his presidency.  
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The nation was evenly divided between Kennedy and Nixon. A 
few factors may have been crucial for Kennedy. His performance 
in the September 26
th
 television debate and Eisenhower’s late 
endorsement of Nixon may have tipped the scales. In the end, 
Kennedy won by a small margin: 118,550 votes out of 68 million. 
This was hardly a mandate for Kennedy’s presidency. This fact 
had a profound impact on Kennedy. He proceeded with caution 
despite his strong campaign rhetoric. Caution may also been a 
factor for his decision to rely on a seemingly stronger cabinet 
made up of experts from all areas of academia and enterprise. 
Kennedy’s “Best and Brightest” minds indeed came from 
across the U.S. from all fields of endeavor: academics, 
politicians, military, and business. In this way he hoped to 
have a more diversified field of experience to choose advice 
from. This was to be different from Eisenhower’s cabinet, which 
was chosen primarily from big business and the military. While 
it may have seemed logical to have diverse points of view as 
greater sources of information, this would have dire 
consequences for U.S. foreign policy.   
Finally the Truth about the Missile Gap. Kennedy’s ideas on 
foreign policy were informed by the initial impression of a 
rising missile gap between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.: so he 
immediately endorsed a buildup of nuclear missiles. Also, 
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Kennedy opted for a flexible response, as opposed to the 
Eisenhower/Dulles policy of Massive Retaliation.
349
 President 
Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara 
would build up conventional forces as well as a deterrent to 
Soviet mischief. President Kennedy’s first action was to assign 
McNamara to do a Department of Defense study of the details 
concerning the missile gap. McNamara found there indeed was a 
missile gap in favor of the US by a wide margin.
350
 Considering 
the vastly superior economic position that the United States had 
then it would have been logical to assume that there would have 
been a larger missile force. Although the Soviets had built up 
their supercomputing arsenal, they still lagged behind the U.S. 
both quantitatively and qualitatively, and this was a crucial 
relationship to a large and reliable arsenal.  
At the time the U.S. was still reeling from Soviet gains in 
their space program, despite the fact that those gains were, 
more or less, a diversion from the continuing arms race. Yet the 
president felt compelled to engage in the “space race” by 
pledging to put a man on the moon by the end of the decade. With 
Project Mercury the fledgling NASA thus acquired a challenging 
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but profitable objective. Naturally, supercomputers were to 
contribute to these goals. 
By 1960, IBM had manufactured its 1400 series computers. 
These were of little consequence, as this series was mostly 
geared towards business applications. However, Univac began a 
strictly military project for the U.S. Navy, which only produced 
two computers. The Livermore Advanced Research Computer (LARC) 
was considered by many to be the “first” supercomputer (not 
really the case) because of its unmatched speed. According to J. 
Presper Eckert the LARC was “100 times faster than today’s 
scientific computers and internally 1,000 times faster than 
today’s business data-processing system.”
351
 In fact, Eckert 
considered the LARC project to be the first long-range strategy 
for supercomputing.
352
 Despite the performance of the LARC and 
its self-assigned “grand strategy,” only two computers were ever 
delivered. One machine went to the Livermore Radiation Labs in 
California. The other went to the U.S. Navy at the David Taylor 
Model Basin. One was geared to assist nuclear weapons 
development and the other to assist the design of experimental 
ships. The outcome of the LARC project remained quantitatively 
limited. This was not an abnormal situation during this time. 
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For example, in April of 1960 IBM’s latest entry into 
supercomputing, the 7030, better known as the “Stretch,” was 
announced only to be withdrawn from service one year later. Of 
course, since the government negotiated with IBM a price of 
$10,000,000 and with a monthly rental of $300,000, the machine 
proved to be too costly even for such a facility as the labs at 
Los Alamos.
353
   
Meanwhile one of RAND’s analysts, Herman Kahn, was causing 
a stir. Like many at RAND, Kahn was searching for solutions to 
the problem of nuclear war with the Soviets. Kahn had made his 
reputation at RAND by examining Game Theory. Most of this work, 
not surprisingly, was done in 1957, before Sputnik. He found 
that the Game Theories, as they applied to nuclear conflict, 
were difficult to analyze, but that mathematical knowledge aided 
such analysis.
354
 He also stated that the theories had 
shortcomings because nothing can predict the future. In short 
there was, as he put it, no “oracle.”
355
 He did point out, 
however, that the theory was useful for policy papers and 
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 What was meant by hardware is unknown but the term 
has been applied to computers in reference to the actual, 
physical systems that constitute the building blocks of the 
computer. In the end, Kahn stated that hardware and Game Theory 
could no longer be ignored in current war-gaming scenarios. 
The Optimal Solution 
Kahn made his biggest impact with his book titled On 
Thermonuclear War published in 1960. In this study he argued 
that the nation that depended more on defense, rather than the 
nation that attacked first, would bare more of the brunt in the 
aftermath of the war.
357
 Kahn also stated that nuclear war did 
not have to be “unlimited.” This was not much different from the 
thesis posed by Henry Kissinger, Paul Nitze, and others. Kahn, 
however, was overly optimistic about the notion of nuclear war, 
how to survive it, how the scenario of the war would play out 
and how to strike back. One of the reasons for this optimism was 
a shift in his approach of analysis. He stated that the earlier 
approaches at RAND were to find optimal solutions to problems.
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He then added: 
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 Naturally the high-speed computer often played a 
central role in all this. Sometimes our researchers 
took a curious pride in the prowess of their high-
speed computers.  They would make such remarks as, 
“More than a million campaign calculations went into 
this analysis.”  Or, “This is the first analysis done 
by man in which 10,000,000 multiplications were made.”  
Or even a more extreme boast, “These results came out 
of complicated calculation performed by the most 
modern of high-speed computers using the most advanced 
mathematical techniques available.  Do you want to 
argue with an electronic machine backed up by all the 
resources of modern science?”  The only possible 




 Kahn’s new approach was to find simpler systems and apply 
them broadly, taking into account all levels of solutions.
360
 
This would be fine, except that broader solutions do not fit the 
intricacies of such a conflict.  
In the case of thermonuclear war, there must be an optimal 
solution. This would require reliance on complex calculations 
that only the supercomputers could supply. Furthermore, the 
thesis went against the work that Kahn had produced for RAND up 
to that point. He knew that game theory sought an optimal 
solution in which massive computing was integral to the process. 
In short, he was going against the entire mathematical doctrine 
that the Cold War was predicated on. This was a dangerous 
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gamble. His rationale was that simply weighing numbers in 
situations where a decision-making committee is charged with 
finding a solution makes it almost impossible to find a 
consensus.
361
 While Kahn may have been incorrect in his analysis 
about optimal solutions, he was more insightful on the pitfalls 
of the necessity of consensus. 
McNamara and RAND. The “Best and Brightest” were chosen not 
on their experience, but rather their “style” and their personal 
loyalty to Kennedy himself. This was an attempt to gain tighter 
control over the apparatus of the executive branch and most 
specifically the national security apparatus. As a first act, 
the president’s National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy 
eviscerated Eisenhower’s National Security Council. The staff 
was cut from 71 advisors to 48 and its duties were drastically 
limited.
362
 Another move was to appoint Robert McNamara to the 
department of defense. Civilian control of defense under 
McNamara was not exactly welcomed by the military, but RAND was 
thrilled, understanding the statistician’s love of analysis and 
numbers.
363
 This analysis would be the cornerstone of foreign 
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policy not only for Kennedy but for Lyndon Baines Johnson as 
well. In this manner President Kennedy may have seemingly gained 
more control over the apparatus with a wider range of ideas, but 
in actuality by cutting out those with experience, by stating 
that he would rather have smaller meetings with department 
heads, he hamstrung himself in foreign affairs in a series of 
failures. 
The Bay of Pigs and Berlin. In an effort to seem vigorous 
and strong in international affairs Kennedy embarked on mischief 
in Cuba. The President had inherited Castro’s Cuba from the 
previous Administration. The CIA had planned an operation aimed 
at overthrowing Castro in April of 1961. The ensuing fiasco at 
the Bay of Pigs marked the first failure of the Administration. 
The Kennedy administration sought success by molding its 
strategy in a calculated manner to produce a firm response. 
Unfortunately, the strategy and the tactics utilized at the Bay 
of Pigs were unable to produce success.  
A more crucial test of the administration’s foreign policy, 
international commitments, and the rational schemes of the Cold 
War came with the Second Berlin Crisis. At the Vienna Summit 
Chairman Khrushchev met with President Kennedy and made it known 
in no uncertain terms of his intent to seal off Berlin from the 
west. In August 1961 Khrushchev was attempting to make good on 
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that promise. Soviet tanks pulled up to the Brandenburg gate. In 
response, U.S. forces met the Soviets nose-to-nose. Again the 
Soviets were testing the established boundaries in the main 
front of the Cold War in Europe. The tank commanders were 
independent and this increased the danger in the standoff. In 
this defection from von Neumann’s scheme, both Dean Acheson and 
Henry Kissinger argued for a stern response. This is not what 
the President did. Instead, Kennedy was willing to not push the 
matter further, and the Soviets erected the Berlin Wall 
splitting the two Berlins and creating another rational 
equilibrium.  
The question of success and failure in the crisis is a 
matter of point of view. There was no definitive escalation to 
the point of defection and that was a success. The outcome can 
be seen as a failure for Kennedy for not taking a stronger 
stand. The President did not see a viable reason to kill 
American soldiers over access to Berlin thinking that the two 
Berlins would never be united again.
364




On the other hand, for Khrushchev the outcome was murky. If 
he sought a unification of the two Berlins under the Soviet 
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banner then he failed in his purpose. But, if he sought to stem 
the tide of peoples leaving East Berlin for the west then the 
wall was an effective, if not an elegant, solution. Apparently 
the Chairman was in line with Kennedy as well. He saw no need to 
risk Soviet lives for East Berlin. He even went a step further, 
stating that the “Wall” was a general good for the U.S.S.R. in 
that an additional Soviet labor force would not have to be sent 
to East Germany to aid their troubled economy.
366
  
Privately, both leaders had gotten what they had wanted out 
of a potentially deadly situation. The crisis was averted, and a 
new cooperative equilibrium was established, but it was not the 
last time “defection” would be a possibility during Kennedy’s 
tenure. Nevertheless, rationality held firm. The reasons behind 
the new equilibrium were different from the equilibrium set at 
the outset of the Cold War. Fear of each opponent in the game 
nearly flared out of control. Before this crisis there had been 
distrust of the opponent and perhaps fear, but rational loss of 
control had never come this close.  
Both the Bay of Pigs and the second Berlin Crisis were 
stringent tests of Game Theory. At the Bay of Pigs Kennedy 
through the CIA was making an aggressive move towards the 
defection point. Although Cuba was strictly in the U.S. sphere 
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of influence in the western hemisphere, Castro had committed 
Cuba to an anti-American stance even before Kennedy became 
president and in 1960 approached the Soviets. The CIA operation 
under the direction of Richard Bissell had come up with a 
seemingly logical, calculated, scheme to oust Castro. But 
Bissell did not pay attention to the details of the domestic 
situation in Cuba. Ultimately, this variable was significant and 
led to an obvious failure. Furthermore, this pushed Castro 
indelibly into a close relationship with the Soviet Union. The 
Soviets could have reacted at any time but the line of defection 
had not been crossed in a significant manner. 
On the other hand, the second Berlin Crisis was a 
significant move toward defection. Soviet and U.S. forces 
encountered one another directly. Thankfully and interestingly, 
the defection from von Neumann’s rational scheme did not produce 
war. The Berlin Wall had been erected and because both Kennedy 
and Khrushchev did not see the point in risking war over Berlin 
thusly a new rational equilibrium was established. Both crises 
tested the boundaries of Game Theory and even in face of 
irrational actions on the part of both nations Cold War 
rationality held.     
Soviet Defense Expands. During this time the Supercomputer 
Race continued unabated. The Soviets were not resting on their 
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laurels simply because they were ahead in the space race against 
the U.S. In that year the U.S.S.R. released three new series of 
supercomputers: Bashir Rameev created the URAL series followed 
by the MINSK I of which 220 were produced by August and the M-3 
followed by December. And in 1961 Sergei Lebedev and his 
scientific comrades, most notably Vsewolod Burtsev struck once 
again with the introduction of the 5E-92-B. This computer was 
more than notable because it was the first computer to deal with 
anti-missile defense. Testing began in 1961 and, although the 
system was not complete (similar to the situation with SAGE) its 
testing was successful in destroying a ballistic missile, a hard 
task indeed because of the acquired speeds and the smaller mass 
of the new missiles. This, in and of itself produced a certain 
amount of security for the Soviets, and possibly led to a 
stronger stance by the U.S.S.R. vis-à-vis the U.S.  
 Despite the successful tests of the 5E-92-B, the Soviet 
Union still lagged behind the United States in the quality of 
supercomputers. It was producing new models and, for certain 
periods, outpacing the U.S. in quantity. The Soviet Union had 
also increased its stockpile of nuclear weapons, though its 
arsenal was still well behind U.S. production. Nevertheless, the 
difference may have been irrelevant, given the destructive power 
of the weapons.  
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The U.S. during this time only produced one serious 
supercomputer: the IBM 7090. The 7090, although described by IBM 
as a general purpose system, was actually specifically intended 
for the “design of missiles, supersonic aircraft and nuclear 
reactors.”
367
 IBM, oddly, disclosed where the 7090 was located. 
The 7090s were located at Werner von Braun’s development group 
in the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center for NASA. The 
machine was charged with the design of the Saturn rocket, meant 
to be used for space flight.
368
 Once again IBM followed its 
procedure of gouging the government. The 7090 was sold at a 
price of $2,898,000 and rented for $63,500.
369
 Luckily for IBM 
and others who took part in the defense of the United States, 
Kennedy’s Flexible Response included the largest peacetime 
increase in the military’s budget to that point.
370
 The budget 
had increased by $9 billion and this was more than all of U.S. 
allies in NATO put together.
371
 This meant that the government 
could afford an IBM computer that would crash after only fifteen 
minutes of work, but did perform impressive calculations in that 
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short period of time.
372
 The budget increase was engineered by 
McNamara, who had gained the reputation of a “human computer.”
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President Kennedy’s handling of foreign affairs had 
produced failures in Cuba and Austria. And in the Berlin Crisis 
the Berlin Wall, was erected and attributed by some to Kennedy’s 
failure to confront the Soviets on the most important front of 
the Cold War. The next event, however, would test the 
President’s resolve to the utmost degree and show the dangers of 
both von Neumann’s “defection” and Kahn’s “consensus.” 
Cuban Missile Crisis and Game Theory 
Between October 14, 1962 and October 28, 1962 the Cuban 
Missile Crisis occurred. This was possibly the most dangerous 
event of the Cold War and the closest to the defection scheme of 
von Neumann for both superpowers. The U.S.S.R. had been secretly 
delivering nuclear missiles to Cuba. The CIA in over-flight 
surveillance of Cuba discovered thirty sites with intermediate 
range nuclear missiles near San Cristobal that were able to 
strike targets in the United States; later it was found that 
there were more than 100 sites.
374
 The only cities that might be 
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spared were in Washington State, Alaska and Hawaii.
375
 John von 
Neumann’s blueprint for the management of the Cold War had not 
been abandoned. Similarly the Berlin Wall stood as a demarcation 
of stability as was suggested by Harvard scholar Thomas 
Schelling. Both Herman Kahn and Schelling had advanced the use 
of Game Theory as a cornerstone of nuclear management. Now with 
the possibility of missiles ninety miles off the coast of the 
United States, the prospect of defection was very real and 
threatening the destruction of the globe in the process.   
 As noted, according to von Neumann’s game, the best 
possibility for the avoidance of nuclear war was cooperation by 
both hostile adversaries, even though there was no real 
information about the intentions of the other player. The 
scenario was played on a rational basis. The problem here was 
that Khrushchev had “defected” from that scenario. There is no 
doubt that the move was not a rational one. Khrushchev had been 
convinced in June of 1962 by Fidel Castro to deliver to Cuba 
these weapons to thwart possible invasion attempts by the United 
States into Cuba. Khrushchev’s move brought brinksmanship to new 
levels. This was the case on October 14
th
, when U-2 flights over 
Cuba had found launch sites. Washington immediately wondered 
what Khrushchev sought to gain. By defecting from the game, the 
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apparent immediate outcome was that the U.S.S.R. had an upper-
hand in nuclear deterrence. By upsetting the equilibrium 
however, the leader of the Soviet Union had to know about the 
probable consequences of his actions, too: the United States 
would feel provoked into a counter-action. To think otherwise 
would make Khrushchev a dunce. It was certainly not that 
Khrushchev did not understand the implications of nuclear war, 
as he once stated: “It will be too late to cry over lost hair 
after your head is cut off.”
376
  Furthermore, the Chairman knew 
that he did not have a nuclear advantage. He was even prone to 
muse sarcastically, as he once did in a conversation with his 
son Sergei on the subject of the Soviet R-7 missile. Sergei 
asked his father: “How can you say that we are producing rockets 
like sausages, Father? We don’t have any rockets.” His father 
replied: “That’s alright. We don’t have any sausages either.”
377
 
Apparently, there was no real gain to be had by delivering 
missiles to a government in Cuba that was openly hostile to the 
United States. But Khrushchev believed that he could score again 
in the political battle. Defection from the game is caused by a 
perception that the opponent does not have the credibility to 
defend himself. Following the Bay of Pigs and Berlin debacles, 
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the president, in Moscow’s opinion, lacked the credibility that 
Eisenhower possessed. This emboldened Khrushchev to strengthen 
his Communist allies, thereby bolstering his own position in 
global affairs and tweaking America’s nose at the same time. The 
Soviet leader believed Kennedy would not react to the move in 
Cuba. After-all the Soviets had not reacted to U.S. missiles in 
Turkey, which were very close to the U.S.S.R. Missiles in Cuba 
was an equitable move.
378
 Furthermore, President Kennedy did not 
prevent the Berlin Wall from being erected in 1961. While this 
reasoning was logical in its premise, it was bound to fail.  
Analysts Herman Kahn and Daniel Ellsberg stated plainly 
that these moves were a game of “chicken,” the outcome of which 
was that the most belligerent player was likely to win the game. 
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At this point on October 16
th
 the Soviets had moved from the 
optimal “C, C block” to the “C, D block,” in which they had the 
upper-hand, at least temporarily. On the same day, President 
Kennedy was briefed on the situation. Unable to come to a 
decision about what to do, Kennedy called in EXCOMM (executive 
committee): this was composed of the Kennedy cabinet members and 
such foreign policy experts as General Maxwell Taylor, Paul 
Nitze and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The time it 
took EXCOMM to deliberate and the President’s need to build 






















Secretary of Defense McNamara and EXCOMM came to the 
decision not to launch a strike against Cuba but to blockade. 
The blockade was renamed a “quarantine” thinking that the word 
“blockade” was too aggressive a term. Any Soviet ships that were 
going to Cuba were subject to the quarantine. NATO was put on 
alert, a further deviation from the normative situation. Acheson 
was sent to consult with France. Kennedy revealed the existence 
of missiles in Cuba on television on October 22, 1962. This 
caused not only concern, but panic as well. There was no doubt 
that this was a dire moment. Interestingly, in hindsight, it was 
likely that Cuba remained a focal point, not only because the 
crisis emanated from there, but also because the supercomputer 
defense systems SAGE in the United States and the 5E-92-B in 
Russia made both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. targets, if not 
untouchable, definitely undesirable ones. Defense and response 
time would have been too quick, and given the independent nature 
of the systems, the ability to pull back from total war may have 
been impossible. Perhaps this was considered by both superpowers 
and was an additional fact in containing the focal point to Cuba 
alone. Khrushchev knew that the missiles in Cuba were not tied 
into the Soviet defense network strike commands were independent 
of the computers possibly giving him more control over Cuba 
during the crisis.  
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Diplomacy a Return to Rationality. Meanwhile, on October 
25
th
 in the U.N. ambassador Adlai Stevenson confronted Ambassador 
Valerian Zorin as to the presence of nuclear devices in Cuba. 
The Soviets continued to deny the existence of the missiles. 
Photos of the sites were revealed to the U.N. audience. This was 
an attempt move towards the “C, C” Cold War normative state.  
However, in presenting the evidence in such a hostile manner, 
Stevenson could have produced the “D, D” defection point. 
Khrushchev’s temperament was still unknown at that point. 
Khrushchev sent a telegram to Kennedy that was not quite 
coherent, but essentially stated that he wanted a cessation to 
the hostilities: 
 What would a war give you? You are threatening us with 
war. But you well know that the very least which you 
would receive in reply would be that you would 
experience the same consequences as those which you 
sent us. And that must be clear to us, people invested 
with authority, trust, and responsibility. We must not 
succumb to intoxication and passions. These are indeed 
transient things, but if indeed war did break out, 
then it would not be in our power to stop it.
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Seemingly, this was an attempt at the rationality that was 
necessary to achieve equilibrium and return the actors to the 
normative C, C state that had existed up to this point. The 
problem was that the game depended on cool rationality and the 
                       




situation, at this point, still did not give itself to the 
requisite amount necessary for such a return.  
Unfortunately, later Kennedy received another telegram that 
was much more hostile, stating unequivocally that the US must 
back down. Kennedy and EXCOMM did not know which telegram was 
authentic; they even speculated that a coup d’état must have 
taken place in the U.S.S.R. and that Khrushchev was out. They 
then decided to respond to the first telegram. Meanwhile, secret 
negotiations were taking place between Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy and the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Their 
agreement, in the end, was to remove U.S. Jupiter missiles in 
Turkey aimed at Moscow in return for suspending the installation 
of the R-16 missiles in Cuba. The U.S. had to promise it would 
not invade Cuba. President Kennedy had previously wanted the 
Jupiter missiles removed, but the decision was revoked for fear 
that it would ignite resentment in Turkey.
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 By October 26
th
, 
there were repeated attempts by the Soviets to have the United 
States remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey; on this point, 
the administration would not budge. Khrushchev also wanted the 
president’s statement that the United States would not invade 
Cuba to be made public. All this time, progress was still being 
made on the operational status of the missiles and further 
                       




encroachments on the quarantine zone. In the midst of the 
crisis, the avatar of calculated rationality, Robert McNamara 
wondered if he would see “another Saturday night.”
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A deal was struck on October 27
th
 when Kennedy wrote to 
Khrushchev pledging not to invade Cuba. But the deal was secret, 
and in the public’s eyes the crisis was still ongoing. Until, 
all of a sudden, on October 28
th
 the Soviet ships withdrew and 
the crisis was over. This was a huge success for the president, 
and mostly what his legend in foreign affairs was based upon. 
Rationality had won out and the C, C (normative position) was 
re-established, and perhaps even strengthened. Realizing that 
this situation was not worth bearing again, a hotline was 
installed in the White House that connected directly to the 
Kremlin. The application and veracity of von Neumann’s theory 
were born out. The crisis was an example of a situation where 
human judgment mostly recreated von Neumann’s equilibrium. But 
the realization of the nature of mechanized, automatic defense 
systems such as SAGE and the 5E-92-B more than likely played a 
part in containing the focal point to Cuba alone despite the 
NATO alert. 
Controlled Nuclear War and Equivalency. The Missile Crisis 
did have a sobering effect on both Kennedy and Khrushchev. The 
                       




proliferation and positioning of nuclear weapons would upset von 
Neumann’s cooperation matrix and cause a nuclear conflict. As in 
the Berlin Crisis, an irrational move created a new equilibrium, 
but was the new standard set by rationality and calculation, or 
by fear?   
It would seem that the avoidance of global Armageddon would 
be enough for all people to enjoy. However, many people were not 
satisfied. It was not so much that the avoidance of nuclear war 
was not the preferable outcome, but it was the manner in which 
the crisis was handled that rankled Acheson and Nitze in the 
EXCOMM meetings. This form of disagreement was bearable, but 
among those who were not pleased at the avoidance of war itself 
were the analysts at RAND, and specifically Herman Kahn at the 
Hudson Institute (he had left RAND by the time of the Crisis) 
who wanted to test their theories of Controlled Nuclear War.  
According to Kahn a quantitative scheme would be applied to 
major cities in both the United States and the Soviet Union, and 
a scheme of equivalency would thus be applied. Herman Kahn’s 
daughter Debbie reminds us that the scheme would play out in 
this manner: 
 There’s an accident, we drop a bomb on Kiev. It was a 
fluke we didn’t mean to. The Russians believe we 
didn’t mean to. Then there’s a negotiation about where 
can we drop a bomb on something that is of equal value 
238 
 
of Kiev. If we drop the bomb we can stop now. If you 





Accidental or not, the possibility of controllable missile 
strikes was taken seriously. Here was rationality gone wild. The 
idea of trading city for city might seem rational, if one 
discounted the horrifying results of a nuclear war. Eighteen 
years since the nuclear genie had been out of the bottle, 
people, even smart and powerful ones did not seem to understand 
the unlimited effects of nuclear conflict. The quantitatively 
minded analysts were loosened. They had been powerful before 
McNamara took power at the Defense Department, but never as 
powerful as they were now that he was there. Luckily, for all of 
humanity, President Kennedy was not convinced of the notion of 
controlled nuclear war. Kennedy did threaten massive retaliation 
and, despite Herman Kahn’s notion of that type of response as a 
“wargasm,” the crisis did end to the benefit of all. If the 
rational schemes had been utilized to their ultimate extent, the 
result would indeed have been nuclear Armageddon. Kahn’s 
equivalency scheme was quantitative. In order to give a 
comprehensive program of equivalency many variables such as: 
population, industrial value, agricultural production, and 
                       




others would have to be calculated on an unprecedented scale. 
The supercomputers would be the only way to compile this amount 
of data and a project such as this might have even stretched 
their abilities. Furthermore, as a military project Secretary of 
Defense McNamara would have had to examine and approve any such 
scheme. Kahn’s scheme would have tested McNamara’s devotion not 
only to RAND and other think-tanks, but to rationality itself. 
Later, at the end of his tenure as Secretary, McNamara did 
question the rationality of the Cold War. This, however, was 
after his frustrating experience in directing the Vietnam War. 
It is unknown what the younger McNamara would have done in 
considering a rationalized scheme.  
On October 28, 1962 the rest of the world was able to 
breathe a huge sigh of relief as the crisis abated not just for 
the superpowers, but everyone. Despite the severity of the 
crisis, nations on both sides of the Cold War did not pause in 
their efforts to build their arsenals aided by supercomputer 
technology. In fact, not only did the arms race continue 
unabated, it increased in tempo as well.
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  Shortly before the 
crisis over Cuba, the Soviets created over 100 of the Minsk II 
series. By March of 1963 they also had the M2-4M, which was used 
                       




to design rocket hulls.
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 The NATO allies were no different. In 
1962 Great Britain ATLAS was created and the French, who tested 
their first nuclear weapon in 1960, just after Kennedy had been 
elected president, had the aid of Bull and CAE supercomputers. 
The nuclear game was not merely continuing but becoming more 
complex. This expansion, and the fear generated by the crisis, 
largely motivated both superpowers to promote an international 
agreement for a “Limited Nuclear Test Ban.” 
CDC 6600 and Abrogation 
Kennedy, in a further effort to avoid future nuclear 
confrontation in July of 1963 proposed the Limited Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty. By 1963 a new “bright-light” (perhaps the brightest 
in the history of supercomputing) made his definitive mark on 
the geopolitical landscape.  
The link between the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and 
supercomputing has to be established by going back to 1952. 
Communications Supplementary Activity Washington or CSAW would 
be incorporated into the National Security Agency (NSA).
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 From 
that group emerged a supercomputing company Engineering Research 
Associates or ERA. During the previous year ERA was being 
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absorbed by Remington-Rand (Univac). It was during that year 
that ERA hired Seymour Cray. Cray was a brilliant engineer who 
wanted only one thing: to build the fastest computers in the 
world. By 1957 Cray would leave Remington Rand for a new company 
Control Data Corporation (CDC). It was there in 1963 that Cray 
created the CDC 6600.          
 The CDC 6600 possessed ten thousand logic gates, which made 
it fifty times faster than CDC’s previous model the 1604 and 
even faster than that amount when compared to any of IBM’s 
models that had appeared in the previous seven years. The 6600 
had been purchased by the National Security Agency, the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory and Livermore Labs. Nothing at the 
time could compare to the speeds that the 6600 produced. The 
machine was instantly recognized to be above and beyond the 
capabilities of all others. To this end, France had attempted to 
buy a CDC 6600 to augment its nuclear program. The U.S. State 
Department had blocked the export of the machine, perhaps a sign 
of a furthering rift between the U.S. and its ally for reasons 
of “National Security.” In any case, the real significance of 
the CDC 6600 was its impact on the Test Ban Treaty. The 
provisions of the treaty were that the parties would not carry 
out any detonation in their respective areas, in the atmosphere, 
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underground or in the seas with any device that would produce 
radioactivity. 
 Any treaty is a contract between states or nations and in a 
legalistic sense it is treated as such. The basis and perhaps 
the most integral part of the contract is “good-faith,” meaning: 
A state of mind characterized by honest belief, 
absence of malice or intent to defraud, absence of a 
design to seek unconscionable advantage or of 




 This is one of the oldest and most respect tenants of 
Contract law. If this “state of mind” does not exist in the 
consideration of the contract, or in this case the treaty is 
null and void prima-facie. This was the case ultimately for the 
Test Ban Treaty. One of the reasons that the government of the 
United States was willing to enter into this agreement was that 
it knew the capabilities of the CDC 6600. 6600s were sent to Los 
Alamos and Livermore Labs to calculate thermonuclear problems 
for simulation modeling. The model would show the blast pattern 
and radiation output of the detonation of devices without 
atmospheric testing of any kind and at 3 million instructions 
per second it could be done quickly. Because of this modeling 
simulation done exclusively in the labs the U.S. could publicly 
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appear to enter into this treaty in good faith, but privately 
nothing would change. In short, the U.S. government knew that it 
would not have to limit its own nuclear testing. This was a 
decisive edge for the U.S. It was not that Great Britain and 
most certainly the Soviet Union did not have supercomputers, but 
they did not have anything that could come close to the 
performance of the 6600. In short, the Limited Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty was not worth the paper it was printed on. The 
supercomputer abrogated the treaty from its inception.  
Geopolitics was once again subordinated to the abilities of the 
machines. 
In the 1960 election Kennedy had barely won against Nixon. 
The narrow margin of victory obviously weighed heavily on his 
mind. Despite his bravado during the election about the missile 
gap and his efforts to create a more flexible, dynamic policy in 
the face of Soviet aggression, he proceeded with caution when 
dealing directly with Moscow. During that election year the 
United States had only produced one supercomputer to foster its 
ever-growing nuclear arsenal. The Soviets still lagged behind, 
but in that year were outpacing the United States in 
supercomputer production, which also assisted their own 
thermonuclear efforts. Kennedy had shown lack of resolve 
especially in Vienna, spurring Nikita Khrushchev to more 
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aggressive actions. Two events in close temporal proximity, the 
Second Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis produced two 
serious possibilities of defection from the von Neumann scheme. 
Nevertheless, the strategy held up. President Kennedy’s grand 
strategy of Flexible Response and its military build-up may have 
provoked the Soviets, but in the end the stability of von 
Neumann’s theories held. By the year of Kennedy’s death the SAGE 
system had been completed in its fullest extent at a cost of $8 
billion dollars, and, despite being on the brink of nuclear war 
twice in three years, the competition for computational and 
nuclear power continued unabated. The Limited Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty was a public step towards nuclear control, but ultimately 
behind the scenes the Treaty was void. The supercomputers on 
both sides could do the explosion simulations, but the United 
States enjoyed a clear advantage because of Seymour Cray and the 
CDC 6600. 
Both the Berlin Crisis in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis 
in 1962 were indicators that Game Theories; in and of 
themselves, were not sufficient to prevent irrational situations 
from coming to fruition. The human qualities of fear and 
understanding were significant factors in the avoidance of two 
cases where the outcome might have produced nuclear war.  This 
led to an understanding between the two superpowers for the 
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necessity of to control nuclear proliferation in some manner. 
This led to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but still the need for 
superiority remained. Seymour Cray’s CDC 6600 superseded the 
treaty and allowed the United States to quietly test its own 
arsenal and perfect it. The implications were that the danger of 
nuclear proliferation remained and the U.S. sought to cross the 
“D,C block” (U.S. Nuclear superiority) without being detected. 
This would only happen later after the passing of President John 



















The Silent Arms Race 
 
The first real foray into the notion of high-speed 
computing began in the United States in the mid to late 
twenties, with Vannevar Bush’s Differential Analyzer. The 
differential equation was solvable through purely human effort, 
but time and margin of errors were always factors to be 
considered. Mechanized calculation increased speed and reduced 
human error. The military was particularly interested in the 
analyzer for the creation of accurate firing tables. This was a 
modest but concrete foundation for the symbiotic relationship 
between computing and the military, a symbiosis that continues 
to the present day.  
The true test of the benefits of high-speed computing came 
during the Second World War. During the War the differential 
equation was not the only problem to solve. Now high-speed 
computing was necessary for decryption purposes and weapons 
design. To this end the most notable supercomputer was Alan 
Turing’s Colossus. Meanwhile, other powers had also invested in 
supercomputing. One of the most obscure was Germany’s Konrad 
Zuse. His Z-1 through Z-3 computers were particularly advanced 
machines. Although Zuse denied that these machines were used for 
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the Nazi war effort, this is unlikely. For example, the V-2 
rockets could have been designed by humans but only after a long 
time and vast amounts of human error. Furthermore, while the 
Nazi regime was on the run from the encroaching allies, it made 
provisions to move the computers along with the scientists. It 
is plausible to conclude that these machines as well as the 
scientific community that created them were among the most vital 
assets of the Nazi arsenal. It is also clear that they the Nazis 
underestimated the benefits of supercomputing, and without that 
advantage, they were not able to make substantial progress in 
their rocket programs.  
Much the same could be said of the U.S. decryption programs 
in the Pacific Theater. Of course, the benefits of high-speed 
computing counted most in the creation of the atomic bomb. 
Without supercomputing efforts the atomic bomb might have 
arrived too late to save hundreds of thousand lives in the 
invasion of the Japanese home islands. In short, it was the 
mathematical machines and mathematical techniques that seriously 
helped the war effort. Those who had invested in supercomputers 
won and those who did not lost. 
By the end of the Second World War, with no apparent enemy 
on the immediate horizon, supercomputing efforts seemed to take 
second priority. The ENIAC had been built, but somewhat too late 
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for the war effort, and the project was expensive perhaps to an 
unwarranted degree. But once the Soviet Union proved its 
aggressive intents in Eastern Europe, also threatening Western 
Europe, the need for high-tech military escalation became 
evident again. Soon the Cold War became founded on nuclear 
deterrence. Investment in atomic arsenals for deterrent effects 
became necessary for both superpowers. This in turn spurred on 
the need for more investment in supercomputers.  
During the early days of the Cold War grand strategies such 
as George Kennan’s “Containment” were developed to handle the 
new geopolitical environment. At the same time, John von Neumann 
and Oskar Morgenstern had already devised a modern version of 
Game Theory that could be and in fact was applied to nuclear 
conflict. Considering the central role of the nuclear weapon to 
the Cold War, this mathematical construct was in itself a grand 
strategy, and one that would outlast the other geopolitical 
strategies, which changed their focus with each incoming 
presidential administration.  
Institutions and think tanks such as RAND established a 
strong cooperation with the military, utilizing high-speed 
computing to create and analyze strategies to manage the 
conflict with the Soviets. Often, these institutions’ advice 
carried great weight. For example, by the time that NSC 68 was 
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adopted RAND’s report on the placement of military forces, which 
had been mathematically calculated with supercomputers, 
recommended the placement of bomber forces only within the 
United States. This left NATO forces in Western Europe 
completely vulnerable to Soviet attacks. Paul Nitze, the author 
of NSC 68, in the end adopted RAND’s advice and in an indirect 
way followed the mathematical methods that had been developed by 
von Neumann and RAND.  
When the Soviet Union tested its first atomic device in 
1949, Soviet supercomputer efforts had also preceded those 
tests. The Soviets had also invested in supercomputing. However, 
they had come late to the game. One of the reasons for this was 
that science in the Soviet Union had been subordinated to 
ideological concerns since the 1920s and 1930s. Another reason 
was that the Soviet state was still feeling the after-effects of 
World War II. It took time to overcome this hurdle, but finally 
Stalin did see the need for supercomputing efforts. He 
understood that mathematics could not be tied to ideology, and 
he even came to coin the term “practical math.” To this end, he 
created two large institutions to produce supercomputers for the 
U.S.S.R. The Soviet computer genius Sergei Lebedev above all 
began to tackle the Soviets main problem: the need to catch up 
and then overtake the West.  
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The atomic age did not last long. By 1952 it gave way to 
the thermonuclear age, which has lasted until the present. 
During the transition supercomputing became inextricably linked 
to the Cold War. Thermonuclear calculations were too complex to 
be done by human efforts alone. This fact led to the creation of 
various Princeton Class Computers, with large investments from 
the military.  
When Dwight David Eisenhower came into office in 1953, the 
link between supercomputers and geopolitical theories became 
even more concrete. Eisenhower’s reliance on the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal required more investment. Such investment did not 
contradict the President’s mantra. The U.S. reliance on nuclear 
deterrence actually bolstered its economic position in order to 
more effectively confront the Soviets. So, spending on 
supercomputing projects did not subside. In fact, the Eisenhower 
administration expanded the role of supercomputers in the 
application of strategy and tactics. Eisenhower did not only 
rely on the U.S. nuclear arsenal but also on various espionage 
efforts. By 1954, IBM computers were put to the task of 
translating the Russian language into English. The machines did 
this in an adept and efficient manner, and in doing so increased 
American knowledge of Soviet activities of all kinds. 
Furthermore, supercomputers were utilized in nations such as 
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Taiwan to build infrastructures. This was another facet of the 
Cold War: keeping anti-Communist nations modernized to ensure 
the stability of their governments.  
In the Soviet Union supercomputing projects blossomed 
especially with the support of Khrushchev and Bulganin, who had 
contact with computing circles prior to coming into positions of 
power. Lebedev, as well as Isaak Bruk and Iurii Bazilevskii were 
the top scientists who quickly created supercomputers such as 
the M-1, M-2 Strela and BESM, to aid with weapons design and 
radar control. In Darmstadt, Germany the Soviets revealed to the 
world their own supercomputers. It was both a strategic and a 
public relations coup that heightened the alarm in the west. 
1957 was a watershed year for the high-tech Cold War. In 
that year John von Neumann died, and Sputnik was launched into 
orbit giving rise to the persistent myth of a “Missile Gap” 
favoring the Soviets. President Eisenhower soon discovered this 
“gap” to be untrue, but nevertheless he created ARPA and NASA, 
both agencies relying heavily on computing power. In the 
following year the National Defense and Education Act was 
passed, encouraging many of America’s youth to pursue jobs in 




1957 was not all doom and gloom for the United States. In 
that year the largest supercomputing project to that point was 
completed. Manual efforts to track, warn, and then direct forces 
to areas under attack from the Soviets at supersonic speeds was 
no longer possible. Project Whirlwind was a limited early 
warning system to counter such attacks. To guide such a system a 
supercomputer had to be created that would vastly reduce human 
interaction and be nearly 100% reliable. The project culminated 
in the SAGE defense system, powered by two gigantic IBM 
supercomputers at a total cost of 8 billion dollars. This was 
hardly a small investment, but, when one considers that SAGE was 
online from 1957 to 1983, the investment more than paid off. The 
Soviets would eventually have an equivalent to SAGE, but were 
always one or two steps behind western supercomputing efforts. 
As is with computing efforts in the present, any delay in 
producing cutting edge technology is crucial.  
From 1957 onward leading academics such as Henry Kissinger 
and Herman Kahn criticized Eisenhower’s policy of Massive 
Retaliation and strove to create a doctrine that was an 
alternative to nuclear Armageddon. This gave rise to the notion 
of limited nuclear war, which in retrospect was a ridiculous 
notion, but at the time seemed feasible. RAND analysts picked up 
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on this and added these ideas to von Neumann’s construct.  These 
ideas bled over into the following administration. 
JFK had won the 1960 election based on the “Missile Gap.” 
His Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara soon realized there was 
no such gap. Nevertheless, in the changing Cold War that prized 
both counter-insurgency and high-tech competition the new 
president set a new strategy, designed to be more flexible than 
simple reliance on a massive nuclear attack. To this end 
“Flexible Response” was created at a 9% increase in the military 
budget. McNamara took a leadership role in the administration. 
He had a mathematical background as a statistician and gained 
the reputation as a human computer, a paragon of rationality. 
This fit in well with RAND’s notions and procedures. McNamara 
and the think tank worked in close connection. At the time, 
analysts such as Herman Kahn and Daniel Ellsberg had spent the 
bulk of their time with Game Theories that kept in tune with 
Flexible Response. They soon had their chance to test their 
theories of controlled nuclear conflict, in which mathematical 
schemes were applied to the trading of Soviet and American 
cities to try to limit the conflict. This equivalency scheme 
seemed logical but it was anything but rational. During the 
Cuban Missile Crisis the rationality, which held von Neumann’s 
strategy together broke down. President Kennedy did not believe 
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in the idea of controlled nuclear war and averted the crisis 
without such reckless schemes of equivalency. Ironically, 
Kennedy, went against his own strategy, Flexible Response, in 
favor of threatening Massive Retaliation if the Soviets did not 
back down. In the end it was von Neumann’s strategy that held 
up. Strangely, the fear generated by the idea that nuclear 
strikes were dangerously close to becoming a reality shook both 
nations back into rationality. Even after the crisis was over, 
the U.S. continued further investment in supercomputers, which 
remained highly regarded, and nuclear arsenals along with them.  
The crisis prompted the main nuclear powers Great Britain, 
the United States, and the U.S.S.R. to sign the Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty. But the treaty was quickly put into question with the 
creation of Seymour Cray’s supercomputer the CDC 6600. The CDC 
6600 was the fastest supercomputer in the world at that point. 
It was able to do thermonuclear modeling on a whim. Nothing the 
Soviets or anyone else had could match it. This simply meant 
that the United States did not in fact have to limit its nuclear 
testing. The treaty was null and void on its face because the 
U.S. did not enter into the treaty in good faith, but no one 
knew that at the time. This was because the other signatories to 
the treaty were unaware of the 6600’s advanced capability.  
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Thanks to the Cold War’s reliance on nuclear weapons, the 
supercomputers assumed a pivotal importance. Mathematical 
analysis ultimately sustained grand strategy. The major players 
in the arms race had no choice but to rely on their respective 
supercomputing programs in order to not only to affect greater 
policies and strategies; the supercomputers kept the Cold War 
cold and, at least in its major area of confrontation, rational. 
If it had not been for the supercomputers and the ultimate 
destructive power of the nuclear weapon, the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. might have engaged in a major “hot” war in various 
places around the globe, creating conditions much like that of 
the Second World War and a similar amount of deaths. 
Rational calculation may at times favored irrational 
conduct, as it almost happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis; 
but overall, supercomputing, the cold machine, assisted not only 
U.S. victory, but also the best instincts and sentiments of the 
Cold War leaders.  








 Seventeen years into the Cold War supercomputing efforts 
had reached their zenith. After President Kennedy was 
assassinated and Lyndon Baines Johnson succeeded him, McNamara 
continued on as Secretary of Defense with an unwavering faith in 
mathematical analysis, which he put into even broader use. In 
1964, however, things began to change for both the United States 
and the Soviet Union.  
By that year the Soviet Union had a new Premiere, Leonid 
Brezhnev. Brezhnev did not give the same support to the 
supercomputing projects as his predecessors had. This, most 
likely, was due to the fact that the U.S.S.R. already faced 
financial troubles (In 1964 Russia’s gold reserves amounted to 
only an estimated $2 to 3 Billion while the West had roughly $43 
Billion).
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 Instead of creating new unique supercomputers which 
cost the Soviet state untold amounts of monies, Moscow decided 
to steal the plans for the IBM 360 series of computers and copy 
them en masse. According to the accounts of every major Soviet 
computer scientist this was an unacceptable solution leading to 
stagnation, in keeping with the “era of stagnation” as 
Brezhnev’s premiership is frequently referred to. Another 
                       




problem facing the Soviets was a turn inward to solve their 
economic woes. The supercomputing projects branched out to 
create vast mathematical plans to govern the nation in a 
scientific manner. These plans were created by GOSPLAN and they 
were rigid to the point of being detrimental to the nation. 
GOSPLAN kept “optimum schedules” adhering to an ultimate 
rationality to the point where everything was counted down to 
the last toothbrush. The schedules themselves did not damage the 
computing projects in the Soviet Union. Rather it was the 
converse; the GOSPLAN schedules created by computer analysis 
ruined the nation’s economy such as it was. Micro-managing only 
made domestic conditions worse for the U.S.S.R.  Soviet 
economists, with their computer generated schemes began to hold 
less sway politically to the point of being ignored. The 
benefits of computer analysis failed in creating a better, more 
stable economy and the military build-up continued thereby 
draining the Soviet state even further. The effects on the 
computer scientists were that they became disgruntled with 
having to alter their computer manufacturing to suit foreign 
i.e. IBM machines. Government investment in supercomputers 
dwindled as there were less and less funds to devote to the 
industry and many talented scientists left the field. 
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For the United States, its foray into Vietnam also had 
detrimental effects on supercomputing. Secretary McNamara kept 
to mathematical schemes developed by RAND to have data on body-
count. This hurt the war effort because officers in the field 
had to fill out intricate flow charts in order to get data which 
was easily manipulated, in turn skewing the data giving an 
incorrect assessment of the direction of the war. Furthermore, 
other automated schemes such as Project Igloo White creating a 
line of sensors along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, called McNamara’s 
Line, to get a count of enemy movements was a failure. The 
sensors were easily located and then deactivated by enemy 
soldiers urinating on them.
389
 In the end this was a complex 
mathematical failure. Rationality does not apply to irrational 
circumstances. And there were many of them in the Cold War 
before, during, and after Vietnam.  
Furthermore, there were other major failures. One of the 
most costly fiascos of all time began in 1964. The ILLIAC series 
of computers had been developed at the University of Illinois 
Urbana campus since early in the Cold War. The first two 
computers performed admirably, but the third ILLIAC was 
destroyed in a fire and that investment obviously was lost. Even 
worse, the ILLIAC IV was an experiment in massive parallel 
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processing. The idea was that many processors could work in 
conjunction on various problems increasing speed and the overall 
ability of the computer to solve problems that up to that point 
had been out of reach. Unfortunately, the computer had various 
complex design problems and ran into cost overruns that would 
put most defense overruns to shame.
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 The computer didn’t go 
into operation until 1975 and so it arrived eleven years too 
late and in the end it could not solve the problems it was 
designed for, much less the problems that had become more 
complex since 1964.
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 The computer became a joke among computing 
circles; even Seymour Cray quipped; “Would you rather have a 
cart pulled by two strong oxen or 1,000 chickens.”
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As far as mathematical strategies go, von Neumann’s 
theories held as to the nuclear aspect of the Cold War, but in 
other areas mathematical strategy did not apply. As the war in 
Vietnam turned sour by 1966 the think tanks that had created 
those schemes and sold them to a receptive Secretary of Defense 
were subjected to the same protests that other governmental 
institutions were. In 1967, when McNamara was dismissed from the 
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Defense Department, the world of computer science was changing 
as well. The make-up of the discipline was changing from the 
pocket protector sporting engineers to computer scientists who 
were deeply involved in the counter-culture of the late 1960s.
393
 
The new breed was distrustful of the government and now 
considered the receiving of governmental monies immoral.
394
 
Defense projects began to suffer.  
In Nixon and Kissinger’s era of Détente there were further 
computer woes. Nixon cut the defense budget. He signed into law 
the Military Procurement Act of 1970 and so ancillary areas of 
supercomputing, such as the pursuit of Artificial Intelligence, 
which had been a serious focus even before the beginning of the 
Cold War, faced vast financial cuts leading to what was termed 
the “AI Winter.”
395
 Furthermore, Kissinger, who focused on a 
diplomatic stance to foreign affairs rather than a military one, 
alienated many in the military. Kissinger, although he 
computerized the White House in order to coordinate his 
diplomatic efforts, was no fan of technology, in keeping with 
that very European mistrust of technology.
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 Compounding this 
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problem, the nation’s financial affairs had gone awry. There was 
an energy crisis to be confronted; moreover, the costs of the 
Vietnam War which had to be resolved. This crisis continued into 
the Ford Administration, and as inflation worsened, 
supercomputing projects were cut even further. For example, 
Seymour Cray’s Cray I was purchased by few governmental 
institutions despite its vastly superior abilities.  
During the Carter Administration there was a slight 
upswing, especially in espionage efforts. The Central 
Intelligence Agency had been defanged by the Church Committee in 
1975. Nevertheless there was a necessity for intelligence 
gathering. President Carter’s DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner 
decided to bolster the CIA’s abilities to collect intelligence 
by putting a heavy emphasis on the utilization of spy 
satellites.
397
 The erratic foreign policy in the administration, 
however, initially focused on diplomatic efforts to reduce 
nuclear arsenals, until after the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, when Carter increased the military budget. 
Nevertheless, the original focus of Carter’s foreign policy, 
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which was a continuation of Détente combined with economic 
weakness in the nation kept supercomputing projects in check.  
It was not until the Reagan Administration that there was a 
serious return to military projects. Neo-Rollback required a new 
arms race and, of course, new supercomputers were necessary to 
design new weapons, especially Reagan’s beloved Strategic 
Defense Initiative. By this time, however, the computing world 
had changed. The emphasis was no longer really focused on “Big 
Iron.” Smaller, less expensive but more powerful computers were 
displacing the large mainframes. There were still Cray computers 
and IBMs, and they were still necessary, but there were also 
Apples and various PCs that were created by engineers like 
Douglas Engelbart who were directly influenced by counterculture 
values. 
The big push of the arms race during the Reagan and Bush 
administrations played a significant role in breaking the Soviet 
Union along with cultural and economic measures. The Soviet 
Union dissolved late in 1991 and Communist rule in came to an 
end. At the end of the Cold War, however, once again there were 
questions about the future of supercomputing as far as the U.S. 
government was concerned. The government had subsidized 
supercomputing since the beginning of the Cold War. It was 
necessary in order to confront the Soviets. With the Soviet 
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Union gone and no major enemy on the horizon there was no 
justification for government investment in large supercomputing 
projects.  
During the Clinton administration supercomputing returned 
to the point it occupied at the end of the Second World War. The 
necessity of huge, expensive machines was once again in 
question. There were some advances in artificial intelligence, 
but that sector never seemed to attain its ultimate goals. One 
of the shortcomings of the discipline was that there were 
various definitions of intelligence, and with no singular goal, 
the ultimate needs of the discipline were not fulfilled. There 
were also some flirtations with new technologies in computing, 
such as the use of gallium arsenide to speed up computational 
power. This is what Seymour Cray had been working on until 1996, 
when he died in an auto accident. Overall it seemed like the big 
defense projects were over. For example, Cray’s stock had dipped 
to only four dollars per share by September 10, 2001. 
On September 11, 2001 the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon were both subjected to terrorist attacks. On the very 
same day that the War on Terror began Cray stock quadrupled to 
sixteen dollars per share. Supercomputing returned from the 
dead. New weapons had to be designed and utilized for the new 
war effort and so the necessity for the big machines returned. 
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Much has happened in the past decade and supercomputing has 
benefitted directly from the wars that we are still fighting in 
Iraq, Afghanistan and other areas of the globe. Interestingly in 
a time when the People’s Republic of China seems to be the new 
economic colossus in the world, the supercomputer race finally 
got a public nod. In January of 2011 in his State of the Union 
Address President Barack Obama turned his attention to China’s 
lead over the United States in the field of Supercomputing.
398
 
China had just taken the top spot in the Top 500 Supercomputer 
list with its Tianhe 1A Supercomputer, displacing the United 
States’ computer. The president felt this important enough not 
only to point it out in his speech, but also to mention it in a 
press conference that came at a later date. Furthermore, in a 
show of support for the industry, President Obama earmarked $126 
million dollars for high-speed computing efforts. This was up 




This is not a trivial amount as demonstrated by National 
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and 
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Counterterrorism Richard A. Clarke’s in his book Cyber-War: The 
Next Threat to National Security and What to do about it. The 
author states that the Chinese do not present a direct military 
threat to the United States. They do not even possess one 
Carrier Strike Group. In fact, the first line of offense for the 
PRC is cyber-strikes. These strikes do have the ability to wreak 
havoc not only on domestic systems such as in banks and utility 
systems, but also in any wired military forces such as our 
fleets. The problem, according to him, is that there are no 
manual backup systems and so after one effective cyber-strike 
our fleets would be nothing more than floating hulks in the 
water before we could launch any form of attack.
400
 This is a 
sobering thought and definitely shows the continued military 
need for supercomputers. As during the Cold War, we cannot 
afford to fall behind in this crucial arms race. We can either 
invest or suffer the same fate as the Soviets did at the end of 
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